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Abstract
The long freedom struggle in India culminated in a victory when in 1947 the country
gained its independence from one hundred fifty years of British rule. The irony of this largely
non-violent struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi was that it ended in the most violent and bloodiest
partition of the country which claimed the lives of two million civilians and uprooted countless
millions in what became the largest forced migration of people the world has ever witnessed. The
vivisection of the country into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan did not bring
the hoped for peace between the two neighbors. The partition of the sub-continent created many
new problems and solved none. In the last sixty years or so since partition, the two countries
have gone to war with each other three times. When not in war, they have engaged in a nonending cycle of accusations and counter-accusations at the slightest provocation and opportunity.
The two most fundamental questions about the partition - was it inevitable and who is
responsible for it - have not been fully answered despite countless theories and arguments that
have been put forward by historians. This thesis attempts to answer those questions by
objectively examining and analyzing the major events of the decade preceding the partition,
unquestionably the most critical period to understanding the causes of partition.
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Introduction
The partition of India was the defining moment in the country’s history and perhaps its
saddest chapter too. The events that accompanied partition were cataclysmically violent even for
a land which had witnessed many tragic events in the past. The partition of India uprooted entire
communities and left unspeakable violence in its trail. Communal massacres triggered a chaotic
two-way flight, of Muslims from India to Pakistan, and of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to
India. An estimated 15 million people were displaced in what became the largest forced
migration the world had ever known to that point. 1 The death-toll that accompanied the
horrendous events surrounding the partition has been estimated as high as 2 million.2 The whys
of partition have intrigued and fascinated historians since it took place and countless books,
essays and memoirs have been written about it. The partition debate has raged on since
independence and would continue to be a heated topic not only among academic historians but
also among the general public, for centuries to come. Historians have been wrestling with some
basic questions about the partition: Why did the partition occur? Could it have been avoided?
Who was to blame for it? In answering these questions, they have propounded many theories. I
have outlined below a select few from the available historiography on the topic.
Sucheta Mahajan, a nationalist historian from India, argues in his book Independence and
Partition (2000) that Britain’s retreat from India was a triumph of Congress nationalism over
British imperialism. She attributes the cause of India’s partition to two factors – Jinnah’s
unwavering insistence on Pakistan and the British appeasement of communal elements in India.
In her opinion the partition could have been avoided had the British been firm and suppressed the
1

Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The partition of India (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 2.
2
Ibid, 2.
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communal tendencies of the Muslim League forcefully. In her analysis, Mahajan completely
absolves the Congress of any wrongdoing.3
Similarly, B. R. Nanda, a noted historian from India, in his book The Making of a Nation
(1998) puts the blame for India’s partition squarely on Jinnah’s shoulder. He writes that Jinnah
used the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’ and raised the specter of ‘Congress tyranny’ and ‘Hindu raj’
to arouse Muslim antipathy against the Hindus and widen the communal gulf between them.
According to Nanda, Jinnah was able to create a climate in which the idea of partition thrived
and ultimately became a reality. He argues that Jinnah was rigidly uncompromising and had little
flexibility. Per Nanda, Jinnah did not meet the Congress halfway or even quarter way. Indeed, he
did not even budge an inch from his demand of Pakistan. As we shall see in the course of this
thesis that Nanda’s assertion is not entirely true. Jinnah did display the ability to compromise
during the Cabinet Mission negotiations and it was the Congress which fell short of that very
essential quality often needed to reach an agreement. Like Mahajan, Nanda sees India’s
independence as a result of unrelenting nationalism of the Congress. He writes: ‘It was the aim
of Indian National Congress to wear down the British reluctance to part with power…The brunt
of the struggle for the liberation of India was borne by the Congress. The Muslim League had no
part in it.’4
Anita Inder Singh in The Origins of the Partition of India (1990) argues that the social
division between the Hindus and Muslims in religious terms was not the root cause of partition.
She points to the fact that the two communities had lived side by side harmoniously for

3

Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India (New
Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Limited, 2000), 21.
4
B. R. Nanda, The Making of a Nation: India’s Road to Independence (New Delhi:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), 303.
2

centuries. According to her, it was the successful politicization of the religious differences by
Jinnah that made partition inevitable. She writes that the importance of Jinnah’s address at
Lahore, where the Pakistan Resolution was adopted, lay in his assertion that the Indian problem
was not inter-communal but an international one as between two nations. Singh argues that the
British deliberately propped up the Muslim League during the war years as a counterpoise to the
Congress demand for independence. She writes ‘The prestige thus acquired from the British
helped make Jinnah’s League the only plausible representative of Muslims at all India level.’5
She points out that once the war was over the British were no longer interested in building up the
League. They wanted to transfer power to a united India. She goes on to argue that Jinnah’s call
for Direct Action in 1946 and the resulting worsening of the communal situation made it
impossible for the British to hold India much longer. Per Singh, Mountbatten’s decision to quit
India in record time was a direct consequence of the worsening communal situation. She is
mostly correct in her analysis, except in one respect: she does not hold the Congress responsible
for the partition of India, just like Nanda and Mahajan and other pro-Congress historians.
Not all historians, of course, hold a pro-Congress view. In The Sole Spokesman (1994),
Ayesha Jalal propounds the theory that Jinnah did not want the partition of India. It was the
Congress led by Nehru and Patel who pushed for it. She writes ‘Jinnah’s ultimate goal was to get
a seat at the center…6 Jinnah’s Pakistan did not entail the partition of India, rather it meant a
union between Pakistan and India which would stand tall against the common enemy. This was
no clarion call for pan-Islam; this was not pitting the Muslim India against Hindustan; rather it
was a secular vision of a polity where there was real political choice and safeguards, the India of
5
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Jinnah’s dream, a vision unfulfilled but noble nonetheless.’7 Jalal’s argument is partially correct.
She is right when she says Congress pushed for the partition. However, her statement that Jinnah
really didn’t want Pakistan is stretching one’s imagination a bit too far in the name of arguing
something new. There is overwhelming historical evidence that Jinnah demanded a separate
homeland for Muslims of India from 1940 onwards and to brush aside that is to look askance at
the proof that is plain as daylight. In support of her thesis, Jalal argues that Jinnah did not want to
come out openly in favor of the union scheme in the Cabinet Mission Plan fearing that it would
expose his Pakistan demand as phony in the eyes of his supporters. Jalal adds that Jinnah did not
want to seem too eager for the union scheme because he feared that he would then loose his
bargaining lever with the Congress.
Others place blame for partition on earlier historical events. Uma Kaura in Muslims and
Indian Nationalism (1977) traces Muslim alienation from the Congress Party to 1928 when the
Nehru Report rejected several of their demands for safeguarding Muslim interests. She writes
that in 1928 a majority of top Muslim leaders were prepared to give up having a separate
electorate provided their other demands were met.8 These demands included separation of Sind
from Bombay province, one-third Muslim representation in the Central legislature, constitutional
reforms in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and statutory Muslim majority in
Punjab and Bengal. She points out that none of these demands were a threat to the unity of India.
Yet, Motilal Nehru, in order to placate the Hindu Mahasabha, rejected the demands of the
Muslims. Kaura asserts that the failure of the Nehru Report to satisfy Muslim demands
embittered the Muslim leaders. According to Kaura, the Muslim dissatisfaction that started in

7
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1928 intensified in 1937 when the Congress refused to establish coalition ministries in the
provinces. She adds that the pro-Hindu policies of the Congress Ministries further alienated the
Muslims of India. Kaura’s main thesis is that the events between 1928 and 1940 were primarily
responsible for Muslim alienation from the nationalist cause and the emergence of the demand
for Pakistan.
According to Kaura, the Congress leaders did very little to address the Muslim
grievances. Nehru maintained a complacent attitude towards the whole situation. For him, the
problems of unemployment and poverty, and the international situation were more real and
urgent than the communal problem. Like Gandhi, he believed that once the British left India, the
communal situation would resolve by itself. Kaura adds that Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of
India, played the game of divide and rule by taking advantage of the Muslim dissatisfaction and
encouraging them to move further on the road of separatist politics.9 She writes that Linlithgow
was jubilant at the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940 at Lahore. Obviously he thought
that he could use it as a handy tool against the Congress. Kaura’s analysis is right on the mark.
Her main argument that it was the Congress’s attitude towards the Muslims that was primarily
responsible for their alienation from nationalist cause and which drove them towards separatist
tendencies is correct. However, her analysis is incomplete as it stops at the year 1940 and does
not dive into the crucial years leading up to the partition in 1947.
In The Making of Pakistan (1967), K. K. Aziz, an eminent historian from Pakistan, traces
the beginning of Hindu-Muslim rift back even further to the years 1906 through 1911. In 1905,
Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, partitioned the province of Bengal into two parts, a Muslim-

9

Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India’s Partition,
1928-40, 165.
5

majority East Bengal and a Hindu-majority West Bengal. According to Aziz, the Bengali Hindus
feared that as a result of partition they would lose their monopoly over trade, business, and
governmental positions. So, they launched anti-British agitation. Azad comments that the
Muslims interpreted the Hindu agitation against the Bengal partition as an attempt by the Hindus
to maintain their superiority over the Muslims.10 Per Aziz, the orthodox religious views and
belligerent political actions by some Congress leaders such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak alienated the
Muslims from the mainstream of Indian nationalism.11 The Morley-Minto Act of 1909 granted
the Muslims separate electorate which angered the Hindus. The repeal of the partition of Bengal
in 1911 was received by the Muslims with shock and bitterness.12
Aziz points out that the years 1911 to 1922 saw cooperation between the Congress and
the Muslim League against the common enemy, the British. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was a
result of this entente in which the Congress accepted in principle the separate electorate
provision for the Muslims. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 culminated in the India Act
of 1919. The 1919 Act erected a system of Dyarchy i.e. a division of power between the
popularly elected representatives and the British Governors in the provinces. Some subjects
became the responsibility of elected representatives and the rest remained with the Governors.
Aziz mentions that the Congress support for the Khilafat movement brought the two
communities closer. The Khilafat movement was a pan-Islamic campaign launched by the
Muslims of India after World War I to protest the dismemberment of Ottoman Empire and the
harsh treatment meted out to Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey. The Hindus, led by Gandhi, made
common cause with the Muslims in the Khilafat movement and participated in the extremist
10
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agitations of 1919-1921. But this unity did not last long. The 1920s witnessed the worsening in
the Hindu-Muslim relations manifested through communal clashes in places like Malabar.
The Simon Commission came to India in 1927 to look into advancing constitutional
progress in the country. The Indians protested the all-white composition of the Commission and
boycotted it. Like Kaura, Aziz argues that the Nehru Report of 1928 made the Hindu-Muslim rift
final and irrevocable. 13 The Report recommended the immediate abolishment of a separate
electorate for the Muslims. Aziz asserts that from 1928 onwards the Congress became all but in
name a Hindu body.14 Aziz goes into great details in outlining the Congress atrocities perpetrated
in the provinces against the Muslims during the period from 1937 to 1939. According to Aziz,
the Congress’s behavior during these two and half years further alienated the Muslims.15 He
writes: ‘The Congress might have treated the Muslims on an equal footing, tolerated their
existence, acknowledged their separate status and honestly tried to meet their wishes. This is how
Britain and, to some extent, the United States have dealt with their minorities. But the Congress
refused to adopt this method.’16
Aziz’s line of argument follows from what Jinnah had said in his Presidential address to
the Muslim League at Lahore in 1940 i.e. India was composed of two nations and Hindus and
Muslims were fundamentally different and hence could not be forced to live together. Aziz
writes that the Muslims are closer to the Christians than the idol-worshipping Hindus. He adds
‘With the Hindus one was always on one’s guard against breaking some caste restriction or
polluting a Brahmin household.’ Aziz argues that the Muslims in India feared that once the
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British left, they would be subjected to discrimination and oppression in a Hindu raj, and that
was the main reason behind the demand for Pakistan. Aziz argues that it is a myth to suggest that
the Hindus and the Muslims had lived in complete harmony and peace in India for a thousand
year. According to Aziz, that assertion overlooks the fact that the Muslims came as conquerors to
India and as long as they occupied that position the Hindus dared not show their enmity.17 Aziz
rejects the notion that the Hindu-Muslim rift was a product of British divide and rule policy. He
says that the Muslims were not put in India by the British and hence the British could hardly be
blamed for the minority problem. Aziz adds that a separate electorate was not imposed upon the
Muslims against their wishes. He writes ‘The Muslims rarely made a nuisance of themselves. On
the whole they were ‘good’ subjects – cooperative, loyal, law-abiding. On the contrary, the
Congress thrived on non-cooperation and agitation. If, in these circumstances, the Government
tended to lean a little towards those whom it could trust, this could hardly be called a calculated
satanic scheme to divide the Indians.’18 Aziz’s analysis is very partisan and anti-Hindu and antiCongress in tone.
Like Aziz, most of the Pakistani historians subscribe to the two-nation theory and argue
that partition was inevitable as Hindus and Muslims would have never lived together in peace
after the British departed. For example, Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, a respected historian in
Pakistan, has argued that Islam was a distinctive social order that was fundamentally at odds with
Hindu society. The demand for a separate state was thus a natural expression of this reality.
Khalid bin Sayeed in Pakistan: The Formative Phase (1968) has advanced the two-nation theory

17
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and stated the inevitability of Pakistan as being a natural consequence of irreconcilable
differences between Islam and Hinduism.19
In contrast to these Pakistani historians, R. J. Moore in Crisis of Indian Unity (1974)
argues that the British policy of divide and rule was one of the primary causes of India’s
partition. According to him, the 1935 India Act widened the gulf between the Congress and the
Muslim League. Moore writes that by giving constitutional guarantees to the Muslims as a
separate community and the Princes as a separate estate, the 1935 Act hindered the emergence of
unity based on a sense of common nationality.20 He adds that the 1935 Act was an inducement to
the Muslims to organize on communal lines for political ends. Moore points out that the 1940
August Offer, drafted by Churchill, gave a pledge to the Muslims that they would have a veto on
any future political settlement that they disliked. This alienated the Congress, says Moore. Moore
asserts that it was the British policy that enhanced the stature of Jinnah as the sole spokesman for
the Muslims of India. Moore suggests that the British right, especially Churchill, tolerated Jinnah
but viewed Gandhi as a wicked and malignant old man. Moore’s thesis tells the story only
partially as it does not take into account the Congress’s role in the partition of the country i.e. the
desire to remove Jinnah out of the way by giving him a moth-eaten Pakistan so that the Congress
could proceed with the task of nation building. According to some Congress leaders, the postIndependence economic and social developments required a strong center, which would only be
possible with Jinnah out of the way.
Reginald Coupland’s take on the partition issue is completely opposite to R. J. Moore’s.
Coupland argues that the British had no role in promoting antagonism between the Hindus and
19
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the Muslims. In fact, he suggests that the continuance of British rule in India had a neutralizing
effect on the two warring communities.21 The moment the British announced their intention to
leave India, the antagonism between them intensified. 22 According to Coupland, it was the
Congress’s impatience for independence that complicated the issue. The Congress was unwilling
to wait until the war was over and did not trust the British promise of independence after the war.
Coupland writes that the British could not have just handed over power to the Congress Party
abnegating their responsibility towards the Princes and the minorities.
H. V. Hodson in The Great Divide (1971) argues that Britain did not promote the divide
and rule tactic as suggested by many. According to Hodson, Britain’s primary goal was to
maintain peace and order in India and encouraging Hindu-Muslim rivalry was contrary to that
goal. He writes that it is not possible to divide and rule unless the ruled are ready to be divided.
Hodson says that the British might have used the Hindu-Muslim rivalry to their advantage, but
they certainly did not invent it. He points out that the Hindu mode of life is quite different from
the Muslim way of life. He adds that despite living together in India for centuries, the two
communities had not integrated in any real sense. Each followed their own culture, custom and
rituals with intermarriage a very rare phenomenon. Hodson’s arguments are very similar to those
by Pakistani historians as mentioned above.
Hodson points out that Jinnah was a nationalist who started his career as the private
secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji. He was also a devoted disciple of another great Hindu nationalist,
Gopal Krishna Gokhale. In 1916, Jinnah engineered the Lucknow Pact between the Congress
and the Muslim League. Hodson suggests that by 1939, thanks to Gandhi’s iron grip on the Party

21
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and the Party’s anti-Muslim policies, Jinnah had been thoroughly marginalized and alienated.
Jinnah was not a person who would accept defeat easily and run away from the battle field. He
took up the challenge and set out to build Muslim solidarity behind the demand for a separate
homeland and rest became history.
Hodson gives high marks to Linlithgow for holding the country together during the time
of war and getting the provincial self-government working. He rejects the notion that Linlithgow
was responsible for leaving the country divided politically more than when he started his
Viceroyalty. Hodson writes ‘Linlithgow had the power neither to create nor prevent the
underlying causes that brought the failures for a political settlement. India was divided not by the
want of self-government but by the prospect of it.’ 23 Hodson also writes that it was not
Mountbatten but the Indians who were ultimately responsible for the partition of the country.
They were the ones who failed to reach an agreement among themselves. Hodson argues that
Mountbatten strove for unity along the same lines as the Cabinet Mission but the Indian leaders
were unable to rise to the occasion and forget their petty bickering in the interests of a united
India. He comments that ‘Pride, jealousy, and suspicion crowded out statesmanship and calm
consideration.’24
Stanley Wolpert’s analysis on the partition issue is quite different from Hodson’s. In
Shameful Flight (2006), Wolpert argues that the British share of blame for partition of India is
significant. Churchill and Linlithgow distrusted the Indians and thought very lowly of them.
Churchill hated Gandhi very much and thought of him as a perfidious man and a perpetual
trouble-maker. In fact, he favored Jinnah over Gandhi and supported the idea of Pakistan, even
23
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‘Princestan’.25 Wolpert points out that Churchill forbade any correspondence between Gandhi
and Jinnah when the former was incarcerated for calling the Quit-India Movement. Wolpert
writes ‘His arrogance in doggedly refusing India’s two most popular leaders to meet served only
to widen the gulf between the respective parties and exacerbated an already impossible
situation.’26 Churchill noted in his diary that he hated India and everything to do with it.
Wolpert argues that Mountbatten did not make an honest effort to avoid the partition of
India. According to him, Mountbatten was in a hurry to get the partition done as quickly as
possible so that he could go back to his naval career in England. Per Wolpert, Mountbatten
ignored Gandhi’s proposal to invite Jinnah to form a government. He asserts that it was the only
plan that could have avoided partition. Mountbatten disliked Jinnah and went so far as to
describe him as a psychopath. In contrast, he liked Nehru very much and thought him as the best
person to lead India. Wolpert argues that by 1947, India had become a burden on the British
Empire. Hence the British Cabinet was eager to extricate Britain from the Indian albatross. The
growing burden of Britain’s sterling debt had swiftly eroded British support for retaining their
erstwhile ‘Jewel on the Crown’. Wolpert blames Mountbatten for rushing through the daunting
task of partitioning a country of 400 million in a matter of few months and without adequate
planning. The consequence of the hasty partition was death, destruction and mayhem of
indescribable scale and magnitude.
The above discussion demonstrates that there are three very contrasting interpretations of
the partition. Nationalist historians from India conclude that without Jinnah there would have
been no Pakistan. They contend that it is the British who encouraged Muslim separatism in India
25
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and that the partition of India is a direct result of Britain’s divide and rule policy. In contrast,
nationalist historians from Pakistan argue that the partition was inevitable given the unbridgeable
gulf that existed between the Hindus and Muslims in terms of religion, custom, and way of life.
They reject the notion that Muslim separatism was a product of British machinations. Some
British historians have argued that the blame for the partition of India should not be attributed to
British policies. They say that Britain wanted to transfer power to a united India but could not do
so because the Congress and the League were too distrustful and suspicious of each other. The
parties were unable to reach any agreement that would have facilitated the transfer of power to a
united country. There is also a fourth interpretation advanced by Ayesha Jalal in recent times.
She suggests that Jinnah’s adoption of Pakistan cause was simply a bargaining tactic to get more
power for the Muslim minority. He really did not want a separate state, she concludes. Her
argument has not gone well among the scholars who find the notion that Jinnah said things on
numerous occasions that he really did not mean, as downright perverse.
None of the above approaches taken on its own explain the partition puzzle in a
satisfactory way. Each looks at the issue through narrow lenses and takes a very parochial view
of the subject. They are very partisan in tone, colored by the biases of their respective authors.
The causes of the partition have been explained by these historians in diametrically opposite
ways. Sometimes political considerations and fear of backlash have prevented some from
venturing outside what is acceptable in their respective communities. Taken individually, these
approaches inhibit a broader appreciation of the complexities of the partition issue. This thesis
takes a new approach, looking at the issue holistically in an objective and impartial way based on
the available evidence. In doing so, it has tried to assimilate the various interpretations to craft a
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plausible and more complete account that tries to answer two basic questions – Why did the
partition happen?, and, Who is to blame for it?
As the research for this thesis progressed, it soon became apparent that the decade
preceding the partition was the most important period and an objective analysis of the major
events of that period is critical to understanding the dynamics that led to partition. Some of the
major events in those ten critical years are the Congress rule in the provinces from 1937 to 1939,
the Pakistan Resolution and the August Offer in 1940, the Cripps Mission and the Quit India
movement in 1942, the Simla Conference in 1945, the Cabinet Mission and the Interim
Government in 1946, and the Mountbatten Viceroyalty and the partition in 1947. Each of the
following chapters goes into great detail describing one of the above events. Each chapter
concludes with an analysis that explains how the particular event contributed towards partition of
India and who were the bad actors in it. For example, the chapter on the Cabinet Mission goes
into rather painstaking detail including all the negotiations that took place between the three
sides involved in the process, the various proposals and schemes that resulted from those
discussions, and how it all failed and who was responsible for the failure. The main argument of
this thesis is that the three major players - the British, the Congress, and the League - are equally
culpable for partition of the country. This thesis asserts that the complex issue of partition can’t
be explained away by a single theory such as the British policy of divide and rule, or Jinnah’s
intransigence, or the power-hungry Congress party rushing into partition. Rather, it is a
combination of all these factors and much more.

14

Chapter One
Congress Rule in the Provinces, Lahore Resolution, and August Offer
Elections to the provincial legislatures under the 1935 India Act were held early in 1937.
The Congress did extremely well in the elections. It won 711 out of 1585 Provincial Assembly
seats with absolute majorities in five (Madras, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Province, and
Orissa) out of eleven provinces.27 In Bombay, it won nearly half of the seats.28 In Assam and
North-West Frontier Province, it was the single largest party. Only in Bengal, Punjab, and Sind,
was it in the minority. In Bengal, the Krishak Praja Party, led by Fazlul Huq, won a large number
of seats and in Punjab, the Unionist Party, led by Sikander Hyat Khan, captured the majority of
seats. Nehru began his election tour in May 1936, and during the eight months preceding the
elections, he travelled the length and breadth of the country, covering some 50,000 miles and
addressing some ten million people.29 His labors were richly rewarded as the election results
showed. In contrast, the performance of the Muslim League in the elections was far from
impressive. It won only 108 seats out of the total of 485 Muslim seats it contested.30
The Congress demanded that the British give assurance that the Provincial Governors
would not use their special powers and let the ministries govern independently before it could
agree to form governments in the provinces. 31 Gandhi said ‘there should be gentlemanly
understanding between the Governors and their Congress Ministers that they would not exercise
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their special powers of interference as long as the Ministers acted within the Constitution.’32 On
3 April, 1937, the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, responded to the Congress demand: ‘I must
repeat that the reserve powers are an integral part of the Constitution that they cannot be
abrogated except by Parliament itself, and that the Governors therefore cannot treat the Congress
as a privileged body which is exempt from the provisions of the Constitution by which the other
parties are bound.’33 The Congress Working Committee met on 28 April, 1937, and passed a
resolution which said that it didn’t want an amendment to the Constitution as being
misunderstood by Lord Zetland; it just wanted an assurance that the Governors’ veto powers
would not be used unless under the most extreme conditions.34 Finally, on 22 June, the Viceroy,
Lord Linlithgow, gave the assurance which the Congress was seeking: ‘There is no foundation
for any suggestion that a Governor is free, or is entitled, or would have the power, to interfere
with the day-to-day administration of a province outside the limited range of the responsibilities
confined to him.’35 The Viceroy added that if under any circumstance a Governor was compelled
to use his special power, then he would have to first clearly explain his decision to the Ministers
why he thought it was the right one. In view of the Viceroy’s assurance, the Congress Working
Committee gave its permission on 8 July to the Provincial leaders to accept office
The expectation was that in the United Provinces a Congress-League coalition would be
formed. Azad held out the hope that the two prominent League leaders of that province,
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Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail khan, would be appointed as Ministers.36 But Azad’s efforts
were frustrated by Nehru, who was President of the Congress at that time.37 Nehru said that only
one of the two leaders could be allowed in the Congress Ministry. The Congress stipulated the
following condition as the price for a coalition with the Muslim League:
The Muslim League group in the United Provinces would cease to function as a
separate group. The existing members of the Muslim League Party in the United
Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share
with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of
the Congress Party. They will be subject to control and discipline of the Congress
Party…38
This was tantamount to asking the League to sign its own death warrant as a separate
political party. As expected, the League rejected the conditions for a coalition government. Azad
writes that on many other occasions, the Congress failed in the test of its claim to be a national
organization representing all ethnic groups in India. For example, in Bombay Provincial
Assembly, Mr. Nariman, a Parsee, was the acknowledged leader. But he was bypassed, and in
his place a Hindu was appointed as the Chief Minister of the province.39 Sardar Patel felt that it
would be unfair to appoint a Parsee as the Chief Minister of a Hindu majority province.40 A
similar incident took place in Bihar. Dr. Syed Mahmud, a Muslim, was the top leader in Bihar
and when the Congress won the elections there, it was expected that he would become the Chief
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Minister. However, he was sidelined in favor of Krishna Sinha, a Hindu. Dr. Rajendra Prasad
played the same role in Bihar as Sardar Patel did in Bombay.41
The election results were a great disappointment to Jinnah and the Muslim League.
Jinnah had pinned all his hopes on a separate electorate to see his party win the elections in
Muslim-majority provinces and come to power there. Despite the safeguards of a separate
electorate, the Muslim League met with an electoral disaster of the first magnitude.42 In Sind, it
won only three seats, in Punjab only one seat, and in North-West Frontier Province none at all.43
The results of the 1937 elections came as a great shock to the Muslims. It showed that they were
weak, divided and disorganized.44 It showed that there were only two foci of power in India, the
British and the Congress.45 Jinnah deliberately set out to rectify the situation by building a third
force, the Muslim League.46 At the Lucknow session of the League in October 1937, he said:
‘No settlement with the majority is possible…An honorable settlement can only be achieved
between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid
ground for any settlement.’47 Following the Congress example, Jinnah reduced the membership
fee of the League to two annas. The members of the All-India Muslim League Council were
selected from local Leaguers instead of handpicked from the intelligentsia.48 Within 3 months of
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the Lucknow session, 170 new branches of the League were opened and it was claimed that
100,000 new members were recruited in the United Provinces alone.49
Jinnah, the ‘superb tactician’, launched an anti-Congress propaganda drive. Muslims
were told that they could not expect fair play and justice under a Congress raj. Pro-Hindu
measures of the Congress ministries played right into Jinnah’s anti-Congress propaganda. In his
Presidential address to the League at Calcutta on 17 April, 1938, Jinnah described the Congress
as a purely Hindu body masquerading under the name of nationalism.50 In support of his claim
he cited the use of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song in the legislatures by the Congress, the effort to
make Hindi a compulsory language, the hoisting of a tricolor flag on top of government
buildings, and the implementation of Vidya Mandir Scheme of education and so on.51 Jinnah
accused the Congress of sheer arrogance and for its brutal, oppressive, and inimical attitude
towards the Muslim community. In another Presidential address to the League at Karachi on 8
October, 1938, he said: ‘It is common knowledge that the average Congressman, whether he is a
member by conviction or convenience, arrogates to himself the role of a ruler of this country and
although he does not possess educational qualifications, training and culture and traditions of the
British bureaucrats, he behaves and acts towards the Mussalmans in a much worse manner than
the British did towards the Indians.’52
Gandhi’s scheme of ‘Basic education’ called the Wardha Scheme was introduced in the
Congress provinces in October 1937. The basic principle of the scheme was to associate book
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learning with some kind of productive and manual work. It embodied Gandhi’s favorite idea of
village uplift through constructive work. Hand-spinning was included as part of the curriculum.
The teaching of religion was completely ignored in the scheme. Muslim children were obliged to
honor the Congress flag, to sing ‘Bande Mataram’, to wear home-spun cloth (Khadi), and to
worship Gandhi’s portrait. Hindi was encouraged as a medium of instruction. All these measures
embodied in the Wardha Scheme were seen by the Muslims as attempts by the Congress to
destroy their culture by inculcating Hindu ideals in the minds of the Muslim children. A report
produced by the Muslim League detailed the anti-Muslim bias inherent in the Wardha Scheme.
The All-India Muslim League passed a resolution listing its objections to the Wardha Scheme:
‘(1) The Scheme is calculated to destroy Muslim culture gradually but surely and to secure the
domination of Hindu culture. (2) It imposes the Congress ideology and aims at inculcating the
doctrine of ahimsa. (3) Its objective is to infuse the political creed, policy and programme of one
party, namely, the Congress, into the minds of the children. (4) It has neglected the question of
providing facilities for religious education. (5) Under the guise of the name Hindustani the
scheme is meant to spread what is highly Sanskritised Hindi and to suppress Urdu which is really
the lingua franca of India at present. (6) The text books prescribed and provisionally sanctioned
by some Provincial Governments are highly objectionable from the Muslim point of view.’53
Throughout the 27 months of Congress rule in the provinces, the League kept up an
intense propaganda barrage, climaxing in the Pirpur Report, the Shareef Report on Bihar, and
Fazlul Huq’s Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule.54 The broad impression created in the
minds of the Muslims of the Congress rule was well summed up in the Pirpur Report published
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by a committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in
Congress provinces. 55 The charges included failure to prevent communal riots, encouraging
Hindi at the expense of Urdu, singing of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song, prevention of cow slaughter,
hoisting of the tricolor flag on top of office buildings, closing of Muslim burial grounds,
suppression of the Urdu Press, and discrimination against Muslim candidates for official
positions and many more. The Report accused the Congress Governments of not giving
protections to the Muslims from Hindu atrocities during the communal riots.
On 3 September, 1939, Viceroy Linlithgow declared India’s entry into the War without
consulting any Indian leaders. The Congress Working Committee passed a lengthy resolution on
15 September, 1939, expressing its sympathy with democracies and condemning German
aggression. However, the resolution declared that India could not associate herself in a war said
to be fought for democratic freedom so long as that freedom was denied to her.56 The resolution
added that the Congress was prepared to cooperate with the British to end Fascism and Nazism,
but it needed to know Britain’s war aims as regards to imperialism. The Muslim League passed a
resolution on 18 September, 1939, promising support to the British in the war efforts on
condition that no constitutional advance should be made without consulting the Muslim League,
the sole representative of Muslims of India.
The Viceroy issued a statement on 17 October, 1939, declaring that India would be
granted Dominion Status at the end of the war. He added that for the present, the Act of 1935
was the best the Indians could hope for. The Congress Working Committee met at Wardha on
22nd and 23rd October. The resulting resolution condemned the Viceroy’s statement as an
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unequivocal reiteration of the same old imperialistic policy. It resolved to not give any support to
Great Britain in her war efforts and called upon the Congress ministries in the provinces to
resign. 57 All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned between 27 October and 15
November, 1939. In early December, Jinnah called upon the Muslims all over India to celebrate
22 December as the ‘Day of Deliverance’. He said:
I wish Mussalmans all over India to observe Friday, 22 December as the day of
deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments
have at last ceased to function…This meeting therefore expresses its deep sense
of relief at the termination of the Congress regime in various provinces and
rejoices in observing this day as the day of deliverance from tyranny, oppression
and injustice during the last two and a half years and prays to God to grant such
strength, discipline and organization to Muslim India as to successfully prevent
the advent of such a Ministry again…58
On 23 March, 1940, at the Lahore session, the League adopted its famous resolution
known as the Pakistan Resolution. In this session, the League formally adopted the idea that
India must be divided into two parts, one for the Hindus and the other for the Muslims. In his
Presidential address, Jinnah elaborated in great detail the case for a separate homeland for the
Muslims of India. He said ‘Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word,
but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims
can ever evolve a common nationality…’59 He added: ‘The Hindus and the Muslims belong to
two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor
interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based on
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conflicting ideas and conceptions’60. Continuing the theme, he said: ‘It is quite clear that Hindus
and Muslims derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different
epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a
foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such
nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to
growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the
government of such a State.’61
Gandhi’s first reaction to the two-nation theory and the demand for Pakistan was one of
bafflement and bewilderment bordering on incredulity. In response, Gandhi said: ‘Religion binds
man to God and man to man. Does Islam bind Muslim only to Muslim and antagonize the
Hindu? Was the message of the Prophet peace only for and between Muslims and war against
Hindus or non-Muslims? Are eight crores of Muslims to be fed with this which I can only
describe as poison?’62 In Harijan on 6 April, 1940, he wrote:
The two-nation theory is an untruth. The vast majority of Muslims in India are
converts to Islam or descendants of converts. They did not become a separate
nation as soon as they become converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same
tongue as a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food, and has the same
amusements as his Hindu neighbor. They dress alike. I have often found it
difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali
Muslim. When I first met Quaid-e-Azam, I did not know that he was a Muslim. I
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came to know his religion when I had his full name given to me. His nationality
was written in his face and manner.63
Nehru’s reaction to the Lahore Resolution was one of anger and deep resentment. He did
not mince words in expressing his sentiments:
There have been complaints in the Press that the Congress leaders had not
successfully negotiated with the League. The Lahore resolution has shown clearly
the mentality of the League leaders and is an answer to such complaints. The
whole problem has taken a new complexion and there is no question of settlement
or negotiation now. The knot that is before us is incapable of being united by
settlement; it needs cutting open. I want to say that we will have nothing to do
with this mad scheme.64
A change of Government took place in Britain in May 1940, and Winston Churchill
became the Prime Minister. The Fall of France temporarily softened the attitude of the
Congress.65 Britain was in immediate danger of Nazi occupation.66 On 2 June, Gandhi wrote ‘We
don’t seek our independence out of British ruin’. On 29 June, Linlithgow and Gandhi met at
Simla, but the talks didn’t yield anything concrete. The Congress Working Committee met from
3 to 7 July at Delhi and passed a resolution that demanded an immediate declaration by Britain
granting India complete independence and a construction of a ‘National Government’ without
further delay.67
The British Cabinet’s reply to the Congress demand was the August Offer. On 8 August,
1940, Linlithgow made an announcement that stated His Majesty’s Government’s new offer. It
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assured India ‘Dominion Status’ immediately after the end of the war. For the immediate future,
the offer included expansion to the Viceroy’s Council that would include a certain number of
Indians from political parties and also the establishment of a War Advisory Council which would
also contain Indians.68 The August Offer also made clear that His Majesty’s Government would
not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities to any system of Government in
India whose authority would be directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s
national life.69 The offer also added that the British Government would not be a party to any
arrangement that coerced the minority to submission, by the majority.70
‘Deeply distressed’ was Gandhi’s reaction to the August Offer. The Congress Working
Committee met at Wardha from 18 to 22 August and expressed its deep disappointment at the
August Offer. The offer was rejected by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on 15
September, 1940. The main ground of rejection was that its demand for a national government
was not conceded in the offer, as was the ultimate demand of complete freedom for India. On 13
October at Wardha, Gandhi unfolded his plan for individual Satyagraha. Gandhi selected Vinoba
Bhave to be the first satyagrahi. Bhave began to deliver anti-war speeches and was subsequently
arrested and jailed. The next person to court arrest was Nehru followed by Patel and Azad.
Nearly 30,000 Congressmen courted arrest as part of Gandhi’s individual Satyagraha during the
year 1940-41.71
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The 1937 elections were the first occasion that gave the Congress the responsibility of
administration. According to Azad, it was a test for the Congress to prove its national character
and everyone watched how it would live up to that standard.72 Azad wrote that the Congress
failed in that test in Bombay and in Bihar. Communal considerations trumped merit in the
selection of Premiers to the two provinces. Also, the Congress’s decision to form one party
Cabinets in the provinces was a serious error in judgment. Drunk with success at the polls, the
Congress set very stiff conditions for allowing the League members into the Cabinet in the
United Provinces. The Congress was basically asking the Muslim League to self-liquidate itself
as a precondition for coalition. Naturally, the League rejected the outrageous conditions set forth
by the Congress. Jaswant Singh writes ‘all such attitudinizing on the part of the Congress gave
the Muslim League a new lease of life and set in motion a process that culminated in the partition
of India.’73 Menon writes ‘this was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the
League and was a factor which induced neutral Muslim opinion to turn in the support of
Jinnah.’ 74 Azad commented that if the league’s offer of cooperation had been accepted, the
Muslim League party for all practical purposes would have merged with the Congress.
Another legitimate complaint against Congress policy was that it spurned offers of
coalition at provinces where it had the majority, whereas it did not hesitate to join coalitions in
provinces where it was in the minority. So, some historians have raised the question ‘if coalition
was bad, how it could be good in one place and bad in another?’ Uma Kaura very correctly
concludes that the Congress’s refusal to form a coalition had a major impact on the evolution of
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Muslim attitude towards it.75 Jinnah was determined not succumb to the dictates of the Congress.
He saw it as an attempt by the Congress to annihilate the Muslim League. According to Nanda,
the reason why the Congress did not opt for a coalition in the United Provinces was because
some of the Congress leaders feared that the League, with its feudal and landlord support, would
oppose the Congress agenda of agrarian reforms, particularly the abolition of landlordism. 76
Another consideration for the Congress was whether a coalition government between the two
parties would be able to maintain cohesion given the fact that they represented two contradictory
urges.77 The Congress stood for democracy, socialism, and Indian national unity whereas the
League was primarily interested in the promotion of Muslim interests.78
The Congress attitude made Jinnah realize that the only way to counter the Congress
challenge was to build a first class organization. In order to unite the Muslims behind his
organization, Jinnah raised the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’ and created an atmosphere of hatred
against the Congress. At the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League, he called for solidarity and
unity among the Muslims. It was in Lucknow that he launched a programme to make the Muslim
League a truly mass organization. The greatest achievement at Lucknow was the recognition of
the League by powerful provincial leaders such as Fazlul Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan as the
sole organization representing the Muslims of India.
The Congress leaders failed to realize the seriousness of the growing ill-will among the
Muslims on the pro-Hindu measures being taken by the Congress Ministries. The Congress
turned a blind eye to the growing uneasiness, bitterness, and distrust among the Muslims of its
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policies. The Muslim League did its best to fan the flames of discontent by publicizing the
alleged insolent behavior of the Congress Ministries.79 As has been mentioned earlier in this
discussion, the All-India Muslim League instituted a commission to look into the Congress
atrocities in the provinces and its findings were published in a report called the Pirpur Report.
The report confirmed the charges against the Congress. A sub-committee was also appointed by
the League to look into the alleged grievances and hardships of Muslims in Bihar under the
Congress rule. The resulting report, called the Shareef Report, reached the conclusion that the
Muslims in Bihar were living in a state of constant fear of attack upon their life and property.80
According to Sumit Sarkar, the Congress totalitarianism was a bit of overstatement. Other
historians have opined that the allegations against the Congress by the Muslim League were
exaggerated. Even if the allegations were overblown, the fact remained that it created deep
suspicion and mistrust among the Muslim community regarding the ability of the Congress to
govern in a fair and just manner. The Congress did almost nothing to assuage the Muslim fears.
Rajendra Prasad’s response to the Muslim League’s accusations was one of complete
indifference.81 He wrote ‘so far as I am concerned, the Congress Ministry has done nothing to
prejudice the Mussalmans.” By the end of 1938, the Muslim League leaders were united in their
determination to not let the Muslims be dominated by the Hindus in a future Central
Government.82 They felt that the Congress demand for complete independence with a centralized
government would place the Muslim minority perpetually at the mercy of a Hindu majority.
Hence, they began to look for alternate schemes, partition being one of possibilities.
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Another accusation against the Congress Provincial Governments was that they were
being ruled from the Center. They were not accountable to the electorate that had elected them,
rather to the Congress High Command. Strict control was exercised over the Provincial
Governments by the Congress High Command, even on minor matters. Hodson writes ‘The main
effect of ‘dictatorship’ by the High Command was to heighten Muslim fear.’ 83 The value of
Provincial autonomy was debased. Despite strict control from Center, the Provincial
Governments were mired in corruption and nepotism. Tomilson comments: ‘Congressmen were
suddenly seized with a desire to capture power at all cost. So long it was a fighting machine, it
was functioning on a high moral plane and followed strict moral discipline. Once they won the
elections, they felt that it was time for reward for their past sacrifices.’84 Tomilson adds: ‘Khadi,
which was the symbol of truth and non-violence, now, became a qualification for its wearers to
secure jobs for themselves and for their friends and families.’85
Nehru dismissed the communal problem as a ‘nonsense’ that needed no attention. For
him the most vital factor was the problem of poverty and unemployment and everything else was
subsidiary to it. Nehru had no idea about the power and potentialities of the Muslim League.86
He dismissed it as a small upper class organization controlled by feudal elements which had no
influence on the masses.87 According to Majumdar, Nehru committed the same type of mistake
as the British with respect to the Congress when they belittled it as an organization of English
educated men constituting a microscopic minority. 88 Instead of conciliating with the Muslim
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League, the Congress leaders set out to destroy it. Accordingly, Nehru announced the Muslim
Mass Contact Programme to win away Muslims from the League. The strategy completely
backfired. Jinnah took up the challenge thrown by Nehru and his brilliance as a leader never
shone forth higher.89 He completely turned the table on the Congress by playing the communal
card adroitly. According to Majumdar, he turned Indian Politics into a battle between the Hindumajority versus the Muslim-minority.90
The Congress argument that since it was secular it represented all sections of India was
spurious. It did not win enough Muslim seats to justify its claim. Moreover, the Congress ideal of
a Westminster model of majoritarian democracy was unsuitable to the Indian condition, given
her complex social arithmetic.91 Nehru and the Congress leaders were blind to the fact that under
the system of separate electorate, which they had agreed to according to the 1935 Act (and a few
times in the past such as Lucknow Pact of 1916), a government entirely majoritarian and not
reasonably inclusive of minorities would be seen as an unrepresentative government.92
The British saw the growing rift between the Congress and the Muslim League as their
trump card.93 During the early stages of the war, the British policy was to win Indian support
without conceding anything grand. They viewed the communal approach taken by Jinnah as their
most effective weapon to counter the Congress’s demands. They saw the communal divide as the
most useful trap for the forces of nationalism. Linlithgow tried halfheartedly to bring the two
parties to an agreement, but he was chastised by Churchill as following a suicidal policy. For
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Churchill, the Hindu-Muslim tension was the bulwark of British rule in India.94 The Congress
committed a serious blunder by resigning en masse from the Provincial Ministries. As a result, it
lost the power to bargain. The resignation of the Congress Ministries allowed the League to
occupy the political center stage. Linlithgow’s attitude towards the Congress changed as there
was no need to placate it anymore. The Congress’s insistence that Britain declare her war aims
made the Viceroy suspect that the Congress was maneuvering to take advantage of Britain’s
difficulties. Hence the Viceroy sought support elsewhere and the obvious choice was Jinnah and
the Muslim League.95 He found it expedient to encourage the Muslim league to become a rival to
the Congress at an all India level. In March 1940, the Muslim League passed its famous Pakistan
Resolution and it never looked back on its demand for Pakistan from that point on.
The promise of Dominion Status at the end of war by the August Offer did not satisfy the
Congress; first, it was unknown how long the war would last and second, the Congress was not
very enthusiastic about Dominion Status. In Nehru’s words: ‘The conception of Dominion Status
developed as between England and her own people spread out in various colonies. There was and
is much in common between them. The common bonding is lacking here and it is difficult to see
how Dominion Status fits in with India.’96 Britain’s obligations to the minorities were spelled out
as a pledge in the August Offer. This was seen by the Congress as the old British policy of divide
and rule. The Congress concluded that the British had no real interest to recognize India’s
independence and would do anything to keep her in perpetual bondage. However, the Congress’s
rejection of the August Offer hurt it politically. The acceptance of the August Offer would have
meant a return of the Congress Governments in the provinces. Then it would have been in a
94

Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 144.
Singh, Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence, 225.
96
Jawaharlal Nehru’s confidential note on Congress Policy, 20 January, 1940, in Panikkar, ed.,
Towards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence of India, 1940, Vol. 1, 119.

95

31

position to counter the growing influence of the Muslim League instead of handing the center
stage to Jinnah on a platter. With the Congress in the wilderness and Jinnah’s hands considerably
strengthened, waverers among the Muslims began trickling into the League.97 For all practical
purposes, Jinnah was given a veto on further constitutional progress.98 The balance of power
altered in favor of Jinnah and the Muslim League.
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Chapter Two
Cripps Mission
Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, and Viceroy
Linlithgow were all opposed to giving India more self-governance while the war lasted.
Churchill wrote: ‘The idea that we shall ‘get more out of India’ by putting the Congress in
charge at this juncture seems ill-founded.’ 99 Amery thought that any settlement with the
Congress Party would alienate the Muslims in India and it could hurt Britain’s war efforts as
most of the military recruits came from the Muslim race.100 Like Churchill, Linlithgow was an
ardent imperialist who believed that the imperial interests would be best served by yielding
nothing to India. He thought that any real transfer of power would exacerbate the racial and
religious divisions in the country.101 Moreover, Linlithgow hated the Congress politicians and
had a very low opinion of them. He wrote the following:
…there is no possibility of giving satisfaction to Congress or securing their real
and wholehearted support. In my experience they are entirely ruthless politicians;
will take all they can get; will do their utmost to maneuver us into a position in
which we make sacrifices that are substantial and that will increase the prestige
and power of Congress in the country.102
Clement Attlee, who was the Lord Privy Seal in Churchill’s Cabinet, opposed the policy
of “do nothing” being advocated by the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. He proposed that a
representative from London be sent to India to find a settlement with the Indian leaders to
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devolve more power into their hands. He thought that the hand-to-mouth policy being followed
by His Majesty’s Government was not statesmanship; rather it was short-sighted and suicidal.103
Meanwhile the war situation in Asia changed rapidly. Singapore fell to the Japanese army
on 15 February 1942, Rangoon on 8 March, and the Andaman Islands on 23 March. Despite the
popular resentment against the British Raj, Indian participation in the Allied campaign was
strong. As many as 2.5 million Indian troops were fighting the Axis forces in Africa, Middle
East, South Asia, and Italy. But, as the war approached India’s doorsteps, the Churchill Cabinet
felt compelled to make some gestures to India to win her greater support for the war efforts.104
During this time, President Roosevelt was pressuring the Churchill Government for a settlement
of the Indian question.105 After Pearl Harbor, American opinion became more vocal and urged
Britain to make greater efforts to seek India’s cooperation in the war. 106 In the newly
reconstituted War Cabinet of Churchill, Attlee was appointed the deputy Prime Minister and Sir
Stafford Cripps as the leader of the House of Commons and also the Lord Privy Seal. It was their
influence that finally persuaded Churchill to agree to an offer that Cripps made to go himself to
India as the representative of His Majesty’s Government to negotiate fresh with the Indian
leaders for a political settlement and in return get India’s cooperation in the war. Another reason
why Churchill agreed to send Cripps was that even if the Mission failed, it would at least show
the world that the British were serious about giving India self-governance.
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After protracted negotiations, the War Cabinet finally approved a Draft Proposal in early
March to be carried by Cripps to India. The salient features of the proposal were as follows:
a) Immediately after the cessation of the war, steps would be taken to set up a
Constituent Assembly which would frame a new constitution for India.107
b) The Indian States would be able to participate in the Constitution making
process by sending their representative to the body.108
c) The right of any province to opt-out of the constitution. These non-acceding
provinces would be allowed to frame their own Constitution.109
d) During the critical period of the war, His Majesty’s Government must
inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the
defense of India as part of their world war effort.110
In the days following his arrival in India, Cripps conducted interviews with leaders of the
Congress Party, the Muslim League, the Sikh Community, the Depressed Classes, and so on.
Some of the features of the Cripps Proposal were unpalatable to the Congress such as the
provinces being given the option to stay out and the inclusion of States’ representatives (not
elected by the popular vote) in the Constitution making body.111 The Congress wanted the British
Paramountcy in relation to the Princes to be transferred to the Indian Government when the
British left India. Cripps said that it was not possible under the treaty obligations of His
Majesty’s Government with the Princes. Gandhi objected to autocratic Princely States persisting
under British protection under the Cripps Proposal.112 He said that the document was a virtual

107

Draft Declaration by British War Cabinet for discussion with Indian leaders, 30 March, 1942,
in Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7: The Cripps Mission, January – April 1942, vol.
1, 565.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid, 566.
111
Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 125.
112
R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 87.
35

invitation to the Muslims to create a Pakistan.113 He described the declaration as a ‘post-dated
check’. The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the plan on the ground that the option given to the
provinces to stay out of the Union would destroy the unity of the country. 114 The Depressed
Classes denounced the scheme for its failure to provide adequate safeguards for them.115 The
Sikhs also protested vowing to resist any attempt to separate Punjab from India.116 However,
when Cripps showed Jinnah the draft proposal, he was surprised at the distance it went to meet
his Pakistan demand and of course he did not oppose it. Once again, it appeared that British
overtures were favoring the Muslim League above all else.
The Congress Working Committee met during the first week of April and deliberated on
the Cripps Proposal. The resulting resolution raised objections to some provisions in the
proposal. According to the resolution, although the Cripps Proposal accepted India’s right to
self-determination in future, certain provisions in it fettered, circumscribed, and imperiled the
development of a free and united India.117 The rights of the peoples in the States were vitiated by
introduction of non-representative elements in the constitution-making body.118 The resolution
said: ‘Complete ignoring of 90 million of people of Indian States and treatment as commodities
at the disposal of their rulers is complete negation of democracy and self-determination.’119
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The CWC resolution criticized the prior acceptance of the principle of non-accession for
provinces as a severe blow to their conception of Indian unity. The resolution expressed
Congress’s concern that the Cripps Proposal would encourage and would lead to attempts by the
provinces to break away from the Union at the very inception of it and just when utmost
goodwill and cooperation were needed. 120 It accused the British Government of giving in to
communal demands by a certain section of the Indian population, which could have grave
repercussions by encouraging other minority communities to make similar demands. The
resolution objected strongly to the provision in Proposal that stipulated that the defense of India
would remain under British control until the war was over. It said that at any time defense was a
vital subject, but at the time of war, defense was all important and covered almost every sphere
of life and administration.121 By taking away that responsibility, the British Government had
reduced the power to be given to the Indians to an absolute farce and nullity.122 The Working
Committee argued that in order to rouse the Indian masses and get their enthusiastic support for
the war, they must be made to believe that they were free and were in charge of maintaining and
defending their own freedom.123 Similarly, C. R. Rajagopalachari, one of the major leaders of the
Congress, told Cripps that it was essential that the Indian leaders should be able to give some
clarion call to the Indians which would stimulate them from their defeatist attitude. The proposal
should explicitly make it clear that the Indian people were being asked to defend their own
country and that it was not merely the obligation of the British Government.124 He recommended
that an Indian Defense Minister should be put in the charge of managing the war in the Indian
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theater of operation. This would essentially put the Indian Army under Indian control while the
British troops would continue to be under the control of British Commander-in-Chief.
Amery’s negative reaction to the Congress Working Committee resolution is wellcaptured in the extracts below from a letter he wrote to Linlithgow in early April:
I have just seen Stafford Cripps’ summary of CWC Resolution. It is certainly
difficult to imagine a more purely negative document and I am afraid it looks as if
Gandhi had once again persuaded that wrecking is the best policy. I am not sure
that these people really want responsibility, and if we offered them the moon they
would probably reject it because of the wrinkles in its surface…They must know
equally well that they are quite incapable of taking on the whole defense problem
or of ‘galvanizing the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion’…I
must say that the more I look at the Resolution the more doubtful I am whether
people of that type would ever run straight, even if they could be brought for the
moment to agree. They would be quite capable, not only of making endless
difficulties for Wavell, but even of trying to negotiate a separate peace with
Japan.125
Cripps wrote a letter to Churchill suggesting that it might be a good idea to hand over the
Defense Ministry to an Indian, subject to a convention in writing that the Defense Minister
would not in any matter affect the prosecution of the war act contrary to the policy laid down by
His Majesty’s Government.126 He also suggested as an alternative that if it was impracticable
during the time of war to hand over the full responsibility of Defense to a Minister, then perhaps
some non-critical functions could be delegated subject to the Commander-in-Chief’s approval.127
Essentially, Cripps’s alternative proposal envisioned designating the Commander-in-Chief as the
War Member, converting the Defense Department into the War Department, and creating a
Defense Coordination Department to take over the transferred functions.128 Cripps’s Proposal to
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transfer the Defense Department entirely to Indian hands was voted down by Churchill, Amery,
Linlithgow and Wavell. Amery argued that India was the key to the defense of the British
Empire and putting that key in unskilled Indian hands might prove fatal for the conduct of the
war. 129 Cripps’s alternative proposal was, however, approved by the War Cabinet with the
consent of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief.
The negotiations were further complicated by the intervention of Colonel Louis Johnson,
a personal representative of President Roosevelt. He took an active part in the negotiations on the
defense formula. The resulting proposal, called the Johnson-Cripps formula, inverted the original
proposal approved by the War Cabinet.130 The original proposal was that an Indian representative
member should be added to the Executive Council who would be in charge of a new department
called the Defense Coordination Department and it would be responsible for specified defense
matters which would be separated from the Commander-in-Chief’s War Department. The
specified defense matters were an unexciting semi-civilian list which included items such as
public relations, demobilization and post-war construction, stationary, printing, and forms for the
Army, reception, accommodation, and social arrangements for all foreign missions, and
dignitaries and so on. 131 The Johnson-Cripps formula stipulated that the Defense Department
would be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to
the conduct of the war would be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who would be in control
of the armed forces in India, and who would be the member of the Executive Council in charge
of the War Department. 132 The Johnson-Cripps formula met strong disapprovals from the
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Viceroy who complained to London that Cripps was negotiating behind his back. The War
Cabinet wrote the following letter chastising Cripps for going beyond his mandate:
War Cabinet deeply sympathizes with difficulties of your task, but is greatly
concerned to find that latest formula was propounded to Nehru and to Working
Committee without previous knowledge and approval of Viceroy and Wavell.
There is also grave danger that Johnson’s public intervention may be
misunderstood as representing action on behalf of U.S. Government, which of
course is not the case.133
When Cripps was conducting interviews with the Indian Political leaders and giving press
briefings, he had used language which implied that under his Proposal a wholly Indian National
Cabinet would be formed in which the position of the Viceroy to the Indian Government would
be similar to the position of the King to the British Government, a largely symbolic position with
no real authority.134 He subsequently pointed out that no major amendment to the Constitution
was possible during the time of war, but he told the Congress leaders that the Governor-General
could allow a National Government by means of a convention.135 The War Cabinet was harshly
critical of Cripps. It objected to his promised Indianization of the executive, which would
severely curtail the Viceroy’s powers and put him in an impossible situation. 136 On 9 April,
1942, when Azad and Nehru talked to him about the prospects of setting up a National
Government, Cripps made it clear that there would be no change to the Constitution while the
war lasted and any such changes to the workings of the government were matters for discussions
with the Viceroy after a settlement had been reached.137 It was in these circumstances that Azad
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decided to place before Cripps a detailed statement of the position of the Congress towards the
Cripps Proposal. Some extracts from Azad’s letter to Cripps sent on 10 April are given below:
These proposals in effect asked for participation in the tasks of today with a view
to ensure the future freedom of India. Freedom was for an uncertain future, not for
the present…In our talks you gave us to understand that you envisaged a National
Government which would deal with all matters except Defense. Defense at any
time, and more particularly in war time is of essential importance; and without it a
National Government functions in a very limited field. Apart from this
consideration, it was obvious that the whole purpose of your proposals and our
talks centered round the urgency of the problems created by the threat of invasion.
The chief functions of a National Government must necessarily be to organize
defense, both intensively and on the widest popular basis, and to create mass
psychology of resistance to an invader. Only a National Government could do
that, and only a Government on whom this responsibility was laid. Popular
resistance must have a national background and both the soldier and the civilian
must feel that they are fighting for their country’s freedom under National
leadership…The formula for Defense that you sent us gave a list of subjects or
departments which were to be transferred to the Defense Department. This list
was a revealing one as it proved that the Defense Minister would deal with
relatively unimportant matters. We are unable to accept this…you had referred
both privately and in the course of public statements to a National Government
and a Cabinet consisting of Ministers. These words have a certain significance
and we had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as
a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; but the new picture
that you placed before us was really not very different from the old…The new
Government could neither be called, except vaguely and inaccurately, nor could it
function as a National Government…138
The Congress Working Committee rejected Cripps Proposal on 11 April. As soon as the
Congress rejected the Proposal, the Muslim League Working Committee followed suit. The
Muslim League resolution was very disingenuous in its reasons for rejecting the offer. It viewed
the Cripps Mission as trying to create a new Indian Union and compelling the Muslims into a
constitution-making body. Here is an extract from Muslim League’s resolution:
In the Draft Declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the
primary object of creating one India Union. So far as the Muslim League is
138
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concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India’s constitutional
problem is the partition of India into independent zones…”139
The arrangement for defense proved to be the most vexed problem that was principally
responsible for the breakdown of Cripps Mission.
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Commander-in-Chief, to continue being responsible for all major functions of the army but this
was unacceptable to the Congress. The Congress’s argument was that Indians should not be
expected to fight a war unless they were given the responsibility for defending their own country.
Another thorny issue that contributed to the failure of the Cripps Mission was the Congress’s
demand for the establishment of a truly National Government in the immediate future, with the
Viceroy acting as the Constitutional head of such a Government. The British Government was
not ready to concede such a demand as it would have entailed changes to the Constitution at a
time of war. The truth of the matter was, Churchill had no intention of giving India freedom
anytime soon. The main purpose behind sending Cripps to India was to show the world that
Britain was making efforts to give India self-governance. The conservatives like Churchill,
Amery, and Linlithgow didn’t want Cripps, a labor leader, to succeed and they constantly
opposed and sabotaged his efforts to accommodate Indian opinions.141 Churchill never trusted
the Congress leaders and thought that Cripps was conceding too much of their demands. Louis
Johnson, Roosevelt’s personal envoy, commented that London wanted a Congress refusal.142
Roosevelt was highly critical of London’s handling of the situation and he said that the deadlock
was caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to India the right of selfgovernment.
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While the responsibility for the failure of Cripps Mission rests largely with the British,
the Congress’s intransigence and its all-or-nothing attitude also hindered reaching a settlement.
Cripps’s Proposal was a significant step towards granting India its freedom. In the long term, it
promised India a post-war Dominion Status with a right to secede, and a constitution-making
body elected from provincial legislatures.. In the short term, Cripps assured the Congress leaders
that the new executive would approximate a National Government, not formally but in practice
through conventions just as the Governors’ special powers had not really hindered the Congress
ministries from effectively ruling the provinces from 1937 to 1939.143 The Congress should have
taken the offer, which would have established a semi-National Government at the center and it
could have hastened the attainment of India’s freedom instead of another five long years that it
took for India to get her freedom and that to after paying the heavy price of division of the
country.
The War Cabinet had misjudged the mood of India.144 For them, the crisis in the war
called for immediate action to break the deadlock in the face of Japanese invasion. Churchill
believed that by dangling the prospects of independence and self-determination after the war, he
could get the support of Indian leaders in the war effort. But many Indians were doubtful of the
victory of Britain and her allies; most of them were apathetic towards the war and did not believe
that Japan would invade India.145 The country was in no mood to sacrifice its political ambitions;
instead, it wanted to take advantage of Britain’s weakening position.146
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Perhaps the biggest reason for Congress’s rejection of the Cripps Proposal was the optout clause for the provinces. By giving the provinces that option, the Cripps formula conceded
the partition of India. In one stroke, the British Government overturned the 1935 Act as a basis
for a post-war constitutional settlement.147 For the first time the British Government recognized
the League’s demand for Pakistan by incorporating the non-acceding clause for the provinces in
the Cripps formula. It advanced the idea of Pakistan one stage further.148 It led to an increase in
estrangement between the two major communities in India. Jinnah now came to believe that the
Pakistan idea was achievable. It would not be a stretch to say that Cripps Mission opened the
doors to Pakistan for Jinnah and his followers.
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Chapter Three
Quit India Movement, Gandhi-Jinnah talks, and I. N. A. Campaign
The failure of the Cripps Mission caused profound disappointment in India. The
Congress leaders realized that Britain was unwilling to concede to India real constitutional
advance while the war lasted. Apart from that, popular discontent was on the rise against the
soaring prices and war-time shortages.
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People resented high-handed actions by the

Government such as the commandeering of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent those being
captured by the Japanese army in case Japan decided to invade India.150 There was a growing
feeling of an imminent British collapse because of the Allied reverses in South-East Asia. The
manner in which the British evacuated from Malaya and Burma further angered the people of
India. It was common knowledge that the British had evacuated the white residents and generally
had left the subject people to their fate. 151 Letters from Indians in South-East Asia to their
relatives in India were full of graphic accounts of British betrayal and their being left at the
mercy of the dreaded Japanese. Against this backdrop, Gandhi started a series of articles in
Harijan in which he urged the British to leave India.152 He was convinced that the time was now
ripe for putting the maximum pressure on the British to quit India.
On 19 April, 1942, Gandhi wrote: ‘If the British left India to her fate, non-violent India
would not lose anything. Probably Japan would leave India alone.’153 In that article he suggested
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that the safety and interest of both Britain and India lay in an orderly and timely British
withdrawal from India.154 On 3 May, Gandhi wrote in Harijan: ‘I feel convinced that British
presence is incentive for Japanese attack. If British wisely decided to withdraw and leave India to
manage her own affairs, Japan would be bound to reconsider their plans. The very novelty of
British stroke would confound the Japanese, dissolve subdued hatred against British.’ 155
Continuing his theme in Harijan, Gandhi wrote on 10 May:
I feel British cannot suddenly change their traditional nature; racial superiority is
treated not as vice but as virtue not only in India but in Africa, Burma and Ceylon.
This drastic disease requires drastic remedy – complete and immediate orderly
withdrawal from India, and from all non-European possessions. It will be bravest
and cleanest act of British people. Clean end of imperialism is likely to be end of
Fascism and Nazism; suggested action will certainly blunt edge of Fascism and
Nazism which are offshoot of Imperialism.156
On 16 May, during a press interview, Gandhi said: ‘I am convinced that we are living
today in a state of ordered anarchy. It is a misnomer to call such rule as established in India a
rule which promotes the welfare of India. Therefore, this ordered disciplined anarchy should go.
And if there is complete lawlessness in India as a result, I would risk it.’157 Gandhi believed that
only an immediate declaration of Indian Independence by the British Government would give the
people of India a stake in the defense of their own country.158 He pushed for the acceptance of a
draft by the Congress Working Committee that he had authored. The main points of the draft
were: ‘(i) A demand to the British Government to clear out (ii) India a zone of war as a result of
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British Imperialism (iii) No foreign assistance needed for the freedom of the country (iv) India
has no quarrel with any country (v) If Japan invaded India it shall meet with non-violent
resistance’.159 Nehru and Azad were opposed to a demand for British withdrawal at a time when
the enemy was knocking at the gate. Nehru said: ‘The whole background of the draft is one
which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively lining up with the Axis
powers.’ 160 But there were staunch supporters of Gandhi such as Sardar Patel, Acharya
Kripalani, and Rajendra Prasad, who favored the proposals.
Meanwhile, the Viceroy Linlithgow and the War Cabinet of Churchill were getting
increasingly nervous about Gandhi’s call for British withdrawal from India at a time of war. The
Secretary of State, Leo Amery, suggested to the Viceroy that if Gandhi continued to be a troublemaker, then the best thing to do was to put him in a plane and fly him to Uganda.161 Perhaps, the
British Government decided not to take the extreme measure of deporting Gandhi to Africa
fearing that it could lead to violent reaction from Indian people and generate adverse opinion
from Britain’s allies. Amery continued to advise the Viceroy to take strong measures against the
Congress leaders if they remained defiant and challenged the British authority.162 If push came to
shove, they should all be put in jail, Amery added.163
Despite sympathy for the Allied cause and the fight against Fascism, a sympathy which
prompted Nehru to take a soft line in not embarrassing the government at a time of crisis, the
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Congress Working Committee, at Gandhi’s urging, passed a long resolution which came to be
known as the ‘Quit India Resolution’. It renewed the demand that ‘British rule in India must end
immediately’164 and that ‘the freedom of India is necessary not only in the interests of India, but
also for the safety of the world and for ending of Nazism, Fascism, militarism, and other forms
of imperialism, and aggression of one nation over the other.’165 The resolution was confirmed by
the All India Congress Committee in Bombay on 8 August. The historic Quit India Resolution at
Bombay was followed by Gandhi’s memorable utterance: ‘I am not going to be satisfied with
anything sort of complete freedom. We shall do or die. We shall either free India or die in the
attempt.’166 It was a clarion call for an unarmed non-violent revolt on a mass scale.167 In contrast,
Jinnah viewed the Quit India Resolution as a clever move by the Congress to coerce the British
to transfer power to a Hindu raj, leaving the minority Muslim community at the mercy of the
majority Hindu community. Jinnah and the Muslim League decided not to join hands with the
Congress in any future movement unless the Congress accepted the Pakistan demand. The
attitude of Jinnah and the Muslim League underscored how little chance there was now of unity
between the League and the Congress.
Gandhi had made a serious miscalculation in thinking that because of the war the British
Government would come to terms with the Congress as soon as he launched his movement. He
thought that the Viceroy would at least give him time to negotiate with the Government as his
predecessors had done during 1921 and 1930. Linlithgow, however, had no intention of playing
the game according to the Mahatma’s rules.168 Faced with an impending foreign invasion, the
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Government was in no mood to tolerate an open rebellion.169 In the early hours of 9 August, the
Government struck hard. Gandhi and all other eminent leaders of the Congress Working
Committee were arrested and put in jail. Before long, all the important leaders of the Congress
throughout the country had been taken into custody including Nehru. 170 The Government
declared all Congress organizations, both at the center and the provinces, unlawful and they were
barred from operating.
The sudden removal of the leaders of the Congress from all levels left no responsible men
to guide the movement. If the Government had thought that by removing the leaders from the
scene the movement would die, they were in for a rude shock. The sudden attack by the
Government produced an instantaneous reaction among the people. The pre-emptive strike
provoked the people to come out in large numbers to protest the arrest of their leaders. Initially,
the protests were peaceful and non-violent in the form of hartals and demonstrations. However,
when the Government started taking stern measures such as lathi-charge (use of sticks or batons
by police to discharge crowds) and firing on the crowds, the protests turned violent. There were
clashes with the police in Bombay, Delhi, Allahabad, Kanpur, Pune, and many other cities and
towns. There were strikes by millworkers in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur, and other
places. The textiles strikes in Ahmedabad lasted three and half months and the city was described
as the ‘Stalingrad’ of India.171 Students boycotted schools and colleges throughout India. The
Government responded by gagging the press. 172 The National Herald and Harijan ceased
publication for the entire duration of the movement, and others for shorter durations. This was
the first stage of the Quit-India movement.
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In the second stage of the Quit-India movement, the scene of action shifted to the
countryside. Government properties became the targets of people. Railway lines were sabotaged,
post offices were attacked and destroyed, and telephone and telegraph lines were cut. In some
places, police stations were attacked. Trains, buses and trams were set on fire. Parallel
governments were set up in places like Midnapore in Bengal, Satara in Maharashtra, and other
places in Bihar and the United Provinces. Linlithgow sent a telegram to Amery on 20 August
describing the situation:
It now appears that in murders of policemen at Ashti reported yesterday two of
the murdered constables were burnt alive in kerosene…Considerable damage at
Kodarna, station raided by a mob of 500 with Congress flag…Attacks on
communication continues. Real storm center is still Bihar where situation clearly
remains a grave one…173
The situation became so grave in some areas that Linlithgow ordered the machine
gunning of saboteurs from the air.174 Linlithgow struck hard to crush the revolt. The Whipping
Act was revived and thousands of people were detained without trial.175 Considered as the most
serious threat to the Raj since the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the Government acted with utmost
severity. 57 battalions were employed to crush the disturbances. By end of 1943, approximately
91,000 people had been arrested, 1,000 people had been killed in police firings, and 2,000 had
been seriously injured.176 Official estimates put the figures for sabotages as 250 railway stations
damaged, 500 post offices attacked, telegraph and telephone lines cut in 3,500 places, 70 police
stations burnt, and more than 85 government buildings damaged.177
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The brutal and all-out repression succeeded in crushing the mass phase of the struggle
within a period of six or seven weeks. But underground activities of some sort or other continued
for another two years. It was led by Congress Socialists, Forward Bloc members, revolutionary
terrorists, and even some Gandhians, who instigated strikes, cut telegraph and telephone wires
and damaged railway tracks.
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Bipin Chandra writes ‘Their success in disrupting

communications may not have been more than a nuisance value, but they did succeed in keeping
up the spirit of the people in a situation in which open mass activity was not possible because of
superior armed might of the State.’179
The Muslim League Working Committee met on 20 August, 1942, and passed a
resolution condemning the Quit India movement. It described the movement as an attempt by the
Congress to coerce the British Government to hand over power to a Hindu Oligarchy abandoning
their obligations to the Muslims of India.180 It went on to add:
The Working Committee are fully convinced that Pakistan is the only solution of
India’s constitutional problem and is in complete consonance with justice and fair
play to the two great nations – Muslims and Hindus – inhabiting this vast subcontinent whereas if the Congress demand is accepted it would bring the 100
millions of Muslims under the yoke of the Hindu Raj…In these circumstances the
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, call upon the Muslims to
abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to
continue to pursue their normal peaceful life.181
Jinnah appealed to the Muslims to keep away from the Quit India movement. The
Muslims in general remained aloof from the movement. However, there was a total absence of
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communal clashes, a sure sign that although the movement did not arouse enthusiasm among the
Muslims, it did not arouse their hostility either.182
The decision of Jinnah to keep the League away from the Quit India movement kept the
leaders of the League out of jail. This enabled the Muslim League party to gain in strength. In
contrast, the Congress suffered severe setback by its absence from the political scene during
crucial years. In addition, a violent agitation launched by the Congress Socialists, sharpened
official animosities towards the Congress. The countrywide agitation that followed the adoption
of the Quit India movement was interpreted by the British Government as a deliberate attempt to
interfere with the war efforts. The principal concern of the British then was the proper conduct of
war. The Congress party’s stand about India’s participation in the war had greatly exasperated
the Conservative coalition government in Britain and also the bureaucracy headed by Lord
Linlithgow. 183 Consequently, they did everything possible to help and strengthen the Muslim
League and offset the Congress.184
Gandhi was detained at the Aga Khan Palace in Poona after his arrest in Bombay on 9
August, 1942. The massive repression unleashed by the Government to counter Quit India
movement distressed him. What pained him more was the Government’s insistence that he and
the Congress were responsible for the violence. 185 At the close of the year 1942, Gandhi
embarked on a correspondence with Linlithgow to convince the Viceroy of his own commitment
to non-violence and that of the Congress’s innocence in relation to the violence that had taken
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place.186 The Viceroy replied that he was ‘profoundly depressed’ by the policy adopted by the
Congress and even more so by the silence of Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee
members over acts of destructive violence. 187 Gandhi replied to the viceroy that it was the
Government that goaded the people to the point of madness.188 He added: ‘If then I cannot get
soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for satyagrahis, namely, a fast
according to capacity.’ 189 The fast commenced on 9 February, 1943, for 21 days. The
Government offered to release Gandhi for the duration of the fast. Gandhi refused by saying
“Despite your description of it as ‘a form of blackmail’, it is on my part meant to be an appeal to
the Highest Tribunal for justice which I have failed to secure from you. If I do not survive the
ordeal, I shall go to the Judgment Seat with the fullest faith in my innocence. Posterity will judge
between you as representative of an all-powerful Government and me as a humble man who has
tried to serve his country and humanity through it.’190
The British Government was put in a profoundly embarrassing situation. There was
enormous pressure both in India and abroad for the release of Gandhi. The Daily Worker in
London wrote: ‘If Gandhi dies during his fast, irreparable harm will be done to Britain in the
eyes of the freedom-loving peoples.’191 The Government of India knew the risk of disturbances
that would ensue should Gandhi died in jail. But Churchill remained adamant and refused to
succumb to Gandhi’s pressures. The Viceroy contemptuously dismissed the consequences of
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Gandhi’s death: ‘India would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover, the
prospect of a settlement will be greatly enhanced by the disappearance of Gandhi who had for
years torpedoed every attempt at a settlement.’192 The popular response to the news of his fast
was immediate and overwhelming. All over the country, there were demonstrations, hartals, and
strikes. The Daily Worker reported on 12 February, 1943: ‘Following the beginning of Gandhi’s
fast, Indian students left schools and colleges at Karachi and Lahore…All textile mills at
Ahmedabad were closed yesterday as on the previous day. Bombay markets are still shut…’193
Prisoners in jails went on sympathetic fasts. Public meetings were held demanding Gandhi’s
release and the Government was bombarded with thousands of letters and telegrams from people
from all walks of life.
Meanwhile, Gandhi’s condition deteriorated as the fast progressed. On 22 February, the
Daily Worker reported ‘If the fast is not ended without delay, it may be too late to save Gandhi’s
life.’194 The next day the Daily Worker reported, ‘Mr. Gandhi entered a crisis at 4 P.M. He was
seized with severe nausea and almost fainted and the pulse became nearly imperceptible.’195
While the anxious nation appealed for his life, the Government went ahead with finalizing his
funeral arrangement. Military troops were put in alert in case riots broke out if Gandhi died. But
Gandhi, as always, got the better of his opponents, by refusing to die. The 21-day fast ended on 3
March, 1943. The courage with which Gandhi faced the Government and his unshaken resolve
raised him to the height of glory among the millions of his countrymen. The depth of the national
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will symbolized by Gandhi’s fast convinced the British that their days of dominance in India
were numbered.
Lord Linlithgow retired from his viceroyalty on 20 October, 1943. He served for seven
and half years, longer than any other Viceroy. He was foremost in forcefully pursuing the policy
of helping the League to consolidate its power. Whereas, at the beginning of the war there was
not a single Muslim League ministry in any of the provinces, by the time Linlithgow left office
in 1943, the League was in power in four provinces. The person who succeeded Linlithgow was
Lord Wavell. Wavell had served India as Commander-in-Chief since January 1941. He realized
that in order to retain India as a willing member of the British Commonwealth, a change of
attitude in British policy was needed. He started his viceroyalty with a genuine sense of purpose
and sincerity to find a solution to India’s political problem and to transfer power to a united India
when the time came. Imbued with that desire, Wavell released Gandhi in May 1944 on grounds
of ill-health.
At the Karachi session of All-India Muslim League in December 1943, Jinnah coined the
phrase ‘Divide and Quit’.196 In his speech at the session, Jinnah said: ‘…the only honest way for
Great Britain is to divide and quit. Unity can only be realized on the basis of division of property
and possessions between the two respective nations, the Hindus and the Mussalmans.’ 197 He
added: ‘It is a question of defense against the attitude the Congress has taken up since 1937, to
dominate Mussalmans and to establish, by hook or by crook, Hindu Raj and Hindu Government.
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We are defending ourselves against that monstrosity, those machinations and those designs.’198
In that session, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman expressed the determination of the Muslims of India to
attain the objective of Pakistan at all costs.199 He said “if any effort is made to keep us under the
eternal yoke of slavery, we will resist it to our utmost’. 200 In contrast, the All-India Hindu
Mahasabha, meeting in Amritsar, demanded the preservation of unity of India, the introduction
of federation with a strong center, and the refusal to any province the right to secede.201
On 26 July, 1944, Gandhi wrote a letter to Wavell proposing that he was prepared to
advise the Congress Working Committee to withdraw mass civil disobedience and to extend full
cooperation in the war efforts in return for a declaration of immediate Indian Independence by
the British and the establishment of a National Government responsible to the Central
Assembly.202 Gandhi added that no further burden should be placed upon India to bear the cost
of the war.203 The British Government rejected Gandhi’s offer as a non-starter. After this rebuff,
Gandhi realized that his only hope lay in an agreement with the Muslim League.204
Meanwhile, Rajagopalachari had been working on a formula for a settlement between the
Congress and the Muslim League. He had shown it to Gandhi while he was still in jail and had
obtained his approval to negotiate with Jinnah. The Rajagopalachari Formula conceded partition
of India but under certain conditions. It required that the Muslim League endorse the demand for
independence and cooperate with the Congress for the formation of an Interim Government
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during the transitional period. 205 After the termination of the war, a commission would be
appointed to demarcate those contiguous districts in north-west and the north-east of India where
the Muslims were in absolute majority, and in those areas, a plebiscite of all inhabitants would be
held to decide whether they wanted to join Pakistan or not.206 In the event of separation, a mutual
agreement would be entered into for defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs, and
commerce.207 Any transfer of population should be on an absolute voluntary basis.208 On 17 July,
1944, Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah suggesting that the two of them meet: ‘Let us meet when
you wish to. Please do not regard me as an enemy of Islam and the Muslims here. I have always
been a friend and servant of yours and the whole world. Do not disappoint me.’209 Meanwhile,
Jinnah rejected Rajagopalachari proposal as offering ‘a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated,
and moth-eaten Pakistan, but he agreed to discuss the matter with Gandhi.210
The Gandhi-Jinnah meeting took place on 9 September at Jinnah’s residence in Bombay
and continued till 26 September, with brief intervals. Gandhi visited Jinnah’s residence as many
as fourteen times and several letters exchanged between the two leaders during that period. The
fact that the talks continued for so long and in addition, the photographs of the two leaders
smiling and cordially greeting each other, which the newspapers carried from day to day, created
new hopes among the public that perhaps, at last, a settlement was around the corner.211 On 24
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September Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah in which he said he could recommend to the Congress
the acceptance of the claim of separation on the following basis:
I proceed on the assumption that India is not be regarded as two or more nations,
but as one family consisting of members of whom the Muslims living in the
north-west zones i.e. Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, and that part of the Punjab where
they are in absolute majority and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in
absolute majority…The areas should be demarcated by a commission, approved
by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the area
demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population…if
the vote is in favor of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a
separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign
domination…There shall be a treaty of separation, which should also provide for
the efficient and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal
Communications, customs, commerce, and the like…212
Jinnah replied the next day to the effect that Gandhi had already rejected the fundamental
principle of the Lahore Resolution by not accepting the two-nation theory. 213 Gandhi wanted
independence to come first and then the partition to follow and Jinnah wanted exactly the
opposite. Jinnah wanted the two parties to come to a settlement on the partition issue first and
then unite their efforts to secure freedom on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.214 Gandhi’s
proposal included a treaty of separation to provide for the efficient and satisfactory
administration of defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs and commerce, but Jinnah
made clear that all these matters, which were the life-blood of any State, could not be delegated
to any common central authority. The two leaders could not bridge their differences on the above
mentioned points and thus the Gandhi-Jinnah talks ended in failure.
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While the Cripps Mission, Quit India movement, and Gandhi-Jinnah talks were going on,
the struggle for India’s independence was being fought on another front. In January 1941,
Subhas Chandra Bose215 slipped out of his house in Calcutta eluding police surveillance.216 After
a perilous journey through Afghanistan and Russia, he reached Berlin in April, 1941. Bose was
well-received by Ribbentrop, the right-hand man of Hitler. He was allowed to broadcast antiBritish propaganda from Berlin and frequently exhorted his countrymen to rise in arms against
the British.217 Bose proposed that a ‘Free India Government’ be set up in Berlin, recognized by
Germany. Germans were skeptical of Bose’s plan. Bose waited for two years for a German
declaration of free India, and realized that it would not be coming any time soon. He decided to
go to Japan next. After a hazardous sea journey, he reached Tokyo on 13 June, 1943. He was
received by Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan, who promised him full support for Indian
independence.218 In the beginning of July 1943, Bose went to Singapore and based himself there.
He announced the formation of a Provisional Government of Free India on 21 October, 1943. He
formed the Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj) and succeeded in recruiting 20,000 soldiers
from Indian prisoners of war taken by the Japanese.219 Another 18,000 Indian civilians from the
immigrant communities in South-East Asia volunteered to join Bose’s army.
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The I.N.A. brigades, assisted by the Japanese army, advanced up to the Indian border. In
March 1944, the Indian National Flag was hoisted in Kohima. But with the change of fortune in
the war, the launching of a counter-offensive by the British in the winter of 1944, and the final
defeat of Japan, the I.N.A. movement collapsed. In May 1945, the I.N.A. surrendered in Burma
except for Bose and a few companions, who escaped capture. On August 17, 1945, three days
after the Allied victory over Japan, Bose took a plane from Formosa to Manchuria, which
crashed while taking off. Bose died shortly afterwards in a Japanese military hospital. The
British Indian Army captured 23,000 I.N.A. soldiers out of which 6,000 were marked for trial.
The first public trial of four officers - Shah Nawaz, Shegal, Dhillon, and Rashid Khan - was held
at the Red Fort in Delhi. It did not take long for the British to realize that they had made a
blunder. In September 1945, the All-India Congress Committee called for the release of these
officers and declared that it would be a tragedy if they were punished for having labored for
India’s Freedom, no matter by what means. The Muslim League too joined hands with the
Congress in protesting the trial of I.N.A. men. The Congress and the League lined up their best
lawyers to defend the accused. The Indian Press lauded the accused as patriots. There were
demonstrations all over the country demanding the immediate release of the I.N.A. soldiers. The
Government was taken aback by the strength of Indian reactions to the trials. Eventually, the
Government dropped the charges against the officers and they were released. The Congress and
the Muslim League showed remarkable solidarity in opposing the trial of I.N.A. men. If they had
displayed the same unity of purpose in opposing the British rule, the story of India’s freedom
struggle would have ended in a much happier note.
The Quit India movement of 1942 is a landmark in the history of India’s freedom
struggle. In the words of Lord Linlithgow it was ‘by far the most serious rebellion since that of
60

1857’. The Indian revolution reached its climax in the Quit India movement. The people of India
rose in defiance of the British Government and finding no leaders to guide them resorted to
violence. Trains were derailed, police stations were set on fire, government building were
attacked and destroyed, and telegraph and telephone lines were cut. The machinery of
government was paralyzed for a brief period in certain parts of the country. The movement
marked a new high in terms of popular participation in the national movement and sympathy
with the national cause.220 It was this struggle which convinced Churchill that Britain would not
be able to hold India indefinitely. Bipin Chandra writes ‘The great significance of this historic
movement was that it placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of the
national movement. After ‘Quit India’ there could be no retreat. Any future negotiations with the
British Government could only be in the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no
longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the war.’221 In the opinion of
Francis Hutchins, ‘Gandhi’s demand that the British should unilaterally Quit India was in fact
the demand on which the British Government acted in 1947. And the basis for their withdrawal
was, to a considerable extent, an acceptance of Gandhi’s demand that India be left to anarchy.’222
While the Congress leaders were languishing in prison and the Congress organizations all
over the country were outlawed, Jinnah was consolidating his position and that of the Muslim
League. The reorganization of the Muslim League that had commenced in 1937 was expedited
during the war. Imitating the Congress, the League inaugurated a two-anna membership and
soon had considerable numbers in its roll. 223 It began to build bases in the villages. Its
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missionaries went out canvassing support for Pakistan. They promised not only an Islamic state
but also an economic utopia where Muslims would be prosperous in a way not possible under a
Hindu Raj.224 In the process of consolidating its position, the League also made the demand for
Pakistan seem realistic. In 1940, this had not been the case, but, by 1944, Pakistan seemed
attainable. Hence more and more Muslims flocked to the League’s banner.
At the provincial level too, the League made considerable advances. The Muslim Premier
of Sind, Allah Baksh, was dismissed in September 1942 for his anti-British and pro-Congress
attitude.225 The Muslim League was allowed to form a Government in Sind. The League was
likewise encouraged by the Governor of Assam to form a ministry there. 226 The fall of Huq
ministry in Bengal was brought about by a union of League members and the European members
of the legislature. 227 In May 1943, a League ministry was formed in NWFP. The Congress
Party’s stand on the war had greatly exasperated Lord Linlithgow. 228 With Congress in
opposition, Linlithgow looked to the League for its support and cooperation in the war.
Consequently he did everything in his power to help and strengthen the League. 229 So, the
League gained power in all the Muslim provinces except the Punjab where the Unionist Party
maintained its power until 1945. However, with the untimely death of Chief Minister of the
province, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the League started to gain ground in Punjab. Sikander’s
successor, Khizar Hyat Khan Tiwana, lacked his political skills and was no match for Jinnah. It
did not take long for Jinnah to undermine Khizar. Patrick French writes:
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It is not an exaggeration to say that the untimely death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan
was one of the most important factors in the creation of Pakistan. He had been a
highly influential political figure, and he might easily have swung against Jinnah
and the league had he lived longer. His influence had kept the Punjab
comparatively calm during the war, and his support for the British had been
essential in the supply of troops. His death represented a crucial moment in
Jinnah’s career, for without it he would have had great trouble in tightening the
League’s grip on the Muslims of India.230
The Congress suffered severe setback because of its absence from the political scene
during the crucial years of 1942 to 1945. Jinnah got the time and the vacant space he needed to
dominate the political scene. 231 He was able to exploit the official exasperation with the
Congress. The countrywide disturbances that followed the Quit India movement were interpreted
by the British Government as a deliberate attempt by the Congress to interfere with the war
efforts. 232 To maintain power in India, the British encouraged the League’s separatism as a
counter-balance against Congress’s nationalism.
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Chapter Four
Simla Conference
Wavell’s main motive behind calling the Simla Conference was to enter into negotiations
with the Indian political leaders to ease the communal deadlock and to advance India towards her
goal of self-government. His aim was to replace the members of his present Executive Council
by Indians chosen from lists put forward by leaders of major political parties as a result of
negotiations at the conference.233 He hoped that the leaders of political parties would set aside
their communal differences and learn to work together in his council to solve the difficult
problems facing India.234 The new council would be entirely composed of Indians except the
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. The Home, the Finance, and the External Affairs
portfolios would for the first time be held by Indians. Although his powers as Viceroy would
remain unchanged, he would give firm assurance to the political parties that he would not use his
veto powers unreasonably.
Wavell’s proposal faced stiff opposition from the members of the British Cabinet and the
India Committee. For example, Clement Attlee, who was the deputy PM in Churchill’s cabinet,
said that he was horrified at the thought of a brown oligarchy replacing the present government,
which would be responsible to neither the parliament nor the electorate. 235 Lord Wavell
countered by saying that at least the new council would be more representative with a wider
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backing of the electorate than the present council. 236 John Anderson, the Chancellor of
Exchequer, thought that Wavell’s scheme would further weaken an already weak administration
and undermine the position of the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and the Parliament.237 The
India Committee suggested a Grand Council elected by members of the provincial legislatures
and the Viceroy would select the members of his council from that pool.238 Wavell countered by
arguing that the committee’s proposal would be very time consuming to implement and it could
turn into a white elephant or a nuisance.239
Atlee warned the Viceroy that the members of his new council would be politicians
representing their own party interests and the Viceroy would find himself pushed into a corner
by those individuals and he could end up being a constitutional monarch with no real power.240
Lord Wavell acknowledged that the experiment of replacing the present council by leaders of the
political parties was not without possible dangers but he strongly believed that it was the right
step to take in order to break the communal deadlock and to make the parties more responsible
and to get them working together. The Viceroy said he knew that the easiest course of action was
to do nothing at the present until the end of the war, but he believed that it would be most
fatal.241 It would keep India quiet for the time being, but it would damage British-India relations
in the long run, and there could be great danger of serious political unrest once the pressure of
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the war was removed.242 After weeks of meetings, Wavell finally obtained the go ahead from
London to proceed with his Simla Scheme. On 14 June 1945 the viceroy announced his plan for
the Simla Conference in New Delhi. Some extracts from his speech are given below.
I have been authorized by His Majesty’s Government to place before the Indian
political leaders proposals designed to ease the present political situation and to
advance India towards her goal of full self-government…This is not an attempt to
obtain or impose a constitutional settlement…I propose to invite Indian leaders
both of Central and Provincial politics to take counsel with me with a view to the
formation of new Executive Council more representative of organized political
opinion. The proposed new council would represent the main communities and
would include equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims… It would be
entirely an Indian Council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief,
who would retain his position as War Member…The Council will work within the
framework of the present constitution; and there can be no question of the
Governor-General agreeing not to exercise his constitutional power of control; but
it will of course not be exercised unreasonably.243
Wavell sent out the invitation to the Premiers of the Provincial Governments including
the ex-Premiers of the Provinces under section 93, to Gandhi and Jinnah as the two recognized
leaders of the two main political parties, to the leader of the Congress Party and the Deputy
Leader of the Muslim League in the Central Assembly, to the leader of the Congress Party and
the Muslim League in the Council of State, to the leaders of the Nationalist Party and the
European Group in the Assembly, to Rao Bahadur N. Siva Raj as the representative of Scheduled
Classes, and to Master Tara Singh as the representative of Sikhs.244 Almost immediately after
Wavell’s broadcast speech many Indian leaders and national newspapers were sharply critical of
various aspects of the plan. An editorial in the Bombay Chronicle said the following:
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Wavell’s proposals are in fact, worse than the Cripps proposals which were
rejected by almost all the responsible parties in the country…The new
announcement doubtless refers to the full self-government as the goal. But there is
neither a time limit nor an assurance of independence outside the Empire if
Indians so desired…Under the Cripps scheme, an Indian representative member
was to be added to the Viceroy’s Executive who would take over those sections of
the Department of Defense which can organizationally be separated from the
Commander-in-Chief’s War Department. Under the proposed scheme however
there is to be no Indian Defense Member at all.245
In a similar note, the editorial of the Hindustan Times on 15 June, 1945 denounced the
Wavell’s proposal as follows:
The Indian demand for an interim solution has always been the establishment of a
National Government in the center fully responsible to the Indian people in every
way. The British reply has been that this was not possible under present
constitution which cannot be changed during the war, and without an agreement
of all the major elements of the Indian population. During the Cripps negotiations
in 1942, an attempt was made to combine the two parties and evolve the structure
of a de facto National Government without any major changes in the existing
constitution. The negotiations broke down on the question of Defense and
Governor General’s veto. It must be confessed that the present scheme does not
show any marked improvement in respect of either. The Commander-in-Chief
will continue to be War Member and Lord Wavell has explicitly stated that ‘there
can be no question of the Governor-General agreeing not to exercise his
constitutional power of control’. He has, however, been careful to add that ‘it will,
of course, not be exercised unreasonable’.246
The editorial of the Amrit Bazar Patrika described Wavell’s plan as more retrograde than
Cripps’ Proposal because the Cripps offer at least had the merit of presenting a blue-print for the
future constitution whereas the Wavell Plan left out the future altogether. It also pointed out that
Wavell Plan’s proposed parity between the Caste Hindus and the Muslims in the Executive
Council. The newspaper questioned the soundness of such a proposal which would provide
equality of proportion between Caste Hindus who numbered 250 million and the Muslims who
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numbered only 80 million. 247 The Hindu Mahasabha leader Shyam Prasad Mookherjee took
exception to the fact that the Viceroy had not invited any member of his organization to the
Conference. He was sharply critical of the idea of parity between the two communities and wrote
the following in the same newspaper.
There can be no doubt that the main purpose of the scheme is to further placate
the Muslim League and to crush the legitimate political rights of Hinduism. The
Hindu Mahasabha which is acknowledged to be the only organization that can
rightfully represent the Hindu cause has been excluded even from
consultation…The only object of excluding the Mahasabha at this stage is that the
British Government and Lord Wavell know that it will ruthlessly oppose any
scheme which is intended to sacrifice the Hindus and the national cause at the
altar of intransigent communalism…By no standard of logic or fair play, equity of
justice, can any honest government justify the allocation of equal seats to two
communities in India, one numbering about 250 million and the other about 90.
How, again, can 90 million of Muslims be given five seats and 60 million
Scheduled Castes one seat? Indeed a cursory glance at the list of invitees and the
general structure of the scheme goes to show that while it is a dishonest device to
disrupt and disunite the Hindus and to ignore their legitimate rights…A sordid
and unabashed Anglo-Muslim League conspiracy has been the real hindrance to
India’s freedom. Hindus have been penalized mainly for their ardent patriotism
and their anxiety to throw off the foreign yoke.248
All of the above points raised by the various newspapers in India about Wavell’s plan
were valid in the sense that the proposal fell short of meeting India’s aspirations for selfgovernment on many fronts. Wavell’s plan didn’t recognize the state of India as a dominion.
Defense was to continue being a reserved subject, the sole responsibility of the British
Government. The Viceroy’s veto was to remain. The parity between the Caste Hindus and the
Muslims doomed a majority to parity with a minority, and so on. However, Wavell’s plan had
many positive features and it was a step in the right direction in fulfilling India’s demand for
self-government. For the first time it offered the Home, the Finance, and the External Affairs
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portfolios to be held by Indians. Regarding the offer of parity to the Muslims, without such a
gesture toward the Muslim community there was no hope of forming a coalition interim
government at the center. It was the price that the nationalist India had to pay to secure Muslim
cooperation. Wavell understood that very well and hence included parity in his proposal.
The Congress Party was willing to accept parity between the Caste Hindus and the
Muslims in the Executive Council in the name of compromise but they were unwilling to
compromise on the method of selection. 249 They objected strongly to the Muslim League
insisting on having a monopoly on the selection of Muslims to the Executive Council.250 The
Congress Party didn’t want to be maneuvered into a position in which it would be regarded as a
purely Hindu body.251 The Congress Party wanted a voice in the selection of non-Hindus and it
was vital to the party as the interim arrangement would be precedent for the future composition
of a new Council and would affect long term settlement.252 Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy voicing
his strong opposition to the restriction being put on the Congress to nominate only Caste Hindus.
He said that for the Congress to justify its existence for winning the independence of India it
must remain a nationalist party representing all communities and free to choose best men and
women from all classes.253
Jinnah was unyielding in his demand that the Muslim League be given the exclusive right
to nominate all the Muslim members to the Viceroy’s Council. He told the Viceroy that the
Muslims would always be a minority in the new Council because the other communities e.g. the
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Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes would always vote with the Hindus and the Viceroy would be
most reluctant to exercise his veto.254 Wavell tried to reassure Jinnah that in such cases he and
the Commander-in-Chief would see fair play for the Muslims. But Jinnah’s fear of a Hindu
dominance over Muslims was such that he was not willing to listen to any reasonable suggestion.
He asserted that the Muslim League had the backing of 99% of Muslims in India and the party
had won all the by-elections in the last two years.255 It is true that the Muslim League had the
support of the majority of Muslim India but it is also true that a significant proportion of the
Muslim community in India was nationalist in outlook and backed the Congress Party.
Moreover, the president of the Congress Party was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a highly
respected Muslim scholar whom Jinnah described as a traitor to the Muslim community and a
hired stooge of the Congress Party, and refused to talk to him during the Conference. Jinnah was
not even willing to consider a Muslim nominated by Khizar Hyat Khan, the leader of the
Unionist Party in Punjab and a fellow leader of the Muslim community. He stuck intransigently
to his position that only the Muslim League had the sole right to nominate the Muslim Members
of the Council and no one else. He was willing to wreck the Conference on that point only. He
refused to submit a panel of names to the Viceroy unless his demand was conceded.
The Governors of many provinces advised the Viceroy to go ahead and form his Council
without the Muslim League if Jinnah continued to be obstinate. For example, Sir A. Hope, the
Governor of the Madras province, wrote that if the Viceroy didn’t go ahead and form the Council
then the Congress Party and the world would blame the British Government for succumbing to
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Jinnah’s blackmail. 256 Sir G. Cunningham, the Governor of North-West Frontier Province, a
predominantly Muslim area wrote the following:
My impression is that in this Province at least half educated opinion does not
admit right of Jinnah or Muslim League to nominate all Muslims to Executive
Council and would be satisfied with Muslims (provided they are well known
public figures) nominated by Your Excellency even if they included no Muslim
Leaguers…I am hardly in position to judge how complete Jinnah’s discipline over
Muslim League is, but I have been told here there are leading men in his party,
even Liaquat Ali himself, who might desert him if he insisted on bringing to
impasse at this stage, but conclusion therefore is that from Provincial point of
view there is no great danger if Your Excellency challenges Jinnah on this
point…257
The Governor of Punjab, Sir B. Glancy, wrote to the Viceroy that Jinnah’s claim to
nominate all Muslims appeared to him in the light of League’s meager hold on Muslim majority
provinces to be outrageously unreasonable.258 In a similar note, Sir J. Colville, the Governor of
Bombay, wrote that Jinnah should be faced with the alternatives of either come in or the scheme
to proceed without him.259 Sir H. Dow, the Governor of Sind, another Muslim majority province,
also advised the Viceroy to proceed without the Muslim League. Here is an extract from the
telegram he sent to the viceroy:
In my opinion if Jinnah is intransigent, attempts should be made to form
Executive Council without Muslim League. Much of Jinnah’s influence depends
on feeling that he is going to be successful, and will disappear if you make it clear
that he is not going to get away with it. Incidentally, his hold on Sind is very
tenuous and I believe my Premier would require little persuasion to break away
from League…Jinnah’s reference to successes in by-elections does not apply to
Sind, where in one recent election Muslim League candidate withdrew to avoid
certain defeat and in another election could put up no candidate, while in both
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elections candidate who had unofficial support of Muslim Leaguers was
defeated.260
Wavell made many attempts at the Conference to get Jinnah to budge from his position a
little by allowing one non-League Muslim member to be nominated by the Unionist Party. When
all his efforts failed, and Jinnah continued to refuse to submit a list of names, Wavell made a
provisional list for the Council which included four League Muslims and one non-League
Muslim from Punjab. He met with Jinnah again and told him about his provisional selections for
the Executive Council, which included five Muslims of whom four were members of Muslim
League and one a non-League Muslim from Punjab and also revealed the names of the Muslims
in his list.261 Wavell also told Jinnah the communal and party composition of the Council and
asked him if he would be ready to cooperate on that basis. Jinnah replied that it was impossible
for him to co-operate unless all Muslim members were drawn from the Muslim League and the
Governor-General’s veto were reinforced by special safeguard that no decision opposed by the
Muslims should be taken in the Council except by a clear two-third majority, or something of
that nature. These conditions were fundamental and he could not cooperate without those being
met.262
On 13 July 1945, Wavell made a speech at Simla announcing the failure of the plan. He
took responsibility for the failure of the conference without placing the blame on Jinnah because
he feared that it might exacerbate the already tense communal situation in the country. Here is an
extract from that speech:
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The Conference has failed. Nobody can regret this more than I do myself. I wish
to make it clear that the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea
underlying the conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success would have
been attributed to me, and I cannot place the blame for its failure upon any of the
parties.263
Jinnah stuck to his position that the League represented all Indian Muslims and hence
should have the right to nominate all Muslim members to the proposed Council. On this issue,
the Congress could not compromise.264 It claimed to be a secular body representing all sections
of the society. To concede to Jinnah meant giving up this status and becoming a communal party
representing the Hindus only.265 In addition, the President of the Congress, Maulana Azad, was a
Muslim and not to be able to nominate him to the Executive Council was out of the question for
the party.266 Wavell’s compromise formula of ‘4 Plus 1’, i.e. four Muslim League members and a
non-Congress Muslim member from the Unionist Party, was a virtual refusal to regard the
Congress as a secular party. It implicitly conceded Jinnah’s assertion that the Congress was a
Hindu party.
Wavell chose to ignore the advice of his Provincial Governors who overwhelmingly
counseled him to proceed with his plan without the Muslim League, arguing that Jinnah would
cave in eventually. At this time, the fortunes of the League in the provinces were at a low ebb.267
In the Punjab, the Muslim members of the Unionist Party had definitely broken away from the
League. In NWFP, the Congress Party under Dr. Khan Sahib had taken control.268 In Bengal, the
Muslim League leader Nazimuddin had been defeated and the province was under Section 93.269
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Many Muslim leaders of India had publicly proclaimed that they didn’t subscribe to Jinnah’s
two-nation theory and his claim to be the sole spokesperson for the entire Muslim community of
India.
Lord Wavell’s justification for not going ahead with the plan without the Muslim League
might have been driven by the concern that the war with Japan was still to be won, and the
Churchill’s Cabinet in London might not support the formation of an Executive Council which
didn’t include the Muslim League. Britain was in the midst of parliamentary elections and results
were expected on 25 July. Churchill, Amery, and the British Cabinet were reluctant to give
definite instructions to Wavell and advised him to maintain the status quo. This might be the
reason for the failure of the Conference, for the Viceroy could scarcely take major decisions with
London just standing by.270 Whatever might have been his motive, the abrupt abandonment of
the plan undoubtedly strengthened the position of Jinnah and the League at a time when their
fortunes were not so good.271 It weakened the position of those Muslims who had been opposing
the League, particularly the Unionist Party in Punjab.272 The moderate Muslim leaders began to
gravitate towards the Muslim League from that point on. By allowing Jinnah to torpedo the
Simla Conference, the British Government revealed that it was Jinnah who matter the most. The
war was still going on when Wavell called the Conference and for the British the martial
Muslims of India were more useful for the war purpose than the pacifist Hindus. Sucheta
Mahajan’s characterization of British attitude as a blatant display of patronage to the forces of
communalism is not way off the mark. 273 It was a pity that once again an attempt to reach an
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agreement should have foundered upon the old rocks of prejudice. The net result of the
Conference was to introduce the formula of ‘caste-Hindus – Muslim parity’ into body politics
and to stereotype officially the principle of religious division. 274

The two-nation theory

constantly propounded by Jinnah had succeeded in almost totally polarizing the political
situation in India, thus adding ballast to existing British stereotype. I believe that Wavell’s
sudden abandonment of his plan was one of the causes that made the partition of India
inevitable.275
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Chapter Five
Cabinet Mission
Fresh elections were held in India at the end of 1945. Congress sought a mandate for a
united India and the Muslim League ran on the platform of Pakistan. 276 Paradoxically, the
election results confirmed the claims of both parties.277 The Congress won most of the general
seats to the Central Legislative Assembly and secured 91.3% of votes cast. The Muslim League
secured all the Muslim seats and won 86.6% of total votes cast in Muslim constituencies.278 The
pattern was similar in the elections to the Provincial Assemblies. The League secured 90% of all
Muslim seats and 75% of votes cast in the Muslim Constituencies in the provinces, a marked
improvement from the meager 4.4% of votes it had won in the provincial elections of 1936-7.279
The Congress secured an overwhelming majority in six out of the eleven provinces, and enough
majorities in Assam and NWFP to form governments in eight out of the eleven provinces. The
election results proved beyond doubt that the Congress was the single-largest nationalist party in
India. The results also supported Jinnah’s claim to be the sole spokesman for the Indian
Muslims.280
Britain and her allies inflicted a crushing defeat on Germany and Japan, but this victory
came with a heavy price. The fight to finish exhausted Britain’s man-power and economic
resources to such an extent that she could never hope to recover her old power and prestige.281
Britain lost her status as a first-rate power. That position was shifted to U.S.A and Russia.
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Everyone thought that the party led by Churchill would sweep the polls in Britain because of his
magnificent contributions to the Allied victory and his world-wide reputations earned by that.
But this hope was dashed to the ground by the resounding victory of the Labor Party in the
general election. For the first time in its history the Labor Party secured a clear majority over all
other parties combined in the British House of Commons.
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Accordingly Churchill’s

Government was replaced by the Labor Government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and
Lord Pethick-Lawrence as Secretary of State for India. Meanwhile, the public opinion in Britain
had changed in favor of granting India independence. The Labor Party had pledged itself to
Indian independence more than once, and the task of the Labor Government was made easier by
the solid support of public opinion behind it.283 Hence, the Labor Government decided to take
steps to break the political stalemate in India which would facilitate the eventual transfer power
to India. In March 1946, a Cabinet Delegation was sent to India by the Labor Government. The
delegation included Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps,
the President of the Board of Trade, and Sir A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of Admiralty. Its
mission was to confer with the Viceroy and the Indian leaders to find ways to resolve the
political deadlock and to help India set up a constitutional framework in which the Indians would
have full control over their destiny.
Arriving in Delhi on 24 March, 1946 the Cabinet Mission held a series of discussions
with the leaders of the Congress and the League and soon discovered the irreconcilable
differences between the two parties. The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy met Maulana Azad,
the President of the Congress Party, on 3 April to find out the Congress position on how the
transfer of power should come about. Azad told them that the picture Congress had of the future
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of India was a federation with fully autonomous provinces.284 The center would be responsible
for such essential subjects as Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications, and a few others
absolutely necessary for the administration of India as a whole. The residuary powers would be
vested in the provinces themselves.285 On the same day, the Cabinet Mission met with Gandhi
and sought his opinion. Gandhi told them that the two-nation theory being propounded by Jinnah
was most dangerous. The Muslim population, but for a small percentage, was a body of
converts.286 They were all descendants of Indian born people. Gandhi said that Jinnah’s Pakistan
was a sin to which he would never consent. He even proposed that during the interim period
when the Constitution-making Body would be deliberating let Jinnah form the first Government
and choose his ministers from elected representatives in the country. 287
Jinnah was interviewed by the Mission on 4 April. He said that from the ancient times,
India was never a single country. The country was held by the British as one. Even under British
rule, the country had been only partly united. The Indian States had been separate and
sovereign.288 The differences in India were far greater than those between European countries;
even Ireland was no parallel. Jinnah argued that those differences were fundamental in nature to
Indian society. The Muslims had a different conception of life from the Hindus.289 The social
customs were different. Hindu society and philosophy were the most exclusive in the world.
Hindus and Muslims had lived together in India for a thousand years and yet they had never
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integrated. If one went to any Indian city, one would see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters,
not mixed neighborhoods. It was not possible to make a nation unless there were essential
uniting factors. 290 He then asked the delegation how were they to put 100 million Muslims
together with 250 million Hindus whose way of life was so different.291 He said no government
would work on such a basis and if forced upon it disaster would follow. He asserted that there
was no solution but the division of India.
The Sikhs wanted a united India like the Congress. Master Tara Singh said that he stood
for a united India and he thought that to divide India would be a very troublesome course and a
risky game.292 In his opinion, if division was forced upon them, then the Sikhs would want their
separate homeland. Sardar Baldev Singh gave his view that a single India with safeguards for the
minorities was the best solution.293 Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the Scheduled Classes, said that
he did not want a Constituent Assembly at all. It would be dominated by the Caste Hindus and
the Scheduled Classes would be no more than a small minority.294 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the
leader of the Liberal Party, had the same position as the Congress Party i.e. a federation of
strongly autonomous provinces. Shyam Prasad Mukherjee who represented the Hindu
Mahasabha stressed that his Party would never agree to a division of India. He was against any
parity between the Hindus and Muslims in the Central Government.
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On 9 April, Jinnah called a convention in Delhi of over four hundred members of various
legislatures recently elected on the League ticket. The convention passed a resolution which
demanded a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan, comprising of six provinces i.e. Bengal
in the north-east, and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan in the
north-west of India.295 It demanded the setting up of two separate Constitution-making bodies,
one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. The acceptance of the Muslim League demand for
Pakistan and its immediate implementation were declared to be the sine qua non for the Muslim
League cooperation and participation in the formation of an Interim Government at the center.296
The resolution emphasized that any attempt to impose a Constitution or a Government on them
would be resisted by the League with all possible means at its disposal.297
On 11 April, the Cabinet Mission sent a telegram to London outlining two possible
schemes. Scheme A envisioned a unitary India with a loose federation charged primarily with the
control of Defense and Foreign Affairs.298 Scheme B would be based upon a divided India with
only the Muslim-majority districts - Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, Western Punjab, and Eastern
Bengal without Calcutta, and Sylhet district of Assam - going to Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission
pointed out that under Scheme B, the Defense would not be very effective as the small Pakistan
would be very weak and it could only be strengthened by treaty with India. On 13 April, Attlee
replied to the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy that London preferred Scheme A as Scheme B
would destroy the homogeneity of the Indian Army, which was now strong and well-equipped
and was charged with the defense of India. However, London would agree reluctantly to Scheme
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B if that was the only basis upon which a settlement could be agreed among the various players
in the Indian scene.299
The Viceroy met Jinnah on 16 April and presented him the two alternatives i.e. a
mutilated Pakistan with full sovereignty or a larger Pakistan federated with India in a union. He
was told that he could not reasonably hope to receive both the whole of the territory which he
claimed, and also the full measure of sovereignty.300 Wavell said that the full claim for Pakistan
had no chance of being accepted by the Congress or the British Government. If the full territories
were insisted upon then some element of sovereignty must be relinquished. If, however, full
sovereignty was desired, then the claim to the non-Muslim territories could not be conceded.301
The mission believed that progress might be possible in one of the two ways. One way would be
the creation of a separate state of Pakistan which would include Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, and
the Muslim-majority districts of Bengal, Punjab, and Assam. The inclusion of Calcutta in this
Pakistan could not be justified on any principle of self-determination.302 Under this scheme the
Indian States would be at liberty to join Hindustan or Pakistan or to remain outside.
Alternatively, the Congress and the League could sit together and try to agree to an India Union.
If the League agreed to such a union then it would be possible to include the six provinces that
Jinnah was demanding in one of the federations.303
The Cabinet Delegation interviewed Jinnah on 16 April, and Pethick Lawrence
emphasized that the essence of the Union Scheme was the equality of the two component parts.
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Jinnah said that no amount of equality provided on paper was going to work.304 Equality could
not exist between the majority and the minority within the same Governmental system. He did
not think that domination of Muslims by Hindus could be prevented under any scheme that kept
them together.305 Jinnah seemed to like the alternative scheme since it conceded the principle of
Pakistan. He said that he could not accept in any event the exclusion of Calcutta. 306 Jinnah
argued that even if the whole of his claims were granted, the Congress would still get threequarters of India. At the worst they would lose Calcutta, some part of Western Bengal, and the
Ambala division in the Punjab. The Secretary of State said that the Congress would lose much
more than that. They would lose the unity of India, which alone would make the country a strong
entity in the outside world.307 Further, if Pakistan were conceded the difficulty of getting the
States to join India would be greatly increased.308 Jinnah retorted that the unity of India was a
myth.
The Cabinet Mission then examined the question of a fully sovereign State of Pakistan as
demanded by Jinnah. The Mission found that the size of the non-Muslim minorities in the areas
claimed by the League for Pakistan would be very considerable. For example, Punjab had a nonMuslim population of 12 million out of a total population of 28 million, and Bengal’s nonMuslim population was 27 million out of a total population of 60 million. 309 The Mission
concluded that there was no justification for including within Pakistan large areas of Punjab,
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Bengal, and Assam in which the population was predominantly non-Muslim. The Mission
realized that every argument that could be used in favor of Pakistan could equally be used in
favor of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan.310
The Mission then considered the question of a smaller Pakistan by excluding non-Muslim
areas. Apart from the fact that Jinnah regarded it as quite impracticable, the Mission was also
aware that any radical partition of Punjab and Bengal would be contrary to the wishes of a very
large portion of inhabitants of these provinces.311 Punjab was the homeland of the Sikhs and any
partition of it would be bitterly resented by them. The Mission also argued that any partition of
the country would disintegrate the whole transportation, postal and telegraph system and the
irrigation network as they were built with a view to a united India.312 To break the Indian army
into two would be a deadly blow to its long tradition and high degree of efficiency. The small
Indian Navy and the newly formed Air Force would be rendered practically impotent. A further
consideration was the geographic fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan would be
separated by some seven hundred miles and the communication between them would be
dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan. Another important consideration was the greater
difficulty of securing adhesion of Indian States to a partitioned British India than to one having a
common federal center.313 Considering all these factors, the Mission arrived at the conclusion
that it was inadvisable to recommend partition of India.
The Mission then considered the Congress Scheme of Federation of India under which
the provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of central subjects such as
310
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Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications. The Mission saw the following difficulties in
the Congress Scheme:
Such a scheme if it stood alone would present grave constitutional difficulties and
anomalies. Certain Ministers of the Central Government whose portfolios were
concerned with the compulsory subjects would be responsible to the whole of
British India while other Ministers of the same Government whose portfolios
related to the optional subjects would be responsible only to the Provinces which
elected to federate for those subjects. This dichotomy would be reflected in the
Central legislature where it would be necessary to exclude from speaking and
voting certain members when subjects which their Provinces were not concerned
with were under discussion.314
In view of the wide divergence of views between the Congress and the League, the
Cabinet Mission invited four leaders from each of the two parties to a conference to meet with
the three members of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy to hammer out a settlement.315 The
conference met at Simla from 5 to 12 May and came to be known as the Second Simla
Conference.316 The basis for discussion was set out in identical letters of invitation sent on 27
April by Lord Pethick Lawrence to Azad and Jinnah, the presidents of the two organizations. The
plan envisioned a three-tier structure for the future Constitution of India. At the center there
would be a union Government dealing with only Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications.
In the middle tier there would be two groupings of provinces; one group comprising of
predominantly Hindu majority provinces and the other group consisting of predominantly
Muslim majority provinces. 317 The group constitutions for these provinces would deal with
subjects which the provinces in the respective group desired to be dealt with in common. At the
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bottom tier, the provinces would have their own constitutions to deal with residuary subjects not
dealt in the two upper tiers.
Discussions continued through seven sessions in all, but the Congress and the League
remained poles apart. In the first session the Congress representatives and their League
counterparts clashed over the power of the center to raise revenue. The Congress representatives
wanted certain ancillary subjects such as Customs, Currency, and Tariff to be central subjects to
make the center self-sufficient. Jinnah countered by saying that the center should not have the
power to raise money through taxation. Instead, the power should be vested in group legislatures
who should decide how much money to contribute to the center. Nehru said that such a center
would be a vague and airy center with no effective power.318 He argued that in case of war or
other emergency when money would be needed quickly, it was inconceivable that the decision
could be made in a timely manner by two or three forums. He asserted that there should be a
legislative forum at the center and the necessary financial apparatus.
In the second session, Jinnah voiced his opposition to the union having a legislature and
also to Nehru’s proposal for establishing a Supreme Court at the center. In the third session,
Nehru said that the grouping scheme seemed to him an unnecessary intermediate body, placed
between the center and the provincial Governments, which would not be very efficient. 319
Wavell said that the scheme was designed to get over a psychological hurdle. It was not claimed
to be ideal from the administrative point of view. The main reason for the formation of groups
was to get over the communal difficulty and to make it possible to call together a constitutionmaking body. Basically, Jinnah was prepared to accept a union executive formed on the basis of
318
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parity between the Hindus and the Muslims, functioning without a legislature and without the
power to raise taxes. The Congress, in contrast, wanted a union executive without parity, and
with a full-fledged legislature having the power to raise taxes.320 In short, Jinnah wanted a weak
center and the Congress desire was to have a strong center.
In the fourth session, Nehru objected to the provision that would allow compulsory
grouping of provinces. He gave the example of Sikhs and Hindus, a large minority in Punjab,
who would be averse to the idea of Punjab being forced into a group with North-West Frontier
Province. Jinnah retorted that the only way to avoid partition was to allow the grouping of the
provinces.321 The Congress was deeply suspicious of Jinnah’s real motives behind insisting on a
weak center and the compulsory grouping of provinces. They thought that Jinnah was preparing
the ground for the eventual creation of an expanded Pakistan after entrenching itself in the
groups of Muslim provinces.322 Sardar Patel remarked that Jinnah’s suggestion about limiting the
union to a period of only five years clearly exposed his real intentions.
The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy realized that the parties would not be able to
reach an agreement if left to their own devices. Consequently, on 8 May, the Secretary of State
sent to the Presidents of the Congress and the Muslim League a list of suggested points of
agreement between the two parties: “(1) There shall be an All-India Union Government and
Legislature dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defense, Communications, fundamental rights and
having the necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it requires for these subjects. (2) All
the remaining powers shall vest in the provinces. (3) Groups of provinces may be formed and
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such groups may determine the provincial subjects that they desire to take in common. (4) The
groups may set up their own executives and legislatures. (5) The legislature of the union shall be
composed of equal proportions from the Muslim-majority provinces and from the Hindumajority provinces. (6) The constitutions of the Union and the groups (if any) shall contain a
provision whereby any Province can by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a
reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 years
intervals thereafter.”323
Jinnah protested several provisions in the suggested points of agreement, particularly the
addition of “fundamental rights” to the union subjects and union legislature having the power to
raise revenues. He also said that the Muslim League would never agree to a single Constitutionmaking body. Gandhi wrote to Cripps voicing his opposition to the idea of parity between the
five Muslim majority provinces with a population of nine crores and the six Hindu majority
provinces with a population of nineteen crores.324 Azad, the president of the Congress Party,
wrote to the Secretary of State voicing his party’s objection to the compulsory grouping of
provinces and parity.325
The Conference met again on 9 May to take up the suggested points of agreement. Nehru
suggested that in order to break the gridlock, one or more representative from each side should
sit together and discuss the points again to reach an agreement, and an umpire should be

323

Letter from Mr. Turnbull to Maulana Azad and Jinnah enclosing the suggested points for
agreement between the representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, 8 May, 1946, in
Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7: The Cabinet Mission, 23 March – 29 June, 1946,
vol. 7, 462-463.
324
Letter from Jinnah to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 8 May, 1946, in Ibid, 466.
325
Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 258.
87

appointed to give a decision if the two sides were not able to agree on one or more points.326 It
seemed that Jinnah was initially open to the idea of meeting with Nehru and the appointment of
an umpire. However, when the Conference next met on 11 May, Jinnah had changed his mind
and ruled out any arbitration by an umpire.327 On the next day Jinnah submitted a memorandum
that included the minimum conditions on which the Muslim League would be prepared to come
to an agreement. 328 The final position of the Congress was conveyed by Azad on the same day as
a basis for an agreement. 329
.

The lists submitted by the two parties contained a wide divergence of views. The starting

point for the League was to set up first the two group Constitutions, one for Pakistan and the
other for Hindustan, to be followed by the Constitution for the Center. The League wanted an
extremely limited center without a legislature of its own and without the power to levy taxes. It
also wanted parity at the center with an equal number of representatives from the Muslim
majority provinces and the Hindu majority provinces. The starting point for the Congress, in
contrast, was the framing of a constitution for India as a whole to set up a powerful Federal
Government responsible not only for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications but also the
power to raise revenue through taxation, and responsible for matters such as Currency, Customs,
and Tariff.330 The Mission realized that the gap between the two parties was so wide that there
seemed no possible hope of reaching a settlement. It thus proceeded to announce its formula for
bringing about an agreement between the two parties. Accordingly, the Mission issued a
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statement in New Delhi on 16 May. The Statement of May 16 was central to the whole Cabinet
Mission and hence it is necessary to describe it in some detail.
The Statement of 16 May said that the Mission had examined closely and impartially the
possibility of a partition of India. 331 They believed that internal peace in India could not be
achieved unless the Muslims in India felt secure and given control in all matters vital to their
culture, religion, and economic interests. 332 The Mission had considered the option of an
independent Pakistan that would include the whole of the six Muslim majority provinces and had
come to the conclusion that it would not solve the communal minority problem because it would
force a very large population of unwilling non-Muslims into the new State of Pakistan. The
Mission had also evaluated the alternate option of a truncated Pakistan and believed that it would
be an unviable State which would be unable to sustain itself. Moreover, any division of Bengal
and Punjab would be contrary to the wishes of the people in those two provinces. After
considering all these factors, the Mission was unable to advise the British Government to transfer
power in India to two entirely separate sovereign States. The decision did not, however, blind
them to the very real apprehensions of the Muslims that their culture and political and social life
might get submerged in a purely unitary India in which the Hindus would be a dominating
element. The Mission also didn’t consider the Congress proposal of having compulsory and
optional subjects in the Center, in order for the provinces to pick and choose the optional
subjects, as practical and adequate. It, therefore, proceeded to offer its own solution to the
problem, which, in its view, would be fair and just to all parties involved. Keeping all those
factors in mind, the Cabinet Mission recommended the following as the basis for a new
constitution:
331
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1. There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States,
which would deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects.
2. The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British
Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in
the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives
present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of
all the members present and voting.
3. All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest
in the Provinces.
4. The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the
Union.
5. Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and
each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.
6. The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision
whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call
for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10
years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.333
After laying down the broad basis of the future Constitution, the Mission’s statement
proceeded to propose the Constitution-making machinery. 334 The statement observed that
although the most satisfactory and ideal solution to pick members of the Constitution-making
body would be through elections based on adult franchise, it would be a time-consuming process
which would cause unacceptable delay. 335 The alternative was to utilize the recently elected
Provincial Legislative Assemblies. The members of the Constitution-making body would come
from the Provincial Assemblies and each member would represent roughly one million people in
333
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a province. That would allot to each province a total number of seats proportional to its
population.
The Mission’s statement also suggested the procedure to be followed by the Constitutionmaking body. The elected members would assemble in New Delhi as soon as possible for a
preliminary meeting. At this meeting they would decide the general order of business and elect a
Chairman and other officers. Thereafter the representatives would separate into three sections:
Section A (consisting of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, and
Orissa), Section B (consisting of Punjab, NWFP, and Sind), and Section C (consisting of Bengal
and Assam).336 The sections would decide the provincial Constitutions for the provinces included
in their section and whether any group Constitution would be set up and if so, with what
provincial subjects it would deal.337 Provinces would have the power to opt out of the groups
after the first elections were held under the new constitution.338
After the group Constitutions had been settled, the three sections would reassemble for
the purpose of writing the union Constitution. 339 In the Union Constituent Assembly, any
resolution varying the recommendations made by the Cabinet Mission as to the basic form of the
Constitution or the raising of any major communal issue would require a majority of the
representatives of the two major communities present and voting. The Chairman of the Assembly
would decide which resolution raised a major communal issue. However, if so requested by a
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majority of the members of either of the two major communities, he would consult the Federal
Court before giving his decision.340
The Mission’s statement emphasized the importance of setting up at once an Interim
Government to carry on the administration of the country while the task of Constitution making
proceeded. The Interim Government had to have the support of all major political parties in India
and all the portfolios in the Interim Government, including that of the War Member, would be
held by Indians. Finally, the statement expressed the Cabinet Mission’s hope that the newly
independent India would choose to be a member of British Commonwealth. Even if it did not do
so, the Mission looked forward to close and friendly relations between the peoples of Great
Britain and India.
Neither the Congress nor the League was fully satisfied with the Cabinet Mission’s
statement. There followed a series of correspondence and interviews between the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy on the one hand, and the leaders of the two parties on the other. The
League attached the greatest importance to the early formation of groups of Provinces based on
the basis of communal majorities. The Congress, in contrast, laid stress on the freedom of a
province to decide whether to belong to a group right from the beginning. The Congress
Working Committee passed a resolution on 24 May objecting to a marked discrepancy in
Mission’s statement of 16 May. The resolution pointed out that the statement stressed the
principle of provincial autonomy but did not give them the choice whether or not to belong to the
group. 341 Azad also wrote a letter to Pethick-Lawrence pointing out the contradiction in the
Mission’s statement. He wrote: ‘The basic provision gives full autonomy to a province to do
340
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what it likes and subsequently there appears to be certain compulsion in the matter which clearly
infringes that autonomy.’342 In answer to the Congress resolution, the Cabinet Mission issued a
statement on 25 May which clarified the intent of the May 16 statement as regards to grouping of
the provinces. It pointed out that the formation of groups was an essential feature of the scheme
and could only be altered through agreement between the parties. The right to opt out of a group
could be exercised by a province only after the formation of the groups and the holding of the
first elections under the new constitution.343
The Congress also raised objections to several provisions in the Mission’s statement. It
raised the question of the representation of the peoples of the States in the Constituent Assembly.
It disagreed with the voting rights of European members in Provincial Assemblies, particularly in
Assam and Bengal, given the very small European population in those areas which contradicted
the ‘one representative per million people’ principle. The Congress pointed out that it would be
improper for any representative from Baluchistan to be included in the constitution-making body
since there was no elected assembly in that province. While the Congress was still not sure about
accepting the 16 May statement, the all India Muslim League Council met on June 6 and passed
a resolution accepting the 16 May statement with some reservations.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy were engaged in the task of
formulating a plan, acceptable to both the Congress and the League for the formation of an
Interim Government. This task became more and more difficult as the days passed by. The
Congress was firmly opposed to any kind of parity between the Hindus and Muslims or between
the Congress and the League in the Interim Government. It also insisted on including a

342
343

Letter from Maulana Azad to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 20 May, 1946, in Ibid, 640.
Prasad, Pathway to India’s Partition: The March to Pakistan, 1937-1947, vol. 3, 439.
93

nationalist Muslim within the quota of seats allocated to it. The League, in contrast, was equally
determined about getting parity between itself and the Congress, and also stubbornly insisted that
it would not agree to the inclusion of a non-League Muslim in the Interim Government. After all
the efforts to bring the two parties to an agreement failed, the Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy came out with their own plan for the formation of an Interim Government.344 The plan
was announced on June 16 and it proposed to set up an Interim Government comprising of
fourteen people345 - six from the Congress, five from the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian
Christian, and one Parsi.
The Congress and the League were both disappointed by the list proposed in the 16 June
scheme. After prolonged discussions, the Congress Working Committee on 25 June rejected the
16 June plan for the formation of the Interim Government. The Congress was not prepared to
give up its claim to being a nationalist organization representing all sections of the Indian people.
However, largely for tactical reasons, it decided to accept the long-term plan i.e. the Statement of
May 16, of course with reservations and its own interpretations. 346 After learning about the
Congress’s decision to reject the short-term plan on 25 June from the Viceroy, the Muslim
League immediately let the Viceroy know that it had accepted the 16 June statement.
The mission then proposed to set up a coalition Government since both the Congress and
the League had accepted the 16 May plan.347 Jinnah had obtained an assurance from the Viceroy
that if one Party accepted the plan and the other didn’t, the Party which had accepted the plan
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would be invited to form the Interim Government. This was affirmed by paragraph 8 of the 16
June statement, which stated that:
In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join
the setting up of a coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of
the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will
be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of 16
May.348
The interpretation of paragraph 8 of 16 June statement became a bone of contention
between the League on the one hand, and the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, on the other.349
Jinnah contended that since the Congress had rejected the Mission’s scheme for Interim
Government, which was integral to the overall plan, it should be taken that the Congress had
rejected the plan as a whole. Jinnah argued that since the League had accepted the plan in its
entirety i.e. both the Statements of 16 May and 16 June, it should be invited to form the Interim
Government. Contrary to this view, the Mission and the Viceroy held that since the Congress and
the League had both accepted the 16 May plan, they both should be invited to participate in a
coalition Government.350 Unable to reach an agreement, the Cabinet Mission left India on 29
June, after a stay of more than three months. There was still a chance of an agreement between
the parties. But an event took place that according to many brought about the League’s rejection
of the Cabinet Mission Plan.351
On July 10, Nehru held a press conference in Bombay in which he made the most
injudicious statement, which Azad describes in his book India Wins Freedom as one of the most
unfortunate events that changed the course of Indian history. In replying to a question from the
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press, Nehru stated that ‘the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly completely
unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they might arise.’352 On being further
pressed to clarify his answer, Nehru replied emphatically that ‘the Congress had agreed only to
participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet
Mission Plan as it thought best’.353 Nehru’s statement came as a shock to Jinnah. Azad sums up
Jinnah’s reaction as follows:
Mr. Jinnah was thus not at all happy about the outcome of the negotiations with
the Cabinet Mission. Jawaharlal’s statement came to him as a bombshell. He
immediately issued a statement that this declaration by the Congress President
demanded a review of the whole situation. The Muslim League Council had
accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in Delhi as it was assured that the Congress
also had accepted the scheme and the Plan would be the basis of future
constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the
Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the constituent
Assembly, this would mean that the minority would be placed at the mercy of the
majority. His view was that Jawaharlal’s declaration meant that the Congress had
rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and as such the Viceroy should call upon the
Muslim League, which had accepted the Plan, to form the Government.354
The Muslim League Council met in Bombay on 27 July and passed a resolution rejecting
the Cabinet Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to Direct Action for the achievement of
Pakistan. To recover from Nehru’s blunder the All India Congress Committee issued a statement
reaffirming its decision to accept the Mission’s Plan in its entirety. Jinnah, however, was not
prepared to accept the Congress’s position and held that Nehru’s statement revealed the real
intentions of the Congress.355 He said that if the Congress could change its mind frequently while
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the British were still there, what guarantee was there that they would not do so again when the
British left India?356
Thus the last attempt at bringing about a united free India collapsed. Out of the three
major players (the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League) in the game, the side that was
the least responsible for the failure of the Mission was the British. Churchill’s War Cabinet had
been replaced by a Labor Government. The new Labor Government was ideologically more
inclined to grant independence to India and was increasingly anxious to get out of India as soon
as possible.357 The British economy was in dire straits and India represented a drain on scarce
and precious resources.358 Public opinion in Britain was against retaining India, and last but not
the least, the international public opinion, particularly from the United States, was urging Britain
to give up India.359
The British had a long record of encouraging the separatist stance of Jinnah and the
Muslim League as an effective way to counter the forces of growing nationalism in India, in
order to prolong their rule over the country. But once they decided to leave India, they were not
particularly interested in partitioning India. They favored a transfer of power to a united India
that would keep the army undivided. After a close examination of the subject, they came to the
conclusion that a united India would be more helpful to the Commonwealth defense than a
divided one.360 A divided India would destroy the homogeneity and effectiveness of Indian army.
Pakistan was expected to be a weak State militarily which would likely to remain continuously
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embroiled in conflicts with India.361 Lacking depth in defense, Pakistan would not be an effective
buffer to Russian advance to the Middle East. Hence the Cabinet Mission’s first choice was to
keep India undivided through a suitable constitutional arrangement devised through agreements
between the two major parties in India. The Cabinet Mission did not want to transfer power to
the Congress and abandon the Muslims in India, who had been staunchly loyal to them over the
years. They also did not just want to quit India abruptly leaving her in chaos and confusion. That
would have damaged Britain’s prestige and reputation in the world. Hence they did their utmost
to bring the two parties to an agreement to break the political deadlock. They came up with one
of the most ingenious and brilliant scheme (the three-tier structure) ever devised in the annals of
constitutional history of the world and worked diligently to get it accepted by the two warring
parties but failed despite their best efforts.
The failure of the Cabinet Mission was due to many causes. The most important reason
perhaps was the deep suspicion between the Congress and the League.362 At every stage and at
every level the distrust between the two parties stood in the way of compromise. Even at the
personal level, there was deep animosity between the leaders of the two parties. For example,
Jinnah even refused to shake hands with Azad at the conference in Simla. It was a failure of
leadership, statesmanship, and unwillingness by the leaders to compromise for the greater good
of the country. As a result, India lost a golden opportunity to avoid the partition that was soon to
follow.
The Congress gave much emphasize on inessential points such as insisting on the right to
nominate a Muslim to the Interim Government, instead of focusing on the crux of the matter
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which was a united India.363 The Congress was the bigger and stronger party of the two and
hence had a greater responsibility to make concessions for the sake of keeping the country
united. Instead it acted in the most irresponsible fashion by bickering over insignificant issues.
Even when it was offered six seats in the Interim Government, a virtual denial of parity to
Jinnah, it still went ahead and rejected the 16 June statement, thus derailing the whole process. In
the opinion of the Cabinet Delegation, the Congress was playing hardball despite getting several
concessions from Jinnah. Jinnah had supported the Cabinet Mission Scheme, virtually
abandoning his demand for a sovereign Pakistan, instead settling for the grouping of provinces
with residuary powers.364 Nehru’s assertions at the 10 July press conference killed any glimmer
of hope of an agreement that might have been still alive at that point. Jinnah became even more
suspicious of Congress’s real intentions and became more obstinate in his opposition to any
efforts for cooperation with the Congress.365
The Congress goal was to establish a strong and organic center with its own Executive
and Legislature.366 The Congress, at a minimum, wanted the Center to have the power to raise
taxes apart from the responsibility of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications. It wanted
to rapidly industrialize India in the Soviet model. Industrialists like Birla (the major backers of
the Congress Party) were hopeful for a powerful Central Government in free India, footing the
bill for capital-intensive projects like building roads, bridges, power plants and other
infrastructures that India desperately lacked. 367 The Cabinet Mission Plan seemed a cruel
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watering down of all that expectation. 368 The grouping scheme and the compulsion for the
provinces to join their respective groups seemed to Congress a virtual invitation to Pakistan.
When Congress rejected the June 16 Statement, Jinnah took it as a clear indication that he would
be invited to form the Interim Government. However, the Congress decided on 24 June to have
their cake and eat it by issuing a retroactive and heavily qualified acceptance of the 16 May
statement, which allowed them to be brought back into the proceedings.369 Wavell acknowledged
in a secret memorandum that the Congress move was a ‘dishonest one’ and questioned whether it
should be accepted. 370 Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence, who were sympathetic to the Congress
position, intervened in favor of the Congress.
Although the Muslim League had accepted the grouping of provinces under a weak
federation, a reading of its June 6 resolution makes it clear that it had not at all jettisoned its
cherished objective of establishing a sovereign Pakistan.371 The June 6 resolution of the Muslim
League declared:
In order that there may be no manner of doubt in any quarter, the Council of the
All India Muslim League reiterates that the attainment of the goal of a complete
sovereign Pakistan still remains the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India,
for the achievement of which they will, if necessary, employ every means in their
power, and consider no sacrifice or suffering too great.372
In his Presidential remarks on 6 June, Jinnah declared amidst loud cheers: ‘Let me tell
you that Muslim India would not rest content until we have established a full, complete, and
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sovereign Pakistan.’373 Jinnah’s observation and the Muslim League resolution of 6 June make it
clear that the League decided to participate in the Cabinet Mission Plan considering it as a
stepping stone for achieving its ultimate goal of Pakistan. Despite Jinnah’s real intentions, the
fact remains that the Cabinet Mission presented the last best chance for keeping India united and
the blame must be placed on the Congress for its failure to utilize the opportunity.
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Chapter Six
Direct Action, Interim Government, and Constituent Assembly
At the meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League in Bombay on 27 July,
1946 Jinnah accused the Cabinet Mission of breach of faith with the Muslims of India and
having ‘played into the hands of the Congress’. 374 He said that the League had given many
concessions but the Congress had shown no appreciation of the sacrifices it had made.375 Instead,
the Congress was bent upon setting up a Caste Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the
British. Therefore, the League had no alternative but to adhere once more to the national goal of
Pakistan. On 29 July, the Muslim League Council passed the following resolution authorizing
the Working Committee to draw up a plan of ‘Direct Action’ to achieve Pakistan:
…the Council of the All India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has
come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan and
assert their just rights and to vindicate their honor and to get rid of the present
slavery under the British and contemplated future caste-Hindu domination. This
Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole
representative organization, the All India Muslim League, and be ready for any
sacrifice. This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a
programme of direct action to carry out the policy initiated above and to organize
the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.376
The Muslim League Working Committee soon followed up the Council’s resolution by
calling upon the Muslims throughout India to observe 16 August as ‘Direct Action Day’, when
meetings would be held over the country to explain the resolution. On that day, Jinnah thundered
‘We bid goodbye to constitutional methods.’377 While the celebrations of ‘Direct Action day’
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passed off peacefully in most parts of India, Calcutta witnessed the most horrific events. HinduMuslim clashes began on that day and carnage of an unprecedented scale continued for the next
four or five days. It came to be known as the ‘Great Calcutta Killings’ that left over 4,000 dead,
10,000 injured, and 100,000 homeless. It started when Members of Muslim League in
processions on the streets of Calcutta celebrating ‘Direct Action Day’ started attacking and
looting Hindu shops. Soon the acts of vandalism spread throughout the city and Calcutta burst
into flames. Many Hindus were butchered, their women were raped, and their houses and shops
were looted and in some cases burnt.378 The Hindus were taken completely unawares.379 But,
they soon organized and retaliated. Calcutta was soon in the grip of a communal orgy of violence
and the situation descended into an open civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims. The
Muslims started the provocations but, in the end, they were the ones who suffered more
casualties. The Hindustan Times on August 18 and 19 described the events:
The whole city of Calcutta is in the grip of terror. Rioting and looting which
started yesterday continued throughout the night and the situation grew worse in
the morning…Reports of stabbing, assaults on women, burning of houses and
looting of shops on a big scale are being received from different parts of the
city…Two leading hospitals of Calcutta are so full with riot victims that they are
unable to take any more…Bus and tram services in the city are paralyzed…Most
pitiful sights were women and children and injured men being evacuated from the
north side of the city, which is predominantly Muslim, to Hindu areas in the
south. In babbling tearchoked phrases, they told of women being attacked,
children being hacked and their menfolk killed before their eyes…380
Anita Inder Singh writes in her book The Origins of Partition of India: ‘there is no doubt
of the complicity of Suhrawardy and the Provincial League in the incidents in Calcutta’. Azad, in
an interview with the Viceroy, severely criticized the Bengal Ministry and its Premier
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Suhrawardy for not taking sufficient precautions even if they had apprehended trouble.381 He
wrote that throughout Calcutta the military and the police were standing by but remained inactive
while innocent men and women were being killed.382 Indecisive action by the British Governor
of Bengal province, Sir Fredrick Burrows, was also blamed for the situation getting out of hand.
Under 1935 Act, it was the responsibility of the Governor to maintain law and order in his
province. It has been alleged that Burrows sat inactive during the initial hours of the riots
allowing the situation to deteriorate. A prompt action in bringing in the army to contain the
situation would have averted the unprecedented holocaust in Calcutta. However, it was a no-win
situation for the British. If the Governor had called the military and used excessive force to
stamp out the disturbances, the British would have been accused of heavy-handed imperialism
and militarism.
Considering the worsening communal situation in the country, the Viceroy decided to
make another attempt to form a coalition Government. A letter containing a proposal for an
Interim Government which would include six members from the Congress, five members from
the League, and three representatives from minorities chosen by the Viceroy, was sent to Nehru
and Jinnah. As expected, Jinnah rejected the proposal. In the face of Jinnah’s intransigent
attitude, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy felt that the Congress should be given a chance to
form the Interim Government and they hoped that ultimately Jinnah would relent and the League
would join the Interim Government. On 6 August, Wavell wrote a letter to Nehru informing him
the decision to invite the Congress to make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim
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Government. The Congress Working Committee meeting at Wardha on 8 August authorized
Nehru to accept the invitation to form an Interim Government.383
Nehru met Jinnah in order to persuade him to join the proposed Interim Government.
Nehru’s proposals were along the same lines as the Viceroy’s and Jinnah was less disposed to
accept them from the Congress than the British. 384 Jinnah remained as distrustful and
uncompromising as ever. In a published statement he spoke bitterly of the Congress as a Caste
Hindu Fascist organization who along with their few individual henchmen of other communities
wanted to be installed in power and rule over the Muslims, with the aid of British bayonets.385
Nehru and the Viceroy settled on the composition of the Interim Government after few
discussions. On 24 August, the names of 12 out of 14 members were announced. The list
included five Caste Hindus from the Congress (Nehru, Patel, Prasad, Rajagopalachari, and Sarat
Bose), one Scheduled Caste member from the Congress (Jagjivan Ram), three non-League
Muslims (Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, M. Asaf Ali, and Syed Ali Zaheer), one Sikh (Sardar Baldev
Singh), one Indian Christian (John Matthai), and one Parsee (C. H. Bhabha).386
Shortly after making the announcement on the formation of the Interim Government,
Lord Wavell flew to Calcutta to see firsthand the tragic events that had taken place there as a
result of the ‘Direct Action Day’ call by the Muslim League.387 What he saw there convinced
him that if some sort of agreement was not brought about between the two major communities
soon, other parts of the country could experience the horrors of Calcutta. Nazimuddin, one of the
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prominent League leaders in Bengal, told the Viceroy that if the Congress would make an
unequivocal statement that the provinces could not opt out of groups except as laid out in the
Statement of 16 May, there was a fair chance that the Muslim League might join the Interim
Government and the Constituent Assembly.388 Wavell met Gandhi and Nehru on 27 August and
told them what had happened in Calcutta. He gave them the following draft of a formula which
he thought might satisfy Jinnah:
The Congress are prepared in the interest of communal harmony to accept the
intention of the Statement of May 16th that provinces cannot exercise any option
affecting their membership of the sections or of the groups if formed, until the
decision contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the Statement of 16th May is taken
by the new Legislature after the new constitutional arrangements have come into
operation and the first general elections have been held.389
Neither Gandhi nor Nehru was prepared to accept the formula, but at the request of the
Viceroy, Nehru placed the formula before the Working Committee of the Congress. The
Working Committee stuck to its old view and added that any dispute as to the interpretation of
the clauses pertaining to grouping in 16 May statement might be referred to the Federal Court
and that they would abide by it. Nehru wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 20 August informing him
of the decision of the Working Committee. The Secretary of State sent a cable to the Viceroy
advising him to on no account do or say anything that might occasion a break with the
Congress.390 Wavell continued to urge Nehru to make attempts to bring the Muslim League into
the Government. Wavell thought that the Congress was out to grab all powers for itself. He wrote
in his journal:
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I saw Nehru from 3.0 to 4.0 p.m., and Gandhi from 4.0 to 5.0 p.m. No progress,
quite obviously they do not want Jinnah and the League in, and Gandhi at the end
exposed Congress policy of domination more nakedly than ever before. The more
I see of that old man, the more I regard him as an unscrupulous old hypocrite; he
would shrink from no violence and blood-letting to achieve his ends, though he
would naturally prefer to do so by chicanery and false show of mildness and
friendship.391
The question of the League’s participation in the Interim Government continued to be on
the top of Wavell’s agenda.392 He held a series of talks with Nehru, Jinnah and other leaders of
both parties to get the Muslim League in the Government. Wavell tried to impress upon Jinnah
that in its own interests the League would be well-advised to join the Interim Government.
Wavell’s persistence finally paid off. On 13 October, the Muslim League decided to come in. In
his typical fashion Jinnah wrote the following letter to the Viceroy, first rejecting the basis and
scheme of setting up the Interim Government, and then agreeing to participate in the Interim
Government:
The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League have considered the
whole matter fully and I am now authorized to state that they do not approve of
the basis and scheme of setting up the Interim Government…We consider and
maintain that the imposition of this decision is contrary to the Declaration of
August 8, 1940, but since, according to your decision we have a right to nominate
five members of the Executive Council on behalf of the Muslim League, my
committee have, for various reasons, come to the conclusion that in the interests
of Mussulmans and other communities it would be fatal to leave the entire field of
administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress. Besides,
you may be forced to have in your Interim Government Muslims who do not
command the respect and confidence of Muslim India which would lead to very
serious consequences; and lastly, for other very weighty grounds and reasons,
which are obvious and need not be mentioned, we have decided to nominate five
on behalf of the Muslim League…393
On 14 October, Jinnah sent the names of 5 nominees of the Muslim League. They were
Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and Jogendra Nath
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Mandal.394 Two of the people (Chundrigar, and Khan) were complete unknowns. Azad wrote
‘They were dark horses about whom even members of the League had little information’.395
Jinnah deliberately bypassed moderate leaders like Nazimuddin and Ismail Khan who were wellknown nationally and widely expected to be nominated. 396 They were discarded in favor of
Jinnah’s henchmen. Wavell wrote in his journal:
When I studied it in detail, it was rather a disappointing list. Liaquat Ali Khan and
Nishtar were certainties, but Chundrigar from Bombay and Ghazanfar Ali Khan
from Punjab are poor substitutes for Ismail Khan and Nazimuddin.397
The inclusion of a Scheduled Caste member was an obvious reply to the right claimed by
the Congress to nominate a Muslim.398 In order to make place for the nominees of the League,
the Congress decided that Sarat Bose, Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, and Syed Ali Zaheer would
resign from the Interim Government. There followed a tussle between the Congress and the
League regarding the distribution of portfolios. Finally, it was decided to allot to the Muslim
League representatives the five portfolios of Finance, Commerce, Communications, Health and
Law.399
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There was, however, no Coalition Government in the real sense of the word.400 Instead of
the Congress and the League working together, the Interim Government became a sad spectacle
of bitter wrangling between the members of two parties. 401 The real intention of the League
members was to obstruct the Government from within. Before joining the Government,
Ghazanfar Ali Khan had made clear the intention of the League members in the following way:
In the Interim Government all our activities shall be guided by two
considerations: that is, to convince the Congress that no Government in India can
function smoothly without the cooperation of the Muslim League, and that the
League is the sole representative organization of the Indian Muslims. The Interim
Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign and we shall most
scrupulously carry out the orders of Mr. Jinnah on any front that we are called
upon to serve.402
Liaquat Ali as Finance Minister had the right to scrutinize every proposal put forward by
all departments of the Government. He fully utilized his power to make it difficult for any
Congress member to function effectively. Azad said that the League members were in the
Government yet against it. Liaquat Ali framed a budget that proposed heavy taxation on the rich
businessmen and the industrialists. This did not sit well with the Congress as the businessmen
and the industrialists were mostly Hindus who funded the Congress machinery. Patel and
Rajagopalachari were vehemently opposed to Liaquat’s budget, which they said was designed to
destroy the business community and could do permanent damage to commerce and industry.
The League’s entry into the Interim Government did not bring about the expected lull in
communal violence.403 The ‘Great Calcutta Killings’ which began on 16 August as a result of the
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League’s call to ‘direct action’ had spread like prairie fire to other parts of the country. East
Bengal followed by Bihar witnessed the worst communal violence ever seen in India. A wellorganized programme of ethnic-cleansing had been set in motion in the Noakhali and Tippera
districts in East Bengal. 404 There were forced conversions of Hindus to Islam in public
ceremonies where they were made to parade wearing caps inscribed ‘Pakistan’ and Muslim-style
lungis.405 Hindus were forced to eat beef, their shops and properties were looted and destroyed,
and their temples and idols were desecrated. Other atrocities included raping of women and
forcible marriage of Hindu women to Muslim men. A news report in the Hindustan Times on 15
October, 1946 described the situation as:
Riotous mobs with deadly weapons are raiding villages, and looting, murder and
arson are continuing since Thursday, October 10, on a very large scale. Forcible
mass conversion, abduction of women and desecration of places of worship are
also reported…Approaches to the affected areas are being guarded by armed
hooligans…406
Gandhi was in Delhi when the news from East Bengal came through. He was particularly
hurt by the crimes committed against women.407 He cancelled all his plans and decided to leave
for Bengal immediately. 408 Friends tried to dissuade him as he was in poor health and the
ongoing political events unfolding in Delhi required his presence there. ‘All I know is that I
won’t be at peace with myself unless I go there’, he replied.409 There were mammoth crowds at
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all big stations on the way to get a glimpse of Mahatma.410 At Calcutta he saw the ravages of
August riots and confessed to a ‘sinking feeling at the mass madness that can turn a man less
than a brute.’411 At a prayer meeting in Calcutta he said that he would not leave Bengal until the
last embers of the trouble were stamped out.412 In the succeeding days, Gandhi, Suhrawardy and
other prominent leaders of Bengal hammered out a peace formula for bringing back communal
harmony in Bengal, which became the corner-stone of Gandhi’s peace mission in Noakhali.413
The signatories to the peace formula constituted themselves into a peace committee, composed
of an equal number of Hindus and the Muslims for the whole of Bengal with the Chief-Minister
as the chairman, to bring about communal peace in the province.
While preparing to go to Noakhali, news came to Gandhi of tragic events that were taking
place in Bihar. As news of Noakhali spilled over into Bihar, the Hindu-majority province
witnessed the worst communal violence since the beginning of British rule in India. Hindu
refugees who fled from East Bengal into Bihar carried tales of atrocities committed by the
Muslims against the Hindu men, women and children. Their tales of woes excited the Hindus of
Bihar to murderous attacks on their Muslim neighbours, the scale and savagery of which quite
eclipsed that in East Bengal. Sensational newspaper headlines whipped the Hindus into hysteria
and the propaganda by Hindu Mahasabha added fuel to the desire of revenge.414 The carnage
started in Patna and quickly spread to other parts of Bihar. Thousands poured into the streets
chanting ‘Blood for Blood’. The killings of Muslims seem to have been committed by gangs
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organized by local Hindu landlords and financed by the Marwari businessmen of Calcutta.415 The
official estimate put the death toll at 4,580 (some estimates put the figure at 10,000 or more), and
most of dead were Muslims. Nehru was outraged at this mindless killing of Muslims and
threatened to use aerial bombing unless the mayhem stopped immediately. Filled with grief,
Gandhi said that the Bihari Hindus had disgraced India. As penance for the Bihar madness
Gandhi announced that he would keep himself ‘on the lowest diet possible’ and that would
become a ‘fast unto death if the erring Biharis have not turned over a new leaf’.416
From Calcutta, Gandhi proceeded to Noakhali where frightened Hindus were fleeing
before the violence of the Hindu majority.417 Despite his old age and frailty, he plunged into a
punishing regime of travel and speeches, trying to confront the bitterness and terror, calming and
comforting those he met. 418 For months, Gandhi worked 16 to 18 hours a day, going from one
village to another on foot spreading his message of non-violence to induce the two communities
to live in peace and harmony again. He urged the Hindus to return home, and to fear none but
God. In a prayer meeting at Srirampur on 26 November, Gandhi said even if a solitary refugee
had to return to his village populated by Muslims, he would unhesitatingly advise his return. He
further added that if they were to become a self-respecting nation and a brave people, this
courage was indispensable.419
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Gandhi called for a Hindu and a Muslim in each village to accompany the returning
refugees and stand surety for their safety. 420 He instructed each member of his entourage,
including the ladies, to settle down in one affected village and make himself or herself hostage
for the safety and security of the Hindu minority of that village.421 His idea was that every Hindu
worker thus sent should be accompanied by a Mussalman worker and both of them together
should mix with the local people and gradually create an atmosphere in which the refugees
would shed their fears and be able to come back and live in peace and friendship once more.422
He himself decided to stay with Muslim families during his tours of villages. He said if the
Hindus saw him living alone with Muslim families, it would probably induce them to return to
their homes with confidence.423 The Muslims, too, would be able to examine his life closely and
they would find out for themselves whether he was their friend or enemy.424
The restoration of confidence between the two communities was, however, a slow and
gradual process.425 Nevertheless, Gandhi’s presence acted as a soothing balm on the riot affected
villages of East Bengal. It assuaged anger, softened tempers, and eased tensions.426 Yet, Muslim
hostility to his continuing presence was rife and there were sustained propaganda in the Muslim
press against his stay in East Bengal, suspecting it as a ‘deep political game’.427 Gandhi was not
dismayed by the opposition; he was determined to stay in Bengal until calm returned to the area
and it was a ‘do or die’ proposition for him. As the situation in East Bengal improved, Gandhi
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left Bengal and headed to Bihar in March. Basing himself in Patna, he began the same work of
reconciliation and restoration of courage.428 While parts of India were in turmoil, arrangements
for setting up a Constituent Assembly began in New Delhi.
Differences between the Congress and the League came to a head over the summoning of
the Constituent Assembly.429 The annual session of the Congress, which met at Meerut during
the third week of November, demanded that either the League join the Constituent Assembly or
quit the Interim Government as the League’s entry into the Government was conditional upon its
acceptance of the long-term plan of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. Jinnah retorted by saying that
since the Congress had never accepted the compulsory grouping scheme of the Cabinet Mission
Plan, the Constituent Assembly should not proceed. Meanwhile, Wavell was urging London to
issue a clear statement to clarify the real intent of the Cabinet Mission Plan as regards to the
grouping scheme. He admitted that it might anger the Congress and lead to resignation of the
Congress Governments at the center and the provinces and further escalate violence in the
country. In that case, he suggested that the British Government should follow his suggestion of
setting a firm date to quit India and transfer power on a province by province basis in the interim
period.430 However, London was not yet prepared to scuttle from India without making further
efforts to bring the two parties together.
The British Government, realizing that the situation could no longer be allowed to drift
further, decided to summon two representatives from the Congress and two from the Muslim
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League, and one from the Sikh Community.431 Nehru rejected the invitation initially, but later
agreed to come to London at the urging of the Prime Minister Attlee. On 2 December, Nehru,
Baldev Singh, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali, and the Viceroy arrived in London. The discussions that
followed failed to bring out an agreement.432 On 6 December, the British Government issued a
statement that gave a verdict in favor of the League’s interpretation of the grouping scheme of
the Cabinet Mission Plan. 433 The statement also included the right of each party to refer all
questions of interpretations in dispute to a Federal Court whose decision would be final. 434
However, the statement was accompanied by an assurance to Jinnah that if the Federal Court’s
decision was contrary to the British Government’s interpretation then they would have to
consider the position afresh.435 This was unacceptable to the Congress, which was ready to abide
by the decision of the Federal Court even if it went against its position.436
The Constituent Assembly met on 9 December. The Muslim League members decided to
boycott it. The most important and politically significant resolution, known as the ‘Objective
Resolution’, was moved by Nehru. 437 It envisaged the Indian Union as ‘an Independent
Sovereign Republic’ comprising of autonomous units with residuary powers, wherein the
economic, political and social freedom of everyone would be guaranteed with adequate
safeguards for minorities and backward communities.438 The Constituent Assembly met again on
20 January and had a six-day session. Nehru’s ‘Objective Resolution’ was passed and some
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important committees were appointed. The Working Committee of the Muslim League met at
Karachi on 31 January and passed a lengthy resolution denouncing the composition and
procedure of the Constituent Assembly.
When Jinnah called for ‘Direct Action’, he had no idea what was coming. It was for him
a bargaining move to get more out of the British and the Congress, rather than a call to
violence.439 He had called for the day of ‘Direct Action’ to be a day of ‘peaceful reflection’, not a
day of violence. But the call for ‘Direct Action’ unleashed pent-up forces of disorder of such
magnitude that they brought parts of India close to anarchy. It started with the ‘Great Calcutta
Killings’ which claimed five thousand lives and left thousands more injured and homeless. The
violence did not stop there. In a chain reaction it spread to East Bengal where the Muslims
butchered the Hindus in great numbers and, in retaliation, the Hindus in Bihar slaughtered their
Muslim neighbors in even greater numbers. The violence then spread to other parts of India such
as the United Provinces, and Bombay.
Convinced that a Coalition Government was the only way out of preventing a civil war,
Wavell made a last-ditch effort to get assurance from the Congress on the grouping scheme so
that the Muslim League could be induced to participate in the Interim Government. Gandhi and
Nehru stubbornly stuck to their position of ‘no compromise’ with Jinnah. On 2 September, 1946
Congress took office in the Interim Government. The Congress was ready to get the Constituent
Assembly going and it was in no mood to accommodate Jinnah who had been tarred by the spate
of violence that had engulfed India.440 The Congress’s aim was to consolidate its position in the
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Government, get rid of the British as soon as possible, and then it could deal with the Muslims
and the Princes in its own terms.
By the autumn of 1946, Jinnah had been pushed into a corner. Moreover, there was the
danger of the British quitting India, leaving the Muslims at the mercy of a Hindu Raj. At this
point, the only course open to Jinnah was to join the Interim Government and try to prevent the
Congress from consolidating its position.441 Jinnah made abundantly clear that there could be no
question of the League members in the Interim Government cooperating with their Congress
counterparts. As we have seen, the League members, selected by Jinnah, did their master’s
bidding to obstruct the functioning of the Government in every possible mean at their disposal.
Thus a great opportunity to work together was again lost by the two warring parties. Wavell tried
his best to build a truly coalition Government so that the British could transfer power to a
responsible entity. However, the mistrust and the ill-feeling between Jinnah and the Congress
had reached such a level that it was impossible to get them to agree on anything. Hence the tugof-war between them continued unabated and as a result India had to pay a heavy price in terms
of a bloody partition.

441

Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, 223.
117

Chapter Seven
Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Independence, and Partition
On 20 February, 1947 Prime Minister Attlee announced in the British Parliament the new
Statement of British Policy for India. It came to be known as the Attlee Declaration. Paragraph 7
of the declaration said ‘the present state of uncertainty in India is fraught with danger and cannot
be indefinitely prolonged. Hence His Majesty’s Government wished to make it clear that it is
their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transfer of power into effective
Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948’.442 The declaration further added that if the
Indians had not reached an agreement and formed a constitution by the stated date, then the
British would transfer power to parties that would seem most expedient at that time, keeping in
mind the best interests of Indian people.443 Along with this statement it was also announced that
Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in SE Asia,
would soon replace Wavell as the Viceroy of India. Mountbatten was given extraordinary
plenipotentiary power to carry out his mission in India. His mission was clear cut.444 First try to
unite the warring parties and leave a united India. If unsuccessful, then consider the option of
division.445 He was also directed to keep India in the Commonwealth.446
Nehru welcomed the decision of the British Government to transfer power by June 1948.
Jinnah’s response was, come what may, the Muslim league would not yield an inch in its demand
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for Pakistan.447 Meanwhile the communal situation in Punjab rapidly deteriorated. From 1920 till
1942, Punjab operated under coalition governments, mostly under the leadership of Sir Sikander
Hyat Khan, in which Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs had participated.448 After the death of Sikander
Hyat Khan, the Unionist Party had weakened, and the Muslim League, with its demand for
Pakistan, had gained ascendancy in Punjab.449 When the League emerged as the single largest
party in the elections of 1946 and yet failed to put together a coalition government, it became
very bitter and resentful. The Muslim League concentrated all its energies on overthrowing the
coalition government headed by Khizr Hyat Khan, the son of Sikander Hyat Khan. 450 Under
pressure from the League, Khizr resigned. Governor Evan Jenkins called Khan of Mamdot, the
leader of the Provincial Muslim League, to form a government. Both the Hindus and Sikhs
refused to cooperate and as a result the Governor was obliged to impose section 93451 in Punjab
on 5 March.452 Communal rioting broke out on a large scale in Lahore, and from there it spread
into Multan, Rawalpindi, and Amritsar.
A new crisis developed in the Interim Government. Liaquat Ali proposed a 25% tax on
all businesses on profits more than one hundred thousand rupees. The Congress interpreted it as
a clever attempt by the League to punish the Hindu capitalists, the major financiers of the
Congress Party. It was also seen as a maneuver by the League to split the right wing of the
Congress from its socialist left wing.453 By the time Lord Wavell left the country, the situation
was pretty bleak. Riots were widespread in Punjab and elsewhere. The prospect of a Congress
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and League rapprochement looked virtually non-existent. Putting it mildly, the task that faced the
new Viceroy was an unenviable one.
The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in India on 22 March, 1947, and two days
later assumed office. He held a series of interviews with the leaders from both parties. In his first
meeting with Gandhi on 1 April, he was staggered by the Mahatma’s suggestion that Jinnah
should be called upon to head the Interim Government as Prime Minister.454 In the next meeting
with the Viceroy, Gandhi elaborated his proposal and added that Jinnah should be given a free
hand to choose his ministers, if necessary entirely from the Muslim League, and if Jinnah wanted
he could always build a coalition with Nehru and the Congress.455 Gandhi pointed out that if
Jinnah refused the offer, then the offer would have to be made to the Congress, and he hoped that
the Congress would include all shades of opinion including the Muslim League.456 Mountbatten
records his conversation with Gandhi as:
I twitted him that he really desired me to form a Central Government run by the
Congress, to whom I would turn over power, and that the preliminary offer to
Jinnah was merely a maneuver. He assured me with burning sincerity that this
was so far being the case that he then and there volunteered to place the whole
services at my disposal in trying to get the Jinnah Government through first by
exercising his influence with the Congress to accept it, and secondly touring the
length and breadth of the country getting all the peoples of India to accept the
decision. He convinced me of his sincerity, and I told him so.457
When Mountbatten met Azad and told him about Gandhi’s proposal, the latter endorsed
the idea. However, Nehru and Sardar Patel were very much opposed to Gandhi’s proposal as
being impractical and ultimately the Congress Working Committee rejected the idea. Gandhi
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wrote a letter to Mountbatten expressing his failure to persuade the Working Committee to
accept his plan.458
In his meetings with the League leaders, Mountbatten came to know the deep resentment
they held towards the Congress. For example, on 3 April, Liaquat Ali Khan met the Viceroy and
said: ‘Since my dealings with the Congress Members of the Interim Government, I have come to
realize that they are utterly impossible people to work with, since there is no spirit of
compromise and fair play in them, and the majority are thinking only of ways and means by
which they can do down the Muslim League and improve their own position.’459 Jinnah, in his
discussions with Mountbatten, stood firm as a rock on the demand for partition.460 In his third
personal report to London, filed on 17 April, Mountbatten wrote:
I have had six meetings during the past week with Jinnah, averaging between two
to three hours each…He has made abundantly clear that the Muslim League will
not under any circumstance reconsider the Cabinet Mission Plan, and he is intent
on having Pakistan…he said ‘you must carry out a surgical operation; cut India
and its army firmly in half and give me the half that belongs to the Muslim
League’. I told him if I accepted his argument on the need for partition of India,
then I could not resist the arguments that Congress were putting forward for the
partition of the Punjab and Bengal. He was quite horrified and argued at great
length to preserve the unity of Punjab and Bengal…461
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Mountbatten’s impression of Jinnah in his own words: ‘I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic
case; in fact until I had met him I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a
complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down
so powerful a position.’462 On another occasion, when Mountbatten persisted with his argument
that if India was divided, by the same logic Punjab and Bengal, too, would have to be divided,
Jinnah told him: ‘if you persist in chasing me with your ruthless logic we shall get nowhere’.463
Finally, Mountbatten gave him two choices: (1) the Cabinet Mission Plan which gave him all
five provinces of Pakistan with complete autonomy within India and only a weak center; and (2)
a very moth-eaten Pakistan.464 Jinnah replied: ‘I do not care how little you give me as long as
you give it to me completely’.465 These preliminary decisions with the Indian leaders convinced
the Viceroy that the deep chasm between the two parties was unbridgeable.466 It became quickly
apparent to him that there was no alternative to the partition of India. He realized that in the
present circumstances the Cabinet Mission Plan was unworkable and the partition of India was
inevitable.
Meanwhile, the communal tension in the country was going from bad to worse. Some of
the extremists among the Sikhs were demanding their own separate state, to be called Khalistan.
The Sikhs made it clear that if Pakistan was forced upon them, then they would fight against it to
the last man.467 In NWFP, an idea of a separate Pathan state was being mooted.468 Taking their
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cue from Jinnah, the local bodies of Muslim League in the United Province and Bombay began
to demand the right of self-determination for Muslims in certain pockets of those provinces.469
Serious communal outbreaks and incidents of stabbing, arson, and looting were occurring at
various parts of the country. In the face of progressively deteriorating situation in the country,
Lord Mountbatten felt that if the procedure for the transfer of power was not finalized quickly,
then there was a possibility that at least in some parts of the country there would be no authority
to which power could be transferred.470
By the end of April 1947, Nehru and Patel had become reconciled to the idea of partition.
Nehru wrote a letter to Mountbatten on 1 May in which he said:
In regard to the proposals which, I presume, Lord Ismay is carrying with him to
London, our committee are prepared to accept the principle of partition based on
self-determination as applied to definitely ascertained areas. This involves the
partition of Bengal and Punjab. As you know, we are passionately attached to the
idea of a United India, but we have accepted the partition of India in order to
avoid conflict and compulsion. In order to give effect to this partition every effort
should be made to meet the wishes and the interests of the people affected by it.471
However, Gandhi had not yet accepted the idea of partition by then. During his meeting
with Mountbatten on 4 May, he forcefully opposed the partition of India. He was of the view that
if partition must take place, then it should happen only after the British left India. He did not
agree with Mountbatten that the idea of partition was according to the wishes of the people of
India.472 He said that the British were practically imposing partition on the people of India.473
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When Mountbatten asked for an alternative, Gandhi again mentioned his original plan, which
was to invite Jinnah to form a government and let him chose his cabinet and if he refused, then
extend the same offer to the Congress. He also suggested that India should be given Dominion
Status immediately and Mountbatten should continue as the Governor General until June
1948.474 Gandhi followed up by writing a letter to the Viceroy on 8 May reiterating what he had
said on 4 May. Some of the important points from his letter are as follows:
Whatever may be said to the contrary, it would be a blunder of first magnitude for
the British to be party in any way whatsoever to the division of India. If it has to
come, let it come after the British withdrawal, as a result of understanding
between the parties or an armed conflict which according to Qaid-e-Azam is
taboo. Protection of minorities can be guaranteed by establishing a court of
arbitration in the event of difference of opinion among the contending parties…I
feel sure that partition of Punjab and Bengal is wrong in every case and a needless
irritant for the League. This as well as all innovations can come after the British
withdrawal not before…475
In that letter, Gandhi argued that the British Paramountcy as regards to the Princes of the
States should pass to the Central Government when the British left India. He said the following:
The intransmissibility of Paramountcy is a vicious doctrine, if it means that they
can become sovereign and a menace for independent India. All the power
wherever exercised by the British in India must automatically descend to the
successor. Thus the people of the States become as much part of independent
India as the people of British India. The present Princes are puppets created or
tolerated for the upkeep and prestige of the British power. The unchecked powers
exercised by them over their people are probably the worst blot on the British
Crown…476
However, Gandhi’s efforts were in vain. The decision regarding partition had been taken
and approved in principle by the Congress Working Committee on 1 May. In that meeting,
Gandhi was present and found to his utter disappointment that no one except Khan Abdul
474
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Ghaffar Khan supported his point of view. Gandhi’s influence in the Congress had declined
substantially. It was no longer what it had been in the 1920s and the 1930s. While he continued
to be revered by the Indian masses, his influence within the Congress Working Committee had
dwindled in the last few years. 477 The leadership inside the Working Committee had slipped
from his hands into his political disciples, Nehru and Patel.478
Although Mountbatten’s mandate from London was to first try his best to preserve the
unity of India, within a few days of his arrival in India, during which he met with several Indian
leaders, he came to realize the impossibility of the task. As early as 31 March, he was ready with
a tentative partition plan, which became ready by the end of April. The main features of the
Partition Plan which Mountbatten presented at his sixth staff meeting on 31 March are:
1. The essence of the plan would be a form of partition with a Central authority
for reserved subjects; this to be an experimental arrangement and to come into
being in the near future.
2. The three units which would be the result of this Partition would be:
a) Hindustan, to include predominantly Hindu provinces.
b) Pakistan, to include predominantly Muslim provinces.
c) The States.
3. Each of these units would be offered a form of Dominion status. In the case of
the States, the larger would be offered this status by themselves; the smaller
would have to combine into units of suitable size.
4. In view of the grant of Pakistan, and on the same principles which justified that
grant, there would be partition of the Punjab and Bengal.
5. The plan would be brought into force in about May 1947, and would run
experimentally until June 1948.
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6. The Central authority, which might be called ‘Central Government’, would deal
only with the reserved subjects of Defense, foreign Affairs, Communications,
Food, and Finance to cover these.
7. The Central Authority, as well as the Hindustan Government, would be situated
in Delhi.
8. Each of the reserved subjects would be dealt with by a Council or Board,
containing representatives from Hindustan, Pakistan, and the States.
9. The Viceroy would continue to have the right of veto on these reserved
subjects.
10. About three months before June 1948, a decision would be made as to
whether or not the Central authority would remain in being after that date.479
In a report sent to London on 17 April, Mountbatten underlined the gravity of the
political situation in India and the urgent need for the British to make a decision soon one way or
the other. Mountbatten applied himself to the finalization of the Partition Plan and it was ready
by the end of April. Nehru and Jinnah were shown the Partition Plan and they did not have any
major objections to the general tenor of the plan except the usual noise typical of Indian
politicians. Lord Ismay, Viceroy’s Chief of Staff carried the plan to London on 2 May.
Meanwhile, Lord Listowel had succeeded Lord Pethick-Lawrence as Secretary of State.
The Viceroy took a short vacation at Simla and Nehru also went there as a guest of
Mountbatten. On 10 May, Mountbatten received a telegram from London which included the
text of the revised plan for transfer of power. The India Committee and the British Cabinet had
made several modifications to Mountbatten’s original plan for partition. The very same night,
Mountbatten gave Nehru a copy of the revised draft and asked him to read it and give his honest
opinion ‘as a friend’ regarding the likelihood of its acceptance by the two parties. Nehru was
very upset after reading the revised plan and wasted no time in communicating to the Viceroy his
479
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strong objections to the plan being proposed. Nehru saw in the document a blueprint for the
balkanization of India into endless units. He put the following in his letter to Mountbatten:
I read the draft proposals you gave me with the care they deserved and with every
desire to absorb them and accept them in so far as I could. But with all the
goodwill in the world I reacted to them very strongly. Indeed they produced a
devastating effect upon me. The relatively simple proposals that we had discussed
now appeared, in the grab that H.M.G. had provided for them, in an entirely new
context which gave them an ominous meaning. The whole approach was
completely different from what ours had been and the picture of India that
emerged frightened me. In fact much that we had done so far was undermined and
the Cabinet Mission’s scheme and subsequent developments were set aside, and
an entirely new picture presented – a picture of fragmentation and conflict and
disorder, and, unhappily also, of a worsening of relations between India and
Britain…480
The most worrisome part of the revised plan for Nehru was the provision that each of the
successor States could conclude independent treaties with His Majesty’s Government. Nehru
thought that it would create many “Ulsters” in India and they would be looked upon as British
bases on Indian soil possibly having British garrisons.481 It looked like a direct invitation, at least
to the major States, to remain as independent kingdoms, presumably as allies or feudatories of
Britain.482 Nehru said that the Congress had agreed to the partition of the country, with Muslim
majority provinces going into Pakistan, but not to a balkanization of rest of the country. Nehru’s
bombshell had a significant effect on Mountbatten. The whole plan was now revised in
consultation with Nehru and V.P. Menon, the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy.
Menon played a key role in the formulation of the new Plan. In fact, he had outlined the
Plan even before the arrival of Mountbatten in India, with close consultation with Sardar Patel.
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The new Plan was not radically different from the Mountbatten Plan. The most important
difference was the provision for immediate transfer of power to the Governments of both India
and Pakistan on the basis of Dominion Status. 483 In Mountbatten’s Plan, power was to be
transferred to two or three or even more sovereign independent states. 484 This would have
delayed the transfer of power until the Constituent Assembly of each state framed a constitution.
Under his Plan, Menon argued, power could be immediately transferred to the two central
Governments once they accepted the Dominion Status.485 Menon added that by staying within
the Commonwealth as Dominions, the two states would enjoy all the perks that came with that
status.
Mountbatten communicated the new Plan to London. Prime Minister Attlee invited him
to London for personal consultations. Before he left for London, Mountbatten met with Nehru,
Jinnah, and Baldev Singh to secure their written acceptance of the Plan. Baldev Singh accepted
the Plan on behalf of the Sikhs and Nehru on behalf of the Congress, on condition that the
League accepted the Plan as a final settlement. Jinnah was prepared to accept the general
principles inherent in the plan, but refused to give his acceptance in writing. He continued to
voice his opposition to the partition of Bengal and Punjab envisioned in the Plan.486 If Bengal
was indeed partitioned, he wanted Calcutta to be made a free port.487 Similarly, if Punjab had to
be partitioned, he demanded that the matter be decided by a referendum.488 He also demanded a
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corridor through Hindustan to connect the two parts of Pakistan in the North-West and the
North-East.489 These demands were vehemently opposed by the Congress.
The Viceroy left for London on 18 May. The Plan was finally approved by the British
Cabinet by the end of May. The Menon-Mountbatten Plan was presented by the Viceroy to the
Indian leaders at the historic conference held on 2 June in Delhi. 490 Nehru, Patel, and J. B.
Kripalani accepted the Plan on behalf of the Congress and Baldev Singh accepted the Plan for
the Sikhs. On 3 June, Jinnah conveyed his approval of the Plan by just a nod of his head. Attlee
announced the Plan in the House of Commons on 3 June, and hence the Plan came to be known
as ‘the June 3rd Plan’. During a Press Conference on 4 June, Mountbatten gave the first informal
indication that 15 August would be the likely date for the actual transfer of power to the two new
Dominions.491 According to Hodson, the 15 August date suddenly appeared as if by accident.492
Once mentioned that date seemed to take root and was never questioned. 493 Mountbatten
believed that the greatest possible speed was needed in order to avoid risk of further riots and
bloodshed. Menon writes in The Transfer of Power in India that the problem of holding together
the Interim Government ‘was one of the considerations that prompted Lord Mountbatten to press
for the transfer of power earlier than the stipulated period.’494
The June 3rd Plan, outlined province by province, how the question of the partition would
be settled. For Bengal and Punjab, the Plan suggested the following procedure:
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The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will each be
asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the
other the rest of the Province. The members of the two parts of each Legislative
Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the
Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favor
of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.
As soon as a decision involving partition has been taken by either Province, a
Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor General…It will be
instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis
of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.
Similar instructions will be given to the Bengal Boundary Commission.495
For the North West Frontier Province, the Plan stipulated that a referendum would be
held there to decide whether the province would join India or Pakistan. 496 The procedure
pertaining to Sind said: ‘The Legislative assembly of Sind will at a special meeting take its own
decision as to whether its constitution should be framed by the existing or, a new and separate
Constituent Assembly.’497 The procedure for Assam was little bit different. Though Assam was
predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet, contiguous to Bengal, was
predominantly Muslim. So the Plan outlined that if Bengal decided in favor of partition, then a
referendum would be held in Sylhet to decide whether the district wanted to remain in Assam or
be part of East Bengal.498
The verdict of the border provinces was secured in less than a month, from 20 June to 17
July.499 In Bengal, the Provincial Legislative Assembly met on 20 June and decided by a 126
votes to 90 in favor of joining Pakistan.500 However, the members from the non-Muslim majority
areas of West Bengal met and decided by 58 votes to 21 that the province should be partitioned
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and that West Bengal should join India.501 The Punjab Legislative Assembly decided by 91 votes
to 77 to join Pakistan. However, the non-Muslim majority of the East Punjab decided by 50 votes
to 22 that the province should be partitioned and East Punjab should join India.502 The Sind
Legislative Assembly met on 26 June and decided by 30 votes to 20 to join Pakistan. 503 A
referendum was held in Sylhet in which majority of voters, 239,619 to 184,041, were in favor of
separation and joining East Pakistan.504 In the North-West Frontier Province only 50 percent of
the electorate voted, of which 289,244 were for Pakistan and 2,874 for India.505 In the absence of
a legislative assembly in Baluchistan the decision was made by members of Quetta
municipality.506 Thus in effect East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West
Frontier Province all voted for Pakistan.507
Attlee, on 4 July, introduced the India Independence Bill in the House of Commons. 508
On 1 July, Churchill had raised objections to it being called ‘Independence Bill’. He said: ‘The
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1. Two independent Dominions, known respectively as India and Pakistan shall be set up
from 15th August, 1947.
2. The territories of the two Dominions are defined in such terms that Pakistan is to
comprise Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP, West Punjab, and East Bengal (The exact
boundaries of the last two would be determined by two Boundary Commissions).
3. For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who shall be
appointed by His Majesty.
4. The jurisdiction of the British Parliament over India will cease from August 15th, 1947,
and the Legislatures of the two Dominions will be free to pass any laws for their
respective Dominions.
5. With effect from 15 August, 1947, H. M. G. will cease to have any responsibility for the
government of British India; and all treaties and agreements between H. M. G. and the
rulers of Indian States or any authority in tribal areas shall lapse.
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essence of the Mountbatten proposals and the only reason why I gave support to them is because
they establish the phase of Dominion status. Dominion status is not the same as independence,
although it may be freely used to establish independence.’509 Churchill, to the very end, remained
an ardent imperialist at heart. The India Committee decided to retain the title of the Bill as they
thought that it would be most acceptable to both Dominions and Indian opinion.510 The bill was
passed within a fortnight on 18 July.
The question as to who should be the first Governor-General of Pakistan was an
interesting one. The India Independence Bill advised a common Governor-General for both
Dominions. Nehru had already requested Mountbatten to continue as the Governor-General of
India until June 1948. However, Jinnah, on 2 July, told Mountbatten that he wanted to become
the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Mountbatten pointed out to Jinnah the advantage of
having a common Governor-General. He told Jinnah that it was the only practicable means of
safeguarding the division of assets, because as the common Governor-General, he would make
sure that an equitable distribution of assets took place between the two Dominions. Jinnah
refused to budge from his position. In his Personal Report No. 11, Mountbatten wrote about
Jinnah, ‘He is suffering from megalomania in its worst form for when I pointed out to him that if
he went as a Constitutional Governor General his powers would be restricted but as Prime
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Minister he really could run Pakistan, he made no bones about the fact that the Prime Minister
would do what he said.’511
The Boundary Commissions were set up in accordance with the 3 June Plan; one to deal
with the partition of Bengal and other to deal with the partition of Punjab. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was
appointed the Chairman of both commissions. The two commissions, each consisting of two
Hindu and two Muslim judges, failed to arrive at an agreed solution.512 Hence the Chairman
Radcliffe took it upon himself to make the final award. He had very limited time to decide on the
boundaries and could only complete his assignment on 9 August, just a few days before the
creation of the two Dominions. The whole process was rushed through in the shortest possible
time.
For West Bengal, the Congress had claimed fifty-nine percent of total area of Bengal and
forty-six percent of the population of the province.513 The Radcliffe award gave only thirty-six
percent of the area and thirty-five percent of the population to West Bengal.514 For East Punjab,
the Muslim League had demanded not only the three complete divisions of Rawalpindi, Multan,
and Lahore, but also a number of tehsils in the Jullundur and Ambala divisions.515 The Radcliffe
award, however, allocated the whole of Jullundur and Ambala divisions, Amritsar district of the
Lahore division, and certain tehsils of Gurdaspur and Lahore districts to East Punjab. About
thirty-eight percent of the area and forty-five percent of the population were assigned to East
Punjab. The Muslim League bitterly resented the loss of those areas from West Punjab. The nonMuslims of the Punjab, especially the Sikhs, were sorely disappointed at the loss of Lahore and
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the canal colonies of Sheikhupura, Lyallpur and Montgomery. 516 As expected, the Radcliffe
award satisfied none of the parties. The Hindus and Muslims both claimed that the award was
unjust, arbitrary, and each side claimed that it had been cheated in an act of shameful partiality.
Mountbatten rightly assumed that the award would not be satisfactory to either party, so he
didn’t make the award public until 17 August in order to avoid any last minute troubles getting in
the way of Independence Day celebrations in the two countries.
One of the consequences of partition was the division of the Indian Armed Forces. It was
decided that the heads of the armed services of the two Dominions should at once be chosen and
start setting up their headquarters, so as to be ready to take over command by 15 August.517 A
Joint Defense Council was set up to divide the armed forces. Lord Mountbatten served as its
Chairman with Defense Ministers of India and Pakistan, and Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck as
its members. 518 Of all the institutions in India, the army was the least communal. The great
majority of battalions and regiments were mixed units, containing Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.519
Of the twenty-three regiments in pre-partition India, only seven consisted exclusively of Hindus,
or Muslims, or Sikhs. 520 The division of the army along religious lines, which Auchinleck
(Commander-in-Chief) had predicted would take between 5 to 10 years, had to be completed in a
matter of months.521 In the midst of the most appalling killings, which were ripping through
North India, and just when a united and neutral army was needed to contain the situation, the
regiments of the Indian army were dismembered.522 Soldiers were divided according to religious
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hue; Muslim soldiers were sent packing from India to Pakistan and non-Muslim soldiers were
dispatched in the opposite direction. 523 After 15 August, Auchinleck served as the Supreme
Commander in the Joint Defense Council until December 1947, when his post was abolished.
The Joint Defense Council continued to serve until 1 April 1948.524
Another big question that remained to be settled before 15 August was the future of the
Indian States. Under the India Independence Bill of 1947, Paramountcy was to lapse on 15
August. The States were allowed to either remain independent or join either India or Pakistan.
There were roughly 600 States which constituted two-fifths of the land of the country.
Approximately, one hundred million people lived in those States. Most of these States were
inhabited by Hindus and situated within or adjoining Indian territory.525 The Congress naturally
expected most of them to accede to India Union. The matter was complicated by Sir Conrad
Corfield, the political advisor to the Viceroy, who began advising the Princes to declare them
independent.526 With this encouragement, the rulers of Travancore, Hyderabad, Bhopal and few
others signaled their intention to become sovereign States after 15 August.527
The Congress was alarmed at the prospect of the balkanization of India. On 25 June,
Nehru’s Interim Government created a State Department to deal with the situation.528 Two days
later, Sardar Patel was put in charge of the department. Patel appointed V. P. Menon as secretary
of the department. Menon evolved a scheme for the integration of the States into the India Union.
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According to that scheme, the rulers were to be asked to accede to India only on three subjects –
External Affairs, Defense, and Communications.
On 25 July, Mountbatten called a Conference of rulers and representatives of the States.
He exhorted them to accede to India Union because of geographical compulsions and common
economic and administrative concerns. He said that under the British rule, the sub-continent had
come under one administration.529 Once the British left, that link would be broken.530 If nothing
could be put in its place, then chaos would follow and the States would be the first to suffer. He
urged the rulers to accede on those three subjects only, which would leave them practically
independent.531 Lord Mountbatten brought his considerable powers of persuasion to bear upon
the Princes.532 Sardar Patel likewise directed his energies to that end. The combined efforts of
Mountbatten, Patel, and Menon paid off handsomely. One by one the Princes signed on the
dotted line, and the only States that had not acceded to either of the Dominions by Independence
Day were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir.533
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Hyderabad’s population was predominantly Hindu but the ruler was Nizam, a Muslim. Nizam
struggled to maintain the independence of his State. When Mountbatten left in June 1948, Indian
forces marched on Hyderabad and Nizam’s forces surrendered and the State was brought into
India Union. The case in Kashmir was exactly the opposite. It had a Hindu ruler but its
population was predominantly Muslim. The Maharaja of Kashmir evaded accession to either
Dominion until October 1947, when tribal levies from Pakistan invaded the State. The Maharaja
acceded to India and the Indian army recaptured major parts of the State. Junagadh’s population
was mostly Hindus. The Muslim ruler of the State acceded to Pakistan. The people of the State
protested the ruler’s decision. The ruler fled to Pakistan and Indian army captured the State in
October 1947.
136

Communal frenzy gripped the people on both sides of the border immediately in the
aftermath of partition. The migration of people from east to west and vice versa across the border
was unprecedented, the likes of which had never been known before in history.534 There were
millions uprooted from their homes under conditions of indescribable horror and misery. 535
Many had to flee their homes in fear of their lives. They had witnessed their near and dear ones
hacked to pieces in front of their own eyes and their homes looted and destroyed. They had no
choice but to seek safety in flight.536 For most of them the future was bleak and uncertain. Durga
Das describes, ‘Both in India and Pakistan, power-hungry politicians were hatching diabolical
plots in their self-interest which involved the disruption of the lives of millions of people on the
greatest and most tragic movement of refugees in history’.537 The fact that Mountbatten chose
not to make the boundary award public until 17 August, two days after the independence and the
partition of India made the situation worse by creating confusion among the people (those in the
border regions) as they still did not know which state they belonged to
When the British decided that India should remain united, they didn’t rule out other
options. British policy towards communalism was ambivalent; it had no clarity. 538 Positive
intervention was needed to preserve the unity of India, including putting down firmly the forces
bent upon dividing the country, which the British chose not to do. They took the easy way out.539
They did not believe that unity could be preserved through force. So, they concentrated most of
their efforts in trying to bring the two parties together, a hopeless endeavor as long as Jinnah
stood firm on his demand for Pakistan. The British were much more concerned about their
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appearance of impartiality than trying to keep India united. It was more important for them to
look good in the eyes of the world than do the right thing. A serious attempt at keeping India
united would have involved identifying with the forces that wanted unity and countering those
who opposed it.540
In an effort to find the quickest and surest way to transfer power and get out of India, the
British were willing to divide the country whether the demand for Pakistan was just or not.
Mountbatten defended his decision to advance the date of transfer of power on the grounds that
unless he did so, the country would descend into chaos. From the British point of view, a hasty
retreat was perhaps the most suitable action, but it proved catastrophic for India. The speed with
which power was transferred has been criticized by many historians. Jalal described it as an
ignominious scuttle. The 72-day timetable, from 3-June to 15-August, for both transfer of power
and division of the country, was to prove disastrous.541 The abdication of responsibility with such
haste was sheer callousness on the part of the British Government. There was a lack of concern
as to what would happen if they left precipitously. The massacre that happened in Punjab was the
final indictment of Mountbatten.542 By delaying to make public the decision of the Boundary
Commission, Mountbatten exacerbated an already tense situation. People in both sides of the
partition were under the illusion that they were in the right side. When truth was known,
pandemonium broke out.
The appointment of Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission was not a
wise choice. He was a total stranger to India.543 He was a man of integrity, legal reputation, and
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wide experience. But for him India was an alien land.544 He had never visited India before and
had no knowledge of its complex sociology, geography of the land, and any of its many
languages. He did not have a rudimentary understanding of the social spread, intermix, and the
realities of the vast land.545 Yet, he was assigned the very complex task of partitioning the land
and that within the shortest possible time imaginable. Nehru and Mountbatten were in a hurry to
get the transfer of power done as soon as possible. Jaswant Singh writes ‘To them, people did not
matter, only speed and power’.546
The main failure of the Congress was its inability to devise a successful plan to integrate
its strategy of anti-imperialism with a strategy to combat communalism.547 Such a combined
strategy would have brought complete success i.e. freedom of India with unity. But the Congress
devoted little attention to this task in the belief that the communal question could wait or would
get resolved in the course of its anti-imperialism struggle.548 There was little intellectual effort to
combat communalism in order to combat it. The policy of the Congress was that of Gandhi’s i.e.
once the British got out of the way, the communal differences would disappear and the Muslim
League would cooperate with the Congress in the governance of the country. When the Congress
finally realized the seriousness of the problem in 1946 it was too late. The overwhelming success
of the Muslim League in the elections and the subsequent disturbances in Calcutta, Noakhali, and
Bihar convinced the Congress of the destructive powers of communalism. They started to have
doubts about keeping India united in the face of this strident communalism. They realized that no
amount of concessions would satisfy Jinnah short of agreeing to his demand for Pakistan. As
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Sucheta Mahajan writes ‘Assertive communalism marching towards nationhood was hardly
likely to be satisfied by concessions such as provincial autonomy and constitutional procedures
like grouping’.549
The first leader in the Congress camp to jump in the bandwagon of partition was Sardar
Patel. He was extremely annoyed and irritated by Jinnah’s constant demand for Pakistan. The
confrontationist posture of the League Members in the Interim Government further convinced
him that it was impossible for the two parties to work together. He found himself frustrated at
every step by the veto put on his proposals by the Finance Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.550 In
sheer anger he decided that there was no other alternative but partition.551 Once Mountbatten
realized that Patel was ready to accept partition, he turned his attention to Nehru.552 Azad writes
‘within a month of Lord Mountbatten’s arrival in India, Jawaharlal, the firm opponent of
partition, had become, if not a supporter, at least acquiescent to the idea.553 Azad suggests that
perhaps Jawaharlal was greatly impressed by Lord Mountbatten, and even greater by the
attractive and friendly temperament of Lady Mountbatten.554 Leonard Mosley held the similar
view that the Viceroy in persuading Nehru had performed the confidence trick of the century.
Nehru and Patel firmly believed that India needed a strong central government in order to
modernize the country, and it would be only possible when the Muslim League was out of the
way. They were willing to give a few small pieces in the north-west and the north-east to
Pakistan in order to have an India with a strong center. So they used the two-nation theory
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propounded by Jinnah against him to cut his dream down to size. Jaswant Singh in his book
suggests that Nehru and Patel picked a day to pass the Partition Resolution in the Congress
Working Committee when two principal opponents of partition, Gandhi and Azad, were absent.
Gandhi was in Bihar in his great healing mission and Azad was away.555
In his first meeting with Mountbatten on 1 April, 1947, Gandhi made his startling
proposal of letting Jinnah be the Prime Minister and form a Government of United India. Gandhi
assumed that his two chief lieutenants in the Congress, Nehru and Patel, would go along with his
proposal. But they rejected Gandhi’s proposal saying that it was impracticable and would never
work. Gandhi thought that by offering the post of Prime Minister to Jinnah, he would forgo his
demand for Pakistan. However, Nehru and Patel had different take on the matter. They feared
that Jinnah would use his new powers to carve out a Pakistan of his liking. So, they disagreed
with their mentor and India lost perhaps the last opportunity to avoid partition. Nehru and Patel
hoped that their strategy to push for the partition of Punjab and Bengal would scare Jinnah into
giving up his demand for Pakistan when he realized that how moth-eaten and unviable the
resulting Pakistan would be. They thought that the new Pakistan would collapse soon and the
provinces which seceded from India would be forced to return to India. However, Jinnah
remained as relentless as ever in his demand for Pakistan, even if it meant a truncated one.
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Conclusion
The case by case study of major events of the decades preceding the partition of India
presented in this thesis demonstrates that the causes of partition were varied and complex. It
shows that there is no one theory or argument that can fully explain the root cause of India’s
partition. The discussions presented in preceding chapters make it amply clear that the blame for
the partition of India cannot be assigned to any one of the players among the three (the British,
the Congress, and the Muslim League) that participated in the drama of India’s partition. The
study proves that the blame for the division of India has to be shared jointly by the three parties
involved. Perhaps, by picking and choosing select events, one could promote a theory or an
argument to assign blame for the partition exclusively to one party or the other. This is exactly
what most historians writing on the subject have done in the past several decades. The current
study takes an objective and non-partisan approach at looking at the issue afresh by examining
all the major events in the ten year period prior to the partition to reach its conclusion.
The 1937 elections raised expectations that the Congress and the Muslim League would
form coalition governments in the provinces. It presented an excellent opportunity for both the
parties to come together and govern the provinces jointly and thereby promote communal amity.
Instead, the Congress decided to go it alone and spurned the League’s proposal to form coalition
governments at the provinces. Success at the elections blinded the Congress leaders to the
dangers of pushing aside the League. The Congress overestimated its own strength and
underestimated the League’s capacity to create trouble. The decision to form single party
cabinets was a serious error in judgment on the part of the Congress which directly contributed to
alienation of the Muslim leaders, even the moderate leaders who were sympathetic to the
nationalist cause.
142

In Bihar and Bombay, the behavior of the Congress in the selection of leaders belied its
claim of being a secular organization. The Congress also blundered in its Muslim Mass Contact
Programme in 1937-8. By trying to reach the rank and file Muslim voters over the heads of
Muslim politicians, it alarmed the Muslim League into action. The Congress Mass Contact
Programme was seen as an attempt to deprive the Muslim politicians of their constituents.
Hence, the League and the village ulema joined hands to repulse it. The pro-Hindu policies of the
Congress governments jarred on Muslim sensibilities. The Wardha Scheme of education, which
glorified Hindu heroes, emphasized Hindi learning, and obliged Muslim students to worship the
portrait of Gandhi, and other such measures, was perceived by the Muslims as an attempt by the
Congress to convert the Muslim children to Hinduism. The hoisting of the Congress flag over
office buildings and the singing of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song in the legislatures deepened the
Muslim suspicion of Congress’s real motives.
The period of the Congress ministries saw intense factional strife and bickering within
the Congress ranks. There was a scramble for jobs and positions of personal advantage. 556
Opportunists and self-seekers began to join the Congress drawn by the lure of association with
the party in power. 557 Gandhi repeatedly lashed out in the columns of Harijan against the
growing misuse of office and creeping corruption in Congress ranks.558 Jinnah saw an excellent
opportunity in the misrule of the Congress ministries. He set out to create an atmosphere of
hatred against the Congress by carrying out intense propaganda. The Muslim League tried its
best to fan the flames of Muslim discontent by publicizing the alleged insolent behavior of the
Congress ministries. The Pirpur and Sharif Reports, published by the League, charged the

556

Chandra et al., India’s Struggle for Independence, 339.
Ibid.
558
Ibid.
557

143

Congress ministries of forcing cow-protection upon Muslims, pushing the use of Hindi over
Urdu, interfering with Muslim worship, and efforts to prevent the Muslims from being elected to
local bodies. Whether or not these allegations were justified, they played into the Muslim fears
of Hindu domination in a Congress raj. Every incident of communal violence was used by the
League as a propaganda weapon against the Congress. Perhaps a coalition government would not
have eliminated communal riots, but at least it would have saddled the Muslim League with
responsibility and prevented it from playing the communal card.
Instead of assuaging the Muslim fears of Hindu domination, Nehru, Prasad and other
Congress leaders acted in a completely nonchalant manner. Rajendra Prasad wrote in India
Divided: ‘The so called atrocities have remained mere allegations which have never been tested
and put to the proof. They have, nevertheless, been a principal plank of the League’s program
and utilized for propaganda purposes.’559 Nehru dismissed the Muslim League as a small upper
class organization with no hold over the Muslim masses. He said he had greater touch with the
Muslim masses than the members of the Muslim League. Nehru failed to grasp the strength of
Muslim unity when provoked by an outside threat. 560 The cry of ‘Islam in danger’ was a
uniquely potent force.
Jinnah realized that he had to strengthen the League in order to avoid political extinction.
During 1937-39 he set out to follow the lead of Gandhi and create a mass party. His efforts at
reorganizing and revitalizing the party paid off handsomely. Within a few months of the
Lucknow Session in 1937, 100,000 new members were recruited in the United Provinces alone.
Powerful provincial leaders like Fazlul Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan agreed to follow the
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League’s policy on all-India questions.561 This was a significant step towards establishing the
League as a ‘third force’.562
The outbreak of war in September 1939 rapidly raised the status of Jinnah and the
Muslim League. Linlithgow saw the growing rift between the two parties as an effective weapon
that the British could use for their advantage. The British wanted India’s cooperation in the war
without conceding too much in return. They viewed the martial Muslim race as more worthwhile
for the war purpose than the party workers and politicians of the Congress. So, Linlithgow
encouraged the League as a useful counterweight to the Congress. When Linlithgow declared
India’s entry into the war without consulting the Indian leaders, the Congress ministries in the
provinces resigned en masse in protest. By resigning from power, the Congress committed a
serious blunder. Linlithgow could now ignore the Congress as it was no more in power. The
Congress lost the power to bargain. The Viceroy now turned to Jinnah for support and
encouraged the League to become a rival to the Congress at all-India level. Jinnah thus
emboldened passed the Pakistan Resolution at the League’s Lahore session in 1940. At this
session, Jinnah propounded the two-nation theory and demanded separate homeland for the
Muslims of India. Interestingly, Linlithgow did not rush to condemn the Lahore Resolution.563
Looking at the three year period from 1937 to 1940, it is obvious that none of the three
players acted in a way that was conducive to promoting cooperation and unity among the Hindus
and Muslims. The Congress as the senior partner had greater responsibility towards building a
coalition with the League. It should have been more accommodating and sensitive towards the
Muslim fears of Hindu domination. Instead it decided to go it alone and followed policies that
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were perceived by the Muslims as detrimental to their interests. Jinnah, for his part, played the
communal card to fan the flames of Muslim discontent. The Pakistan resolution of 1940 was the
most explicit demand for Pakistan by the League. The revisionist historians like Ayesha Jalal
have tried to discount it by asserting that it was just a mere slogan by Jinnah and the Muslim
League to get more power for the Muslims. But it is hard to dismiss a major resolution by the
second most important party in India as a mere slogan. The British, for their part, played the
game of divide and rule as they had done since their arrival in India. Linlithgow saw advantage
in encouraging the separatist tendencies of the Muslim League as a counterpoise to the
nationalism of the Congress. He saw the martial Muslims as more valuable to war efforts than
the Gandhian pacifists.
The British response to Gandhi’s call of ‘Quit India’ was one of severest repression. All
the major leaders of the Congress were arrested and put in jail for a period of three years. By
confining the leaders of the Congress for such a long period, the British Government left the
field wide open for the League to consolidate its position. The reorganization of the League
which had started in 1937 now went ahead with full pace. League’s missionaries went from
village to village canvassing support for the League and promoting the idea of Pakistan. They
promised an economic utopia for the Muslims in the new State. In 1940, the idea of Pakistan was
mere rhetoric, but by 1944, it seemed achievable. The death of Sikander Hyat Khan made it
possible for the League to consolidate its position in Punjab.
The Cripps Mission was another opportunity that the Congress blew up by its all-ornothing attitude. Cripps Proposal was a significant step towards granting India its freedom. It
promised an expanded executive in which all the members would be Indians except the Viceroy
and the War Member. This was almost like a National Government which the Congress had
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demanded. It presented another excellent opportunity for the two parties to come together and
govern the country jointly. The Congress stuck to its demand that the War Member must be an
Indian and rejected the proposal when its demand was not met. The British, in order to appease
the Muslim League, put the opt-out provision for the provinces in the Cripps proposal. By
allowing the provinces to opt-out of Indian union after a certain number of years, the British
conceded the partition of India for the first time. And, this was another reason why the Congress
rejected the Cripps formula. Cripps tried sincerely to accommodate the Congress’s demand, but
his efforts were hindered at every step by hardcore conservatives like Churchill, Amery, and
Linlithgow, who really did not want a labor leader to succeed. For them, the Cripps Mission was
just a propaganda effort to demonstrate to the world that Britain was sincere in her desire to give
India self-governance. The Congress did not believe that Britain and her allies could win the war
against Hitler. It wanted to take advantage of Britain’s weakening position. So, the failure of the
Cripps Mission was due to Congress’s intransigence and Churchill government’s non-committal
approach to it.
As to the failure of Wavell’s Simla Conference, the conclusion is clear cut. Jinnah
insisted that the League was the sole organization representing all the Muslims of India, and
hence, it should have the exclusive right to nominate the Muslim members to the Viceroy’s
Council. This was anathema to the Congress as it would have meant that the Congress had to
forfeit its claim of being a secular party representing all sections of the Indian life. It would have
reduced the stature of the Congress to a purely Hindu body. Moreover, the president of the
Congress Party, Maulana Azad, was himself a highly reputable Muslim scholar. It was
unacceptable to the Congress that it would not be allowed to nominate its president to the
Viceroy’s Council. However, Jinnah did not budge an inch from his demand. Wavell abruptly
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ended the Conference despite the advice he received from his Governors to proceed with his plan
without the League because Jinnah would eventually cave in. The failure of Simla Conference
enhanced Jinnah’s position. By ending the Conference abruptly, Wavell conceded that Jinnah
could dictate his own terms and get away with it too. It gave the League an equal status to the
Congress.
The end of the war saw a change in Britain’s attitude towards India. Britain was no
longer interested in retaining India. World opinion had turned decisively against empire building
and colonialism. Moreover, India had become a burden on the British Empire. The Labor
Government of Clement Attlee was pro-Congress in its outlook. It wanted to transfer power to a
united India as soon as possible. Thus the Cabinet Mission came to India in March 1946 and
stayed there for three months trying to find an agreement on the basis of which power could be
transferred to a united India. The main reason for the failure of the Cabinet Mission was due to
the lack of trust between the Congress and the League. Deep suspicion and mutual hatred of each
other stood in the way of compromise at every stage of the Cabinet Mission negotiations. It was
a clear case of failure of leadership and statesmanship by the leaders of both parties.
The Congress gave too much emphasis on inessential points such as the right to nominate
a Muslim to the Interim Government instead of the larger issue of unity of the country. Even
when it was offered six seats in the Interim Government as opposed to five for the Muslim
League, it rejected the June 16 Statement. The elections held in the winter of 1945-46 had proved
beyond doubt that the Muslim League now commanded the support of overwhelming majority of
Muslims of India. The Congress’s demand to nominate a Muslim member to the Interim
Government was unjustifiable at this point. During the Simla Conference of 1945, the Congress
had put forward a similar demand and it was legitimate at that time. The success of the League
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among the Muslim electorate in 1946 changed the equation. It could now legitimately claim
being the sole representative of the Muslims of India.
Jinnah had compromised on his Pakistan demand by accepting the grouping scheme in
the Cabinet Mission Plan. However, the Congress rejected it objecting to the compulsion clause
in it which forced the provinces to remain within their respective groups. The Congress feared
that if the two groups, one in the north-west and the other in the north-east, decided to secede
from India into a new State of Pakistan, then the entire Punjab in the north-west and whole of
Assam and Bengal in the north-east would be forced into Pakistan. So the Congress never
accepted the May 16 Statement unequivocally. Nehru’s press statement on 10 July, 1946
exacerbated the whole situation. It made Jinnah more suspicious of Congress’s real intentions i.e.
the Congress could do whatever it wanted once the British left India.
The Congress’s real objective was to establish a strong center with its own legislature and
power to raise revenues. In contrast, Jinnah wanted a very weak center with no power to impose
taxes and most powers devolved to the provinces. Basically, Jinnah wanted a center with no
teeth. In his presidential address to the League on 6 June, 1946 Jinnah said that Muslim India
would not rest content until it had established a full, complete and sovereign Pakistan. Jinnah
saw the Cabinet Mission Plan as a stepping stone for achieving his dream of Pakistan. The
Congress was deeply suspicious of Jinnah’s real motives in insisting the compulsion in the
grouping scheme. Jinnah too never trusted the Congress that it would fair play once the British
quit India. In the end, the Cabinet Mission failed because of the deep distrust and mutual
suspicion that existed between the two parties. The leaders of the two parties failed to rise to the
occasion and take the last opportunity to keep India united.
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Jinnah had expected that since the League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in its
entirety and the Congress had not done so, the Viceroy would invite him to form the Interim
Government. However, the Labor Government decided that since the Congress had not rejected
the plan totally, both the parties should jointly form the Interim Government. Jinnah rejected the
offer and Wavell invited Nehru to form the Government. Jinnah was very upset over the whole
affair. When he called for ‘Direct Action’ in retaliation, he had no idea that it would lead to so
much violence resulting in so many deaths and destructions. The Congress took office in
September of 1946 and soon after the League decided to come in. The League joined the Interim
Government with the sole purpose of obstructing it in every possible way from functioning.
Instead of working together to govern the country, the members from the two parties started
wrangling with each other. Thus yet another opportunity was lost at preserving the unity of the
country.
Within a few weeks of his arrival in India, Mountbatten realized that there was little
chance of bringing the two parties together. The ill-feeling and distrust between them had
reached its fever pitch. The communal situation in Punjab and elsewhere in the country was
rapidly deteriorating and was reaching a point where an outbreak of civil war looked like a real
possibility. The British did not want to transfer power to the Congress in order to keep their
appearance of impartiality. In order to transfer power the quickest and surest way, they were
willing to divide the country. Mountbatten justified his decision to partition the country in the
shortest possible time imaginable by saying that unless he did that, the country was likely to
descend into chaos. The 72-day timetable from 3 June to 15 August for carrying out the transfer
of power and partition of a country of India’s size and with a population of 400 million proved
disastrous. Wolpert has argued that Mountbatten was in a hurry to get back to his naval career in
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London and hence rushed the partition through without adequate planning and preparation.
Wolpert’s argument is questionable given the fact that Mountbatten stayed in India as GovernorGeneral for one more year after the partition. If he was in such a hurry to get back to London to
resume his naval career, he would not have continued as the Governor-General for another year.
The reason why Mountbatten rushed the partition was because he believed that unless he did so
the situation in the country would soon develop into a full-scale civil war between the two
warring communities.
The failure of the Congress to prevent partition stemmed from its inability to understand
the threat and danger of communal forces. It devoted little attention to develop a strategy to
combat the communal forces. The Congress leaders, including Gandhi, believed that the
communal rift between the Hindus and the Muslims was a direct result of British presence in
India. Once the British quit India, the communal differences would disappear on its own accord.
When they finally realized the destructive power of communalism in 1946, it was too late. By
that time, Jinnah was in no mood for compromise. The Congress slowly came to realization that
no amount of concessions would satisfy Jinnah except the partition of the country. The first
Congress leader to jump in the bandwagon of partition was Sardar Patel. Nehru was reluctant to
the idea of partition. But Mountbatten was able to change his mind. Leonard Mosley said that by
persuading Nehru to accept partition, Mountbatten had performed the confidence trick of the
century. Mosley has also argued that a little more patience and a refusal to rush into partition
could have prevented partition as Pakistan was one-man achievement of Jinnah, and Jinnah was
dead within a year of Pakistan’s foundation.564 Moseley is mostly right. However, I disagree with
such assessments that hold Jinnah or Mountbatten or the Congress solely responsible for the
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partition of India. As I have argued in this thesis, the partition of India was the product-mix of
actions taken by the three parties involved – the British, the Congress, and Jinnah - over a long
period of time.
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